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Corn east Corp. v. Behrend 
11-864 
Ruling Below: Behrend v. Comcast Corp., 655 F.3d 182 (3rd Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 2012 
WL 113090 (U.S. 2012). 
Customers brought an antitrust class action against Comcast alleging that it harmed a class of 
people consisting of cable subscribers in the Philadelphia region by improperly eliminating 
competition, raising entry barriers to potential competition, and increasing prices at unreasonable 
levels, while depriving subscribers of lower prices that would have come from effective 
competition, in violation of federal anti-trust laws. Plaintiffs asserted that Comcast caused these 
injuries by certain acquisitions and swaps of customers with other providers in the Philadelphia 
region in exchange for customers in other regions. The United States District Comi for the 
Eastern District Pennsylvania celiified class. Comcast appealed. 
Question Presented: Whether a district court may certify a class action without resolving 
whether the plaintiff class has introduced admissible evidence, including expert testimony, to 
show that the case is susceptible to awarding damages on a class-wide basis. 
Caroline BEHREND; Stanford Glaberson; Joan Evanchuk-Kind; Eric Brislawn 
v. 
COMCAST CORPORATION; Comcast Holdings Corporation; Comcast Cable 
Communications, Inc.; Comcast Cablecommunications Holdings, Inc.; Comcast Cable 
Holdings, LLC, Appellants. 
United States Comi of Appeals for the Third Circuit 
Filed on August 23,2011 
[Excerpt: Some footnotes and citations omitted.] 
ALDISERT, Circuit Judge 
For the reasons that follow, we hold that the 
Court did not exceed its permissible 
discretion in determining that Plaintiffs 
established by a preponderance of evidence 
that they would be able to prove through 
common evidence (1) class-wide antitrust 
impact (higher cost on non-basic cable 
programming), and (2) a common 
methodology to quantify damages on a 
class-wide basis. Accordingly, we will 
affirm. 
I. 
A. 
Plaintiffs, SIX non-basic cable television 
programming services customers of 
Comcast, brought a class action antitrust suit 
against Comcast in 2003. They alleged 
violations of section 1 of the Sherman Act, 
15 U.S.C. § 1, for "imposing horizontal 
territory, market and customer allocations by 
conspiring with and entering into and 
implementing unlawful swap agreements, 
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arrangements or devices," and section 2 of 
the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.c. § 2, on theories 
of monopolization and attempted 
monopolization. The Complaint alleged 
anti competitive conduct in the Philadelphia 
area and the Chicago area. As only the 
alleged conduct in Philadelphia is before us, 
we focus on the nature of the class and the 
allegations in Philadelphia. 
The Complaint alleged that Comcast had 
perpetrated an anticompetitive "clustering 
scheme." According to the Complaint, 
Comcast eliminated competition by (1) 
acquiring competitors in the Philadelphia 
market and (2) swapping with competitors 
cable systems and subscribers outside of the 
Philadelphia market for cable systems and 
subscribers within the Philadelphia market. 
The Complaint also alleged that Comcast 
engaged in conduct intended to exclude 
competition from overbuilder RCN Telecom 
Services, Inc. ("RCN"), by denying it access 
to "Comcast Sportsnet," requll'lng 
contractors to enter non-compete 
agreements, and inducing potential 
customers to sign up for long contracts with 
special discounts and penalty provisions in 
the areas where RCN intended to overbuild. 
As a result of its clustering, Comcast 
allegedly harmed the class by eliminating 
competItlOn, ralSlng entry barriers to 
potential competition, maintaining increased 
pnces for cable serVIces at supra-
competItIve levels, and depriving 
subscribers of the lower prices that would 
result from effective competition. 
II. 
... Reviewing a district COlllt's ceitification 
of a class, we examine the elements of the 
class's claims "through the prism" of Rule 
23. The elements of the claims before us are 
(1) a violation of the antitrust laws (here, 
sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act), (2) 
individual Injury resulting from that 
violation, and (3) measurable damages. 
Individual injury, also known as antitrust 
impact, "is critically important for the 
purpose of evaluating Rule 23(b)(3)'s 
predominance requirement because it is an 
element of the claim that may call for 
individual, as opposed to common, proof." 
At the class certification stage, Plaintiffs' 
burden is "to demonstrate that the element 
of antitrust impact is capable of proof at trial 
through evidence that is common to the 
class rather than individual to its members." 
III. 
Comcast devotes much of its energy to 
contending that the District Court exceeded 
its discretion in holding that Plaintiffs had 
established common evidence of antitrust 
impact. 
A. 
We will affirm the District Court's 
conclusion that the Philadelphia Designate 
Market Rea (DMA) is a relevant geographic 
market "susceptible to proof at trial through 
available evidence common to the class." 
264 F.R.D. at 160. 
The relevant geographic market is a 
component of substantive antitrust law. For 
antitrust claims analyzed through the rule of 
reason, plaintiffs must demonstrate that the 
defendant possessed market power in the 
relevant geographic market. For per se 
claims, plaintiffs need not establish a 
geographic market. Additionally, "direct 
proof of monopoly power does not require a 
definition of the relevant market." 
Defining the relevant geographic market, 
however, is an issue of the merits. At the 
class certification stage, a court need only be 
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satisfied that issues-including the 
definition of a geographic market-will be 
capable of proof through evidence common 
to the class. If the plaintiffs allege per se 
claims, they may still need to persuade the 
district court that, in the event defining the 
relevant geographic market becomes 
necessary, it is capable of common proof. 
B. 
First, we perceive no legal error in the 
District Court's reasoning. Procedurally, it 
conducted the required "rigorous analysis" 
by examining in depth the expert opinions 
on both sides and setting forth its 
conclusions. Substantively, the Court 
determined that "the record evidence shows 
that consumers throughout the DMA can 
face similar competitive choices and suffer 
the same alleged antitrust impact resulting 
from Comcast's clustering conduct in the 
Philadelphia DMA." 264 F.R.D. at 160. 
Comcast contends that the Court failed to 
apply the consumer demand substitutability 
test, which defines the relevant geographic 
market as "that area in which a potential 
buyer may rationally look for the goods or 
services he seeks." We determine otherwise: 
the Court's analysis of the relevant 
geographic market for purposes of class 
ce11ification comp0l1ed with our precedent. 
"[IJdentification of the relevant geographic 
market is a matter of analyzing 
competition." Defining it "is a question of 
fact to be detennined in the context of each 
case in acknowledgment of the commercial 
realities of the industry being considered." 
In these decisions of our Court, one of 
which has commanded our attention for 
almost thirty years, we relied on two 
Supreme Court cases to develop this 
standard: United States v. Grinnell Corp., 
384 U.S. 563, 576 (1966), which held that 
the relevant geographic market under the 
Sherman Act was "not the several local 
areas which the individual stations serve, but 
the broader national market that reflects the 
reality of the way in which they built and 
conduct their business," and Tampa Electric 
Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320, 
327, 332 (1961), which defined the relevant 
geographic area for § 3 of the Clayton Act, 
15 U.S.C. § 3, as "the market area in which 
the seller operates, and to which the 
purchaser can practicably turn for supplies" 
or as the area in which suppliers "effectively 
compete." 
c. 
The District Court's determination-that 
consumers "face similar competitive 
choices" in the Philadelphia DMA as a 
result of Comcast's alleged clustering 
conduct-is consistent with the above 
standards because it considers both where a 
buyer may rationally look for goods and the 
commercial reality of the industry. 
Comcast's insistence that the geographic 
market must be the individual household (as 
the only place where a consumer can 
"comparison shop") ignores that the 
geographic market must be "economically 
significant," and may be premised on "the 
commercial realities of the industry being 
considered," the area where suppliers 
"effectively compete" or the broader market 
reflecting the reality of conducting business. 
We therefore discern no legal error in the 
District Court's analysis .... 
E. 
Second, we recognize ample evidence in the 
record supporting the District Court's 
factual findings underpinning its market 
determination, which precludes us from 
reversing those findings as clearly 
erroneous. 
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Simply put, the District Court determined by 
a preponderance of the evidence that, when 
addressed on the merits, the class may be 
able to prove through common evidence that 
the relevant geographic market is the 
Philadelphia DMA. 
IV. 
Comcast hinges its next line of arguments 
on the District Court's final celtification: 
"Proof of antitrust impact relative to such 
claims shall be limited to the theory that 
Comcast engaged in anti competitive 
clustering conduct, the effect of which was 
to deter the entry of overbuilders in the 
Philadelphia DMA." According to Com cast, 
the District COUlt made clearly erroneous 
findings of fact by relying on Plaintiffs' 
expert, Dr. Williams, in support of the 
certified theory of antitrust impact. 
A. 
On appeal, Comcast constructs a four-tiered 
argument to support its objections. First, it 
contends that Plaintiffs cannot show class-
wide antitrust impact based on potential 
overbuilding by any of the "Transaction 
parties." According to Comcast, the 
evidence demonstrated there was no actual 
competition between the Transaction patties; 
Plaintiffs therefore must show that the 
challenged conduct eliminated potential 
competition. Tn Comcast's view, the record 
evidence reflects that no Transaction parties 
had taken any affirmative steps to overbuild 
and, consequently, there was no potential 
competition to eliminate. Second, Comcast 
contends that Plaintiffs identified only RCN 
Telecom Services, Inc., as attempting to 
overbuild in the Philadelphia DMA. The 
evidence establishes, according to Comcast, 
that RCN was not going to overbuild as a 
result of its own financial woes, not as a 
result of any alleged activity on the part of 
Comcast. Third, as the argument goes, 
because there was no record evidence 
demonstrating actual or potential 
competition, the theoretical OpInIOnS 
indicating otherwise rendered by Plaintiffs' 
expert, Dr. Williams, were clearly 
erroneous. Comcast disputes at many levels 
Dr. Williams's methodology and results in 
his "market structure" and "market 
performance" opinions. Fourth, Comcast 
adds that any evidence of anti competitive 
conduct specific to Delaware County could 
not serve as evidence of class-wide impact 
for the Philadelphia cluster. 
B. 
Plaintiffs respond to each level of Comcast's 
position. First, citing many portions of the 
record, they assert that there IS 
"overwhelming" record evidence that 
Comcast's clustering of the Philadelphia 
DMA deterred and reduced overbuilding 
competition, resulting in antitrust impact 
(higher cable prices) for all class members. 
According to the class, the record 
demonstrates: clustering deters overbuilding, 
the swaps and acquisitions eliminated 
competition, Multi-System Operators 
("MSOs") actually do overbuild one 
another, Comcast and other MSOs look to 
one another's prices to set their own, and the 
MSOs chose affirmatively not to compete. 
Second, Plaintiffs contend that Comcast 
raises a merits issue by asking the Court to 
examine whether Comcast's conduct in fact 
prevented RCN from overbuilding in more 
areas than it did. In any event, they state that 
the record evidence demonstrates RCN had 
the intent and capital to overbuild the 
Philadelphia market. Third, Plaintiffs state 
that Dr. Williams's theoretical model plainly 
shows common evidence of class-wide 
impact; Comcast's contention that Dr. 
Williams's opinions do not prove antitrust 
impact is one for the jury to decide on the 
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merits. Fourth, the evidence related to 
Delaware County "adds to and illustrates" 
the common evidence of Comcast's 
anti competitive clustering conduct. 
V. 
We begin the analysis of these contentions 
by focusing on the precise inquiry: 
Plaintiffs' burden at the class 
certification stage is not to prove the 
element of antitrust impact, although 
in order to prevail on the merits each 
class member must do so. Instead, 
the task for plaintiffs at class 
certification is to demonstrate that 
the element of antitrust impact is 
capable of proof at trial through 
evidence that is common to the class 
rather than individual to its members. 
Hydrogen Peroxide, 552 F.3d at 311-312. 
Many of Comcast's contentions ask us to 
reach into the record and detennine whether 
Plaintiffs actually have proven antitrust 
impact. This we will not do. Instead, we 
inquire whether the District Court exceeded 
its discretion by finding that Plaintiffs had 
demonstrated by a preponderance of the 
evidence that they c01lld prove antitrust 
impact through common evidence at trial. 
Comcast has not carried its burden. 
Plaintiffs provided evidence at the 
certification hearing that tended to show that 
Comcast's clustering (through swaps and 
acquisitions) reduced competition, deterred 
the entry of overbuilders, and resulted in 
higher cable prices for the entire class. This 
evidence displays "some hue of credibility" 
and bears a rational relationship to the 
Comi's finding. 
All of this evidence demonstrates that 
Comcast's alleged clustering conduct indeed 
could have reduced competition, raised 
barriers to market entry by an overbuilder, 
and resulted in higher cable prices to all of 
its subscribers in the Philadelphia 
Designated Market Area. Based on this 
evidence, we determine that the antitrust 
impact Plaintiffs allege is "plausible in 
theory" and "susceptible to proof at trial 
through available evidence common to the 
class." 
VI. 
Comcast's other contentions are equally 
unpersuasive. There is conflicting evidence 
as to the role Comcast played in RCN 
Telecom Services, Inc.'s decision to not 
overbuild futiher in the Philadelphia DMA. 
Plaintiffs highlight record evidence that 
RCN had the intent and capital necessary to 
overbuild the Philadelphia market. Comcast 
contends instead that RCN faced financial 
woes, as a result of which it abandoned its 
plans to overbuild. The District Court 
credited Plaintiffs' explanation: "What Dr. 
Teece considers 'unlikely,' Dr. Singer 
considers to be the common evidence of 
antitrust impact, namely that RCN was 
stymied in its efforts by Comcast's 
predatory behavior." Again, we are satisfied 
that the District Court's finding was not 
clearly erroneous. "Where there are two 
permissible views of the evidence, the 
factfinder's choice between them cannot be 
clearly erroneous." 
Similarly, Comcast contends that Dr. 
Williams's analysis and methodology was 
flawed for various reasons, including the 
allegation that it was unsuppOlied by any 
actual evidence. We disagree. As detailed 
above, there was ample evidence that 
clustering conduct can deter entry of 
overbuilders and result in higher cable 
prices. 
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Comcast also asserts that every individual 
had one or two options from which to 
choose cable and that consequently only the 
name of the provider changed, not the 
number of options. This assertion 
completely overlooks the nature of the 
claims of the class: by clustering, Comcast 
was able to deter the entry of overbuilders, 
which resulted in higher prices for all non-
basic Comcast subscribers. And Plaintiffs 
provided evidence that clustering can have 
this effect. 
As to Comcast's remaining contention that 
the District Court erred by crediting as 
evidence of class-wide impact the alleged 
conduct targeted at RCN Telecom Services, 
Inc., in Delaware County, we agree with the 
class that the alleged conduct is relevant to 
establishing class-wide impact. We have 
explained that "courts must look to the 
monopolist's conduct taken as a whole 
rather than considering each aspect in 
isolation."). Alleged specific conduct aimed 
at preventing the entry of an overbuilder 
anywhere in the Philadelphia DMA supports 
Plaintiffs' allegations of Comcast's ability to 
maintain supra-competitive prices for the 
entire market. 
VII. 
At bottom, Comcast misconstrues our role at 
this stage of the litigation. Comcast would 
have us decide on the merits whether there 
was actual or potential competition among 
the Transaction parties, the reason RCN 
Telecom Services, Inc., abandoned the 
Philadelphia market, and whether Plaintiffs' 
experts proved antitrust impact. Weare not 
the jury. Although in Hydrogen Peroxide we 
heightened the inquiry a district court must 
perform on the issue of class certification, 
nothing in that opinion indicated that class 
certification hearings were to become actual 
trials in which factual disputes are to be 
resolved. 
In sum, we hold that the District Court's 
determination-that Plaintiffs have 
demonstrated by a preponderance of the 
evidence that they can establish class-wide 
antitrust impact through common 
evidence-did not exceed its discretion. 
VIII. 
To satisfy another portion of the 
predominance requirement, Plaintiffs must 
establish that the alleged damages are 
capable of measurement on a class-wide 
basis using common proof. 
A. 
The District Court examined the 
methodology, conclusions, and criticisms of 
the experts on both sides, before providing 
its conclusions. Because on appeal Comcast 
renews the arguments it made to the District 
Court, we set f01ih each side's position in 
the District Court and the Comi's response. 
Plaintiffs' damages expert, Dr. McClave, 
concluded that the prices in the Philadelphia 
market were consistently and substantially 
higher than the prices in areas of effective 
competition. His econometric analysis 
demonstrated that the alleged antitrust 
impact was class-wide, because the prices 
were elevated above competitive levels 
across all class members and for the entire 
time period. For his methods, Dr. McClave 
constructed "but-for" prices against which to 
compare the prices Com cast charged in the 
Philadelphia DMA. "But-for" prices are 
those that would have existed absent the 
alleged anti competitive conduct. To 
construct the "but-for" prices, he first 
selected comparable "benchmark" counties 
around the country by applying two 
"screens" to determine whether the counties 
represented a level of competition similar to 
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what Comcast would have faced in the 
Philadelphia market absent its alleged 
anticompetitive conduct. It is impOliant to 
understand these two screens. The first 
screen-the "market share screen" or "40% 
screen"-required that the county have a 
Comcast subscriber penetration rate of less 
than 40%. Dr. McClave chose 40% because 
it represented the approximate midpoint of 
Comcast's penetration rate in the 
Philadelphia DMA (between approximately 
20% in 1998 and 60% from 2003 through 
2008). He chose this number also because it 
allowed for growth during the class period 
but focused on markets where Comcast was 
likely to have less market power than it does 
in the Philadelphia market. The second 
screen-the "Direct Broadcast Satellite 
screen", or "DBS screen"-required that the 
county be in a Designated Market Area 
where the penetration level for Alternative 
Delivery Systems (which essentially 
includes DBS, but also master antenna 
systems and multipoint distribution systems) 
was at or higher than the national average of 
Alternative Delivery Systems penetration 
rates in Comcast markets. Using data from 
the counties that fit the two screens, Dr. 
McClave performed a multiple regression 
analysis to compare actual prices in the 
Philadelphia DMA to the estimated "but-
for" prices. He then applied the overcharge 
percentage to the relevant revenue obtained 
by Comcast for expanded basic service in 
the Philadelphia market during the class 
period to reach a final conservative 
estimated overcharge value: $875,576,662. 
Comcast's experts, Dr. Teece and Dr. 
Tasneem Chipty, contested several parts of 
Dr. McClave's methodology, and questioned 
his results. First, they challenged both 
benchmark screens used by Dr. McClave. 
Regarding the "DBS screen," Dr. Teece 
asserted that Dr. McClave erroneously chose 
the higher national Direct Broadcast 
Satellite penetration rate, instead of the 
lower regional rate predicted by Plaintiffs' 
experts Dr. Singer and Dr. Williams. The 
District Court rejected the critique, stating 
that Dr. McClave "used his national average 
DBS penetration screen as a descriptor of 
typical competitive market conditions," and 
was not attempting to predict the Direct 
Broadcast Satellite penetration rate of the 
Philadelphia DMA Regarding the "market 
share screen," Dr. Chipty contended that 
because Comcast was present in only a few 
counties in 1999, its actual market share was 
much higher in the counties where it was 
and 0% where it was not; as a result, the 
less-than-40% penetration rate provided an 
inappropriate screen. The District COUli 
rejected the criticism as unsuppOlied by the 
record, stating that Dr. Chipty should have 
presented evidentiary data to show that 40% 
was an incorrect midpoint estimate or 
average rate. The Court also noted that the 
40% screen was supported by the evidence 
as Comcast's approximate share of the 
Philadelphia DMA at the midpoint of the 
class period. 
Second, Dr. Chipty faulted Dr. McClave's 
model for failing to consider properly 
demographic variables among the counties: 
specifically, for omitting the variables of 
population density and the number and type 
of households. The District Court credited as 
well-supported Dr. McClave's response as 
to why he omitted population density: it is 
correlated with medium household income 
(which he included) and using it as well as 
household income would create confounding 
and unreliable results. 
Third, Dr. Chipty criticized Dr. McClave's 
model for comparing list prices for 
expanded basic cable in the Philadelphia 
DMA against the benchmark counties. She 
opined that Dr. McClave's model did not 
take into account the significant number of 
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promotions and discounts offered to 
Comcast customers. The Comt rejected Dr. 
Chipty's models as "suffer[ing] significant 
flaws It stated that Dr. McClave's model 
accounted for discount prices in the formula 
(not model) when he multiplied 
anticompetitive overcharge by Comcast's 
relevant revenues. Accordingly, by adding 
discount prices to the model as well, Dr. 
Chipty's model doubly counted the discount. 
Fourth, the District Court rejected Dr. 
Chipty's attempt to impeach Dr. McClave's 
model by using it to calculate damages for 
basic cable prices, instead of expanded basic 
cable. The Court explained that Dr. 
McClave's model aimed to analyze only 
expanded basic cable, because Comcast 
alters its prices at the expanded level, so 
"any application of the McClave model to 
[basic cable prices] explains nothing." 
Comcast does not contest that mling. 
Fifth and finally, the Court asked the pmties 
after the hearing how to interpret Dr. 
McClave's damages model if it credited at 
least one, but not all, of Dr. Williams's four 
theories of antitmst impact. It determined 
that Dr. McClave's damages model was still 
viable, even if it rejected some theories of 
antitmst impact, explaining that Dr. 
McClave selected benchmarks to isolate the 
effect of anticompetitive conduct, and that 
his use of the DBS screen was "entirely 
unrelated" to Dr. Williams's DBS 
foreclosure theory. The Comt concluded that 
Dr. Williams's theories of antitmst impact 
were not relevant to Dr. McClave's methods 
of choosing benchmarks because "[a]ny 
anti competitive conduct is reflected in the 
Philadelphia DMA price, not in the selection 
of the comparison counties." 
B. 
Comcast contends that the District Court 
exceeded its discretion in accepting 
Plaintiffs' proposed damages calculation 
methodology. Its arguments are recast 
verSIOns of those rejected by the District 
Court. 
Plaintiffs remind us that the District Comt 
already thoroughly considered and rebutted 
each of the points that Comcast now raises. 
IX. 
We pause to identify the forest for the trees. 
If allowed to proceed to trial, the class must 
establish that the injury it suffered from the 
violation of the antitmst laws is measurable. 
The usual measure in an overcharge case "is 
the difference between the illegal price that 
was actually charged and the price that 
would have been charged 'but for' the 
violation multiplied by the number of units 
purchased." Given the inherent difficulty of 
identifying a "but-for world," we do not 
require that damages be measured with 
certainty, but rather that they be 
demonstrated as "a matter of just and 
reasonable inference." 
The inquiry for a district court at the class 
certification stage is whether the plaintiffs 
have demonstrated by a preponderance of 
the evidence that they will be able to 
measure damages on a class-wide basis 
using common proof. Some variation of 
damages among class members does not 
defeat certification. Complex and individual 
questions of damages, however, weigh 
against finding predominance 
On appeal, the inquiry narrows. Because the 
District Comt held that Plaintiffs had 
established they could measure damages 
through common proof, we examine 
whether that determination was beyond the 
Comt's discretion. Having identified the 
forest of law, we proceed to scmtinize the 
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timber that Comcast faults as rotted. 
A. 
Comcast contends that Dr. McClave's model 
cannot isolate damages for individual 
theories of harm, and that it therefore cannot 
distinguish between lawful and unlawful 
competition. 
We are not persuaded by Comcast's 
argument. To measure damages, Dr. 
McClave used screens to select and average 
benchmark counties against which to 
compare the actual Philadelphia market. The 
screens themselves were not intended to 
calculate damages, but instead to construct 
an estimated competitive "but-for" 
Philadelphia market (a market absent the 
alleged anti competitive conduct). 
As a result, if the class proves at trial that 
Comcast engaged in anticompetitive 
behavior, it can use the constructed "but-
for" market to measure the anti competitive 
impact on the class members. At the class 
certification stage we do not require that 
Plaintiffs tie each theory of antitmst impact 
to an exact calculation of damages, but 
instead that they assure us that if they can 
prove antitrust impact, the resulting damages 
are capable of measurement and will not 
require labyrinthine individual calculations. 
We are satisfied that Plaintiffs' damages 
model meets this burden. 
B. 
Comcast's remammg arguments contest 
specific parts of Dr. McClave's damages 
methodology. These contentions are a 
renewal of those it made to the District 
Court, each of which the Court rejected. For 
those determinations to be beyond the 
Court's discretion, Comcast must convince 
us that the COUli's acceptance of the pieces 
of Dr. McClave's methodology was clearly 
erroneous. 
At the outset, we agree with the class that 
the heart of Comcast's arguments are attacks 
on the merits of the methodology that have 
no place in the class certification inquiry. 
Even if we were to overrule as clearly 
erroneous the District Court's findings on all 
four contested pieces of Dr. McClave's 
methodology-i.e., modify both of Dr. 
McClave's screens, add population density 
as a variable, and incorporate Dr. Chipty's 
proposed method for calculating discounts-
only the final amount of estimated damages 
would change. Comcast's assertions do not 
impeach the District Court's ultimate 
holding that damages are capable of 
common proof on a class-wide basis. 
x. 
The District Court certified the class for 
resolution of four claims. Comcast contends 
that the District Court erred by celiifying the 
following claim: 
Whether Defendants conspired with 
competitors, and whether Defendants 
entered into and implemented agreements 
with competitors, to allocate markets, 
territories, and customers for cable 
television serVIces; and l-vhether slIch 
cond1lct is a per se violation, or whether it 
constitutes a restraint of trade in violation of 
Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.c. § 1. 
According to Comcast, the District COUli 
lacked any legal authority to celiify a per se 
claim based on the class's allegations. 
This is a merits issue beyond the scope of 
our Rule 23(f) jurisdiction. Comcast 
misconstrues the District Court's 
certification order. The COUli certified the 
class and stated that one of the questions to 
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be litigated is whether there has been a per 
se violation. It did not declare that a per se 
violation had occurred. Appeals taken 
pursuant to Rule 23(f) do not furnish the 
proper vehicle to address the merits of 
Plaintiffs' antitrust claims. Comcast's 
request to have us declare on the merits that 
Plaintiffs cannot establish a per se antitrust 
violation is beyond the scope of the 
certification decision from which Comcast 
appeals pursuant to Rule 23(f). Accordingly, 
we do not reach this contention. 
* * * 
We have considered carefully all the 
contentions presented by the parties. 
Plaintiffs have demonstrated that this case 
can proceed as a class action. Comcast has 
not carried its burden to convince us 
otherwise. Accordingly, we will AFFIRM in 
all respects the District Court's Order 
certifying the class. 
JORDAN, Circuit Judge, concurring in 
the judgment part and dissenting in part. 
I agree with the Majority's conclusion, 
though not its reasoning, with respect to the 
question of antitrust impact, and I therefore 
join in holding that the District Court did not 
abuse its discretion when it determined that 
Plaintiffs could establish antitrust impact 
through evidence common to a class 
comprIsmg Comcast cable television 
customers in the Philadelphia DMA. But 
because I conclude that damages cannot be 
proven using evidence common to that 
entire class, I would vacate the certification 
order to the extent it provides for a single 
class as to proof of damages, and I would 
remand the case to the District Court to 
consider whether the class can be divided 
into subclasses for the purpose of proving 
damages. I therefore respectfully dissent in 
part. 
Much confusion has been caused in this case 
by the conflation of two distinct concepts: 
the antitrust concept of "relevant geographic 
market," which has traditionally been 
defined as the smallest area within which a 
monopolist can exercise market power, and 
the class action concept of a "class 
definition," which gives the parameters of a 
set of plaintiffs as to whom the elements of a 
claim can be proven usmg common 
evidence. Because, in this case, the class 
definition includes a geographic component, 
the term "relevant geographic market" has 
been used equivocally by the parties, the 
District Court, and the Majority to describe 
both the area affected by antitrust impact 
and the area within which potential class 
members reside-the latter area being what I 
will call, for lack of a better term, the "class 
region." The problem with that equivocal 
usage is that the relevant geographic market 
and the class region are not necessarily 
coterminous. Even if we assume that, within 
the Philadelphia DMA, there are many 
distinct geographic markets that are relevant 
for antitrust purposes, as Com cast argues, 
that does not mean that Plaintiffs cannot 
prove, by common evidence, that Comcast's 
acts caused antitrust impact within all of 
them. As a theoretical matter, class proof 
can cover multiple relevant geographic 
markets, and, indeed, other COUl1s of 
Appeals have so held. 
The Majority is correct that defining the 
relevant geographic market is not a task we 
need to undertake at this stage, but that is 
not because the task takes us into the merits. 
It is rather because, regardless of whether 
there are one or many relevant geographic 
markets associated with the Philadelphia 
DMA, the question before us at this juncture 
is whether there is some class, in this case 
defined geographically, that can be shown, 
through common evidence, to have 
experienced elevated prices as a result of 
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reduced overbuilding because of Comcast's 
clustering. 
II. Whether Damages Can Be Proven 
Using Evidence Common to the Class 
I part ways with the Majority entirely when 
it comes to class-wide proof of damages. 
The only evidence supporting Plaintiffs' 
claim that damages can be proven using 
evidence common to the class is the expert 
opinion of Dr. McClave. But, as detailed 
hereafter, Dr. McClave's testimony is 
incapable of identifying any damages caused 
by reduced overbuilding in the Philadelphia 
OMA. Consequently, his testimony is 
irrelevant and should be inadmissible at 
trial, pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 
702 and Daubert v. Merrell Dow 
Pharmace1lticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), 
as lacking fit. Thus, it cannot constitute 
common evidence of damages. 
Our precedent explains that Rule 702 and 
Daubert impose three requirements for 
admission of expert testimony: the expert 
must be qualified, the expert's methodology 
must be reliable, and the expert's proffered 
testimony must fit the particular case. Like 
any relevancy determination, the question of 
fit is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Here, 
Dr. McClave's opinion fails the requirement 
of "fit" because it is disconnected from 
Plaintiffs' only viable theory of antitrust 
impact, i.e., reduced overbuilding, and, thus, 
the proffered expeli testimony cannot help 
the jury determine whether reduced 
overbuilding caused damages. It was, 
consequently, an abuse of discretion for the 
District Court to consider Dr. McClave's 
opinion as demonstrating that damages 
could be proven using evidence common to 
the class. 
A. Dr. McClave's Benchmark Counties 
Do Not Reflect "But For" Conditions in 
the Philadelphia DMA 
To identify his benchmark counties, Dr. 
McClave used three "screens." While those 
screens might, if properly employed, have 
helped identify relevant benchmark counties 
in a case involving antitrust impacts beyond 
limited overbuilding, they fail to identify the 
"but for" conditions that are relevant to what 
is now the only impact of Comcast's 
allegedly anti competitive conduct, namely 
the deterrence of overbuilding. They, 
therefore, cannot help identify damages 
caused by that impact. 
B. Damages Are Not Capable of Being 
Proven By Evidence Common to the 
Entire Class 
Central to Dr. McClave's damages model is 
the conclusion that the price of cable 
television service in any given franchise area 
is affected by the relative market shares of at 
least three entities: overbuilders, OBS 
providers, and incumbent cable providers. 
All else being equal, for example, areas that 
are overbuilt will have lower prices than 
areas that are not overbuilt, and areas with 
high DBS penetration will have lower prices 
than areas with low DBS penetration. For 
that reason, Dr. McClave's model identifies 
benchmark counties by screening for the 
relative market shares of those three entities. 
While I do not accept the manner in which 
Dr. McClave has measured the relative 
shares of those entities in the "but for" 
Philadelphia DMA, I accept the premise that 
the relative shares have significant influence 
on the price of cable television service. 
If price does vary with the changes in 
relative share within a franchise area, 
however, it is hard to see how those 650 
franchise areas can simply be treated as 
average for purposes of proving damages. 
The record indicates that, on the contrary, 
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the "but for" market shares of overbuilders, 
DBS providers, and incumbent providers 
would vary, sometimes significantly, from 
franchise area to franchise area. 
This primary flaw in Dr. McClave's 
methodology-using a single set of 
assumptions for the entire Philadelphia 
DMA-cannot be fixed merely by altering 
his model. It seems to me that no model can 
calculate class-wide damages because any 
damages-such as they may be-are not 
distributed on anything like a similar basis 
throughout the DMA. Rather, where some 
class members might reside in a franchise 
area that would have been 50 percent 
overbuilt for the entire class period and 
other class members might reside in a 
franchise area that would have been only 5 
percent overbuilt and only for a single year, 
or not overbuilt at all, it strains credulity to 
believe that the damages suffered by those 
individuals would all be the same as a result 
of reduced overbuilding. Yet Dr. McClave's 
model treats them as though they are the 
same, as would any model attempting to 
calculate damages on an average class-wide 
basis. 
III. Conclusion 
For the foregoing reasons, I would vacate 
the District Court's certification order to the 
extent it provides for a single class as to 
proof of damages and remand the case for 
the District Court to address whether Dr. 
McClave's model could, in fairness, be 
revised to accurately reflect the conditions 
that would have existed in the Philadelphia 
DMA in the absence of any reduction in 
overbuilding caused by clustering. I would 
further ask the District Court to consider 
whether the class certified for proving 
antitrust impact can be divided into 
appropriate subclasses for purposes of 
proving damages. 
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"Will Daubert Become Part of Class 
Certification Hearings?" 
JDS1Ipra 
July 16,2012 
Kirk Jenkins 
In the closing days of its term, the Supreme 
Court announced that it had granted 
certiorari in Com east Corporation v. 
Behrend, setting up what is certain to be a 
major battle over expert testimony and class 
certification hearings. 
Behrend arises from what appears to be the 
largest certified class in history-more than 
two million former and current subscribers 
to Comcast's cable services in the 
Philadelphia metropolitan area. According 
to the complaint, Com cast violated Sections 
1 and 2 of the Sherman Act by pursuing a 
strategy of anticompetitive clustering-
deliberately buying up cable systems in 
geographic areas where Comcast already has 
a significant foothold while selling or 
trading away cable systems where the 
carrier's holdings were less 
concentrated. According to the plaintiffs, 
Comcast's clustering deterred entry by 
"overbuilders"-companies who 
deliberately enter a market where another 
cable provider is already established. 
Comcast's celi petition in Behrend set the 
case up as a straightforward application of 
the Court's landmark 2011 decision in Wal-
Mart Stores, Inc. v. D1Ikes, where the Court 
announced that class certification is proper 
only if the trial court is satisfied, "after a 
rigorous analysis," that the requirements for 
class certification have been proven-even 
if plaintiffs will be required to prove the 
same propositions again in order to prevail 
on the merits at trial. Dukes was handed 
down against a background of earlier lower 
cOUli holdings applying a lesser standard, 
often certifying classes based only on a 
determination that class representatives 
would likely be able to establish the 
prerequisites for class certification later, at 
trial. These cases took their cue from the 
Supreme Court's apparent bar in Eisen v. 
Carlisle & Jacq1lelin against inquiring into 
the merits at the class certification stage. But 
the Dukes cOUli dispatched Eisen in a 
footnote, dismissing the relevant language as 
"purest dictum." Comcast asked for 
summary reversal in Behrend, arguing that 
the Third Circuit had ignored Dukes and 
resurrected Eisen, disregarding Comcast's 
various merits arguments on a variety of 
Rule 23 issues. 
The Court seems to have been deadlocked 
about what to do with Behrend for several 
weeks, relisting the case from conference to 
conference no less than seven 
times. Ultimately, the justices reached a 
compromise, granting celi on a single 
question: whether a district court could 
certify a class without deciding whether the 
plaintiffs had introduced admissible 
evidence, including expert testimony, to 
show that awarding damages on a class-wide 
basis is practical. In other words, when an 
expert's testimony is crucial to the plaintiffs' 
Rule 23 arguments-which it will generally 
be in antitrust, if not in most class actions-
must the parties and the court have a full-
blown Da1lbert proceeding before a class 
can be certified? 
"We are really expecting this to be the big 
one," Ankur Kapoor of Constantine Cannon 
told the Philadelphia Inquirer after celi was 
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granted. "The legal journals will be writing 
about it for years." Lawyers at Mayer Brown 
LLP agreed, writing that the issue is of 
"extraordinary importance to businesses 
defending themselves against class actions 
of all stripes." Seyfarth Shaw's Workplace 
Class Action blog agreed, writing that the 
opinion in Behrend "could have wide-
ranging impact on class actions, including 
those in the workplace arena." Cozen 
O'Connor's Class Action Defense Review, 
on the other hand, predicted that Behrend 
would not have the profound impact of 
Dukes and the Court's other class action 
landmark of 2011, AT&T Mobility v. 
Concepcion. 
There's no question a Circuit split has 
developed in the years immediately before 
and after Dukes on the question of how to 
handle expert testimony. As the petitioners 
in Behrend pointed out, the Seventh Circuit 
has held at least twice that district cOUlis 
must make a definitive ruling on the 
Da1lbert inquiry at the class celiification 
stage if the plaintiff's compliance with Rule 
23 depends on the admissibility of the 
expeli's testimony-most recently in 
Messner v. Northshore University 
Healthsystem, and earlier in American 
Honda Motor Co. v. Allen. The Ninth 
Circuit endorsed a full-blown Da1lbert 
analysis in Ellis v. Costco Wholesale 
Corp. The Eleventh Circuit agreed in Sher v. 
Raytheon Co., following Allen in an 
unpublished opinion. 
But on the other hand, there is the Eighth 
Circuit's opinion in In re Zurn Pex 
Plumbing Products Liability Litigation, filed 
only two weeks after Dukes. The Eighth 
Circuit failed to take up the Supreme 
COUli's heavy hint in Dukes that Daubert 
was fully applicable to class certification 
hearings, affirming a district 
court's "tailored" determination that expert 
testimony was sufficiently reliable "in light 
of the existing state of the evidence" to 
justify celiifying a class. After all, the 
Eighth Circuit pointed out, class certification 
was "inherently tentative," and a full 
Daubert inquiry could not be justified at 
such an early stage. 
Given the Supreme Court's dicta in Dukes 
and the apparent compromise at the cert 
stage, it seems likely that the Court will 
reject the Eighth Circuit's approach in Zurn 
Pex, as it should. Class certification is a 
crucial stage in class action litigation, 
particularly in antitrust cases. Designing an 
econometric model which reliably predicts 
damages on a classwide basis is an 
enormous challenge and, as the cert petition 
in Behrend observes, "most cases will be on 
the fast track to settlement shortly after class 
certification." Although plaintiffs may press 
for more discovery pre-certification if courts 
are required to conduct full-blown Daubert 
inquiries before certification, this seems like 
a reasonable price to pay in order to defeat 
meritless class actions early. Although some 
have worried that courts which approve 
expert testimony at the certification hearing 
will decline to reconsider at the close of 
discovery, this seems unlikely, given the 
discovery and factual development likely to 
occur in the interim. All in all, Behrend is 
likely to be an important battle at the 
Supreme Court, and a worthy sequel to the 
Court's opinion in D1lkes. 
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"Behrend v. Comcast: 3rd Circuit Affirms Class 
Certification in Antitrust Case" 
LexisNexis Communities 
November 15,2011 
Louis M. Solomon 
Our immediately prior posting addressed the 
issue of how a single case in a multiparty, 
multidistrict litigation raising industry-wide 
antitrust claims was plucked out and sent to 
arbitration. How a plaintiff manages around 
that result is a question not just of 
international litigation practice but for the 
corporate or transactional lawyer/draftsman 
to avoid as well. 
How are antitrust claims faring these days in 
overcoming another major procedural 
hurdle, that of class certification? Behrend, 
et al. v. Comcast Corp., et al., No. 10-2865 
(3d Cir. Aug. 2011), addresses the issue 
extensively. And despite the Supreme 
Court's decision in Waf-Mart Stores, Inc. v. 
Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011), which we 
discussed here, the Third Circuit affirmed 
the District Court's certification decision of 
antitrust claims. 
The claims arise out of alleged series of 
transactions that increased Comcast's share 
of the multichannel video programming 
distribution services offered III the 
Philadelphia area through alleged 
anticompetitive "clustering". After the Third 
Circuit initially denied interlocutory appeal 
(permissible under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 in 
certain cases) [enhanced version], the 
District Court held a four-day evidentiary 
hearing from both fact and expert witnesses, 
considered as part of that 32 expert reports, 
and examined deposition excerpts and 
documents. The challenges on appeal 
centered around whether there was sufficient 
evidence of class-wide antitrust impact, 
whether the damages methodology was 
acceptable, and whether the District Court's 
certification of what the defendants' 
characterized as a per se antitrust claim was 
clear error. The Third Circuit rejected all 
challenges. 
Among other things, the Circuit rejected the 
invitation to decide the merits of the 
litigation, without discussing whether what 
the District Court did was tantamount to that 
trial nonetheless. Admittedly, recent class-
action jurisprudence "heightened the inquiry 
a district cOUli must perform on the issue of 
class certification," nothing III the 
controlling cases requires "actual trials in 
which factual disputes are to be resolved." 
The Court of Appeals differentiated 
requiring plaintiffs to establish the elements 
of certification by a preponderance of the 
evidence from requiring plaintiffs to "prove 
their case at the class certification stage." 
The Court also noted "recent scholarship," 
which "uniformly has expressed concern 
over the trend towards converting 
certification decisions into mini trials." The 
Court did however quote Oliver Wendell 
Holmes's classic comment from The Path of 
the Law, 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457 (1897): "For 
the rational study of the law the black-letter 
man may be the man of the present, but the 
man of the future is the man of statistics and 
the master of economics". 
The Circuit also rejected the suggestion that 
Wal-Mart supported the claim that the 
damages model proffered by plaintiffs' 
expeli could be "safely disregarded". The 
Court of Appeals, without more discussion, 
found that Wal-Mart "involved a massive 
discrimination class action and ... neither 
guides nor governs the dispute before us". 
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"Federal Judge Recertifies Class in Comcast Antitrust Case" 
Law. com Network 
January 19,2010 
Shannon P. Duffy 
A federal judge has once again certified a 
class action antitrust suit against cable 
television giant Comcast Corp., declaring 
that the plaintiffs have succeeded in 
satisfying a new, stricter class action test 
imposed last year by the 3rd U.S. Circuit 
Court of Appeals. 
The suit, Behrend v. Comcast Corp., alleges 
the company set out to establish a monopoly 
in the Philadelphia market in order to 
increase prices once it had eliminated all the 
competition. 
Comcast and its would-be competitors, the 
suit alleges, struck a series of deals in which 
they "swapped" assets and customers so that 
each company would have "clusters" of 
markets. 
In May 2007, U.S. District Judge John R. 
Padova handed down a decision that 
certified a class of Comcast subscribers in 
the 16-county Philadelphia metropolitan 
area, including six Pennsylvania counties, 
two Delaware counties and eight New Jersey 
counties. 
But the legal landscape changed 
significantly in 2008 when the 3rd Circuit 
handed down its ruling in In re Hydrogen 
Peroxide Antitmst Litigation, and a team of 
lawyers for Comcast, led by Darryl May of 
Ballard Spahr, responded by urging Padova 
to vacate his May 2007 ruling. 
Padova agreed and later held a four-day 
hearing that was designed to meet the new, 
more rigorous test for class certification 
required by Hydrogen Peroxide, including, 
in some cases, an inquiry into the expert 
witnesses offered by both sides to determine 
whether the plaintiffs are truly able to meet 
the requirements of Rule 23. 
Now, in an 86-page opinion, Padova has 
certified the case again, but the opinion 
shows that the judge has significantly 
pruned the plaintiffs' theories. 
"Having rigorously analyzed the expert 
reports, as well as the testimony presented 
by the parties during a four-day evidentiary 
hearing, we conclude that the class has met 
its burden to demonstrate that the element of 
antitrust impact is capable of proof at trial 
through evidence that is common to the 
class rather than individual to its members, 
and that there is a common methodology 
available to measure and quantify damages 
on a class-wide basis," Padova wrote. 
Padova once again appointed two firms-
Heins Mills & Olson in Minneapolis and 
Susman Godfrey in Dallas-to serve as co-
lead counsel for the class. 
Comcast is likely to take an immediate 
appeal-a move that could stall the suit, 
which was filed in 2003, for a year or more. 
Under Rule 23(t) of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure, decisions on class 
certification motions are immediately 
subject to discretionary appellate review. 
In his order, Padova defined the class to 
include "all cable television customers who 
subscribe or subscribed at any time from 
December 1, 1999 to the present to video 
programming services (other than solely to 
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basic cable services) from Comcast, or any 
of its subsidiaries or affiliates in Comcast's 
Philadelphia cluster." 
The Philadelphia "cluster" is defined in the 
order to include: Berks, Bucks, Chester, 
Delaware, Montgomery and Philadelphia 
counties in Pennsylvania; Kent and New 
Castle counties in Delaware; and Atlantic, 
Burlington, Camden, Cape May, 
Cumberland, Gloucester, Mercer and Salem 
counties in New Jersey. 
Pad ova also specifically certified four issues 
to be litigated: 
• Whether Comcast conspired with 
competitors and entered into agreements 
with competitors "to allocate markets, 
territories, and customers for cable 
television services," and whether such 
conduct "is a per se violation, or whether it 
constitutes a restraint of trade in violation of 
Section 1 of the Sherman Act." 
• Whether Comcast "unlawfully attempted 
to monopolize, or unlawfully possess and 
willfully acquired or maintained monopoly 
power in, the Philadelphia area cable market 
with respect to cable television services in 
violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act." 
• Whether the actions alleged to violate 
Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act 
"caused prices for cable television services 
in the relevant markets to be atiificially high 
and not competitive." 
• Whether the plaintiffs and members of the 
class were injured by the alleged conduct. 
But, significantly, Padova rejected the 
plaintiffs' theory that Comcast's clustering 
strategy made it profitable for Comcast to 
deny access to its regional spOtis 
programming content, Comcast SportsNet 
(CSN) Philadelphia, to DirecTV and 
EchoStar, its direct broadcast satellite 
competitors, resulting in decreased 
penetration by the satellite providers in the 
Philadelphia market, which, in turn, led to 
increased expanded basic cable prices to all 
class members. 
In the battle of the experts on that point, 
Pad ova said, Comcast was the clear winner 
and demonstrated that the plaintiffs' theory 
was invalid. 
Padova said the plaintiffs' expert "fails to 
recognize that Comcast has maintained its 
policy of distributing CSN Philadelphia only 
to wireline providers of video services since 
launching CSN Philadelphia in 1997, well 
before formation of the Philadelphia 
cluster." 
And the decision not to license the satellite 
providers, Padova noted, "occurred before 
the class period." 
Lead plaintiffs attorney David R. Woodward 
of Heins Mills & Olson did not return calls 
seeking comment. Comcast's lawyer, Darryl 
May of Ballard Spahr, declined to comment. 
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"Squeezing Class Actions" 
SCO TUSb log 
August 30, 2011 
Scott Dodson 
In their prominent Civil Procedure 
casebook, Rick Marcus, Marty Redish, Ed 
Shelman, and Jim Pfander describe the 1966 
amendments to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure as "bring[ing] about great 
changes in class action practice." Those 
amendments were designed with two related 
ideas in mind. First, litigating in bulk could 
save costs for both plaintiffs and defendants, 
and it could be more efficient for courts. 
Second, the cost savings to plaintiffs, 
coupled with expanding the scope of a 
grievance to many different class members, 
could encourage private litigation to enforce 
public ends. The class action, in other 
words, was designed to be a public benefit, 
saving litigant and judicial resources while 
encouraging salutary litigation. 
One wouldn't guess that from reading recent 
Supreme Court decisions. Today, the class 
action is decidedly persona non grata. The 
Supreme Court's 2010 Term in particular 
evinces both skepticism of and hostility to 
class actions. Justice Antonin Scalia was the 
main frontman, writing two major opinions 
restricting class actions and issuing a stay by 
himself in another. 
What intrigues me is that the assault on class 
actions is coming so forcefully from all 
sides. In Waf-Mart Stores Inc. v. Dukes, the 
Court narrowed the availability of Rule 
23(b )(2), with the effect of shuttling many 
discrimination and civil-rights classes into 
the more-difficult-to-sustain mechanism of 
Rule 23(b)(3). D1lkes also enhanced the 
requirement of commonality under Rule 
23(a)(2), which applies to all class actions in 
federal coUti, by holding that a class must 
demonstrate that each class member's claim 
must depend upon a common contention 
capable of class-wide resolution. D1lkes thus 
confronts the federal class-action 
mechanism directly. 
Other cases, however, come at class actions 
from a different angle. In Philip Morris USA 
Inc. v. Scott, Justice Scalia stayed a state-
court class action against several tobacco 
companies on behalf of all Louisiana 
smokers alleging that the companies 
defrauded the plaintiffs by distorting public 
knowledge about the addictive effects of 
nicotine. The Louisiana courts had credited 
the plaintiffs' theory, certified the class 
under state law, and entered a judgment of 
almost $250 million against the defendants. 
Justice Scalia nevertheless stayed the 
judgment until the defendants could seek 
celiiorari in the Supreme Court because, in 
his view, the Louisiana coUtis had used the 
class-action device to eliminate the 
defendants' opportunity to contest the 
element of reliance on an individualized 
basis. Justice Scalia reasoned that such an 
effect implicated constitutional due-process 
concerns. Scott, then, reflects one Justice's 
invocation of the federal Due Process Clause 
to constrain state class-action relief. 
In AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, the 
CoUti held that the Federal Arbitration Act 
prohibits states from conditioning the 
enforceability of certain arbitration 
agreements on the availability of class-wide 
arbitration procedures. By lifting state 
regulation, the decision enables private 
parties to restrict class procedures under the 
aegis of the FAA. In effect, Concepcion 
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permits "even encourages" defendants, 
through private arbitration agreements, to 
eliminate the class mechanism altogether. 
Class actions have been under attack for 
some time, but usually on their own terms, 
and with some apologies by the Supreme 
Court, as in the famous class-action cases of 
General Telephone Co. v. Falcon, Amchem 
Prod1lcts, Inc. v. Windsor, and Ortiz v. 
Fibreboard Corp. But this Term's assault 
comes from all sides: directly narrowing 
Rule 23, imposing federal constraints on 
state class-action mechanisms, and 
encouraging the privatization of procedure. 
And the pervading tenor of the Court's 
opinions suggests that class actions ought to 
be disfavored and used only in rare cases. 
These features of the COUli's agenda lead 
me to make three observations. 
First, and most obviously, the Court's 
decisions probably will reduce the numbers 
and scope of class actions in both state and 
federal court. As analogous support, 
consider the effect of the Supreme Court's 
Amchem and Ortiz decisions from 1997 and 
1999, respectively. These decisions 
narrowed the scope of Rule 23(b)(3) and 
overturned class settlements of asbestos-
related claims. One might reasonably expect 
the numbers of mass-tort class-action cases 
to fall in the wake of Amchem and Ortiz. 
That seems to have happened; a recent study 
by Brian Fitzpatrick found that of the 688 
federal class settlements in 2006 and 2007, 
almost none was a mass tmi case. If 
Amchem and Ortiz had such an impact on 
mass-tOli classes, consider what kind of an 
impact last Term's Wal-Mart decision will 
have on all federal class actions. 
To compound the effect, state courts and 
class-arbitration agreements are no longer 
safe havens for plaintiffs who fear a new 
restrictiveness in federal courts. The Class 
Action Fairness Act of 2005 reduces the 
number of potential classes that can dodge 
removal to federal court. For those classes 
that properly remain in state court, Scott 
presages greater federal oversight of state 
procedures. And for those classes that the 
law undeniably allows, Concepcion permits 
defendants broad leeway to contract around 
those laws through arbitration agreements. 
Ultimately, the effect on class actions is an 
empirical question, but even in the absence 
of data, it is not a stretch to wonder if we are 
hearing the death knell of the class action. 
Second, the Court's recent class-action 
decisions coincide with a shift in procedure 
theory from liberality to restrictiveness. Bob 
Bone once called for more procedure theory, 
and perhaps the Supreme COUli is 
responding to that call. If so, the class-action 
decisions, with their anti-class sentiments, 
support what Ben Spencer has observed as a 
new "restrictive ethos" of civil procedure 
that elevates efficiency over court access. 
Third, the Supreme Court is charting this 
course on its own. Although it routinely 
enteliains proposals and conducts studies, 
the Rules Advisory Committee has not 
seriously tinkered with Rule 23, and its basic 
structure remains identical to its original 
1966 form. Congress rarely intervenes in 
federal procedure, and although it did pass 
the Class Action Fairness Act to expand the 
removability of state class actions, it did not 
purport to change the standards for class 
certification in state or federal court or 
otherwise constrict the availability of the 
class mechanism overall. Others, such as 
Steve Burbank, Kevin Clermont, Arthur 
Miller, and Steve Yeazell, have criticized 
the Court for failing to defer to the 
rulemakers and to Congress in other areas of 
civil practice. Whether their criticisms apply 
to the Court's recent class-action decisions I 
leave to others to pursue; I mean here to 
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point out that the Court's class-action 
decisions may be part of a broader mistrust 
in the rulemaking and legislative processes 
to solve perceived problems with civil 
litigation. 
Whatever one thinks of the Court's agenda 
from a normative perspective, we ought to 
be aware of how its decisions affect the 
direction of procedure. In a narrow sense, 
decisions like Waf-Mart and Concepcion 
can be seen as part of a recent trend cabining 
the use of class mechanisms. But in a 
broader doctrinal context, they may signify a 
macro shift in procedural theory toward 
efficiency, with system-wide doctrinal 
implications. And in a structural context, 
they may reveal a new role for the Supreme 
Court in civil-procedure development as 
leader, rather than as follower. 
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"Comcast Settles, May Avoid Supreme Court" 
The National Law J01lrnal 
July 27,2012 
Tony Mauro 
Next term's big class-action case before the 
Supreme Court is Comcast Corp. v. 
Behrend, set for argument on Nov. 5, one 
day before Election Day. 
The justices are expected to decide whether 
a district court can certify a class without 
delving into the merits and determining 
whether there is enough admissible evidence 
to show that class-wide damages could be 
awarded. 
Whether the case will still be on the docket 
in November is an open question and 
depends on the status of a possible 
settlement in the underlying antitrust dispute 
between Comcast and 2 million of its 
Philadelphia-area subscribers. 
Twelve days before the Supreme COUli 
granted review in the case, paliies for both 
sides informed a district cOUli judge in 
Philadelphia on June 13 that they "have 
reached a tentative agreement to resolve." 
According to a recent story in The Legal 
Intelligencer, a sibling publication to The 
National Law J01lrnal and Daily Report, 
plaintiffs attorneys say the Supreme COUli 
case could be moot, though the settlement 
has not been approved by the judge. 
Plaintiffs also told the district cOUli that 
Com cast lawyers should have informed the 
Supreme Court about the settlement. 
Miguel Estrada, lead counsel for Comcast 
before the Supreme Court, said III a 
statement, "the case is not moot." 
The Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher patineI' 
added, "I have no reason to believe that the 
case will, or should, be dismissed before or 
after argument." 
Estrada also insisted, "nothing has occurred 
that would warrant any filing with the 
Supreme Court, before certiorari was 
granted or since." He added, "Plaintiffs have 
filed a motion in district court trying to head 
off Supreme Court review, but we have 
opposed that motion." Barry Barnett of 
Susman Godfrey in Dallas, the counsel of 
record for the plaintiffs before the Supreme 
Court, declined comment. 
Alleged anti-competitive transactions by 
Com cast to increase its hold on multichannel 
video programming in the Philadelphia area 
are at the center of the class action. 
The complaint, brought by a group of 
Comcast subscribers, alleged the company 
engaged in an unlawful "clustering scheme" 
through business deals to eliminate 
competition and deprive customers of lower 
prices. 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third 
Circuit last summer upheld class 
certification after declining to consider the 
merits at the certification stage. The court 
certified a plaintiffs' class of all cable 
television customers who subscribe or 
subscribed to Com cast, beginning in 
December 1999, other than solely basic 
cable services. 
Invoking last year's Supreme Court ruling in 
Wal-Mart v. D1Ikes as well as Rule 23 of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governing 
class actions, Judge Ruggero Aldisert wrote, 
"the factual and legal underpinnings of Wal-
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Mart-which involved a maSSIve 
discrimination class action and different 
sections of Rule 23-are clearly distinct 
from those of this case. Wal-Mart, therefore, 
neither guides nor governs the dispute 
before us." 
In his petition to the high comi, Estrada, 
who is co-chair of the firm's appellate and 
constitutional law practice group, said the 
case presents the high court the chance to 
resolve "an issue of great significance" in 
class-action litigation. 
"[I]t would further allow the Court to 
continue its long-standing practice of 
ensuring that lower courts apply procedural 
rules, including Rule 23, with appropriate 
rigor," Estrada wrote. 
Helgi Walker, who has represented Comcast 
in other high-profile cases but is not 
involved in the Supreme Court litigation, 
said the dispute tests whether the high 
court's decision in Waf-Mart will stick. 
Walker is co-chair of the appellate practice 
at Wiley Rein. 
"In Waf-Mart, Justice [Antonin] Scalia said 
evaluation of class certification requires a 
rigorous analysis that may often overlap 
with the merits of the case," Walker said this 
week. "But in the Comcast matter, the Third 
Circuit said, 'We can't engage in an inquiry 
under Rule 23 that goes to the merits. '" 
Walker said she thinks Wal-Mart will 
control how Comeast is resolved in the high 
court and that the Third Circuit will be 
reversed. "I think the American business 
interest community would be suppOliive of 
Comcast's position," she said. 
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Amgen v. Connecticut Retirement Plans and Trust Funds 
11-1085 
Ruling Below: Connectic1lt Retirement Plans & Trust F1lnds v. Amgen, Inc., 660 F.3d 1170 (9th 
Cir. 2011), cert granted, 2012 WL 692881 (U.S. 2012). 
On behalf of purchasers of Amgen stock, Connecticut Retirement Plans & Trust Funds brought a 
securities fraud class action regarding Amgen's misrepresentations from 2004 to 2007 about the 
safety of anemia drugs Aranesp and Epogen, which inflated the price of Amgen's stock. Under 
Section 1O(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b), a plaintiff must show that 
reliance on the alleged misrepresentation is common to the class to obtain class certification in a 
misrepresentation action. The district court granted class-celiification in this action and held that 
Connecticut Retirement Plans & Trust Funds could invoke the fraud-on-the-market theory, with 
rebuttal of that presumption being held for trial. The COUli of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
affirmed, holding that at the time of class-celiification, the plaintiff in a securities fraud class 
action invoking the fraud-on-the-market presumption "need only allege materiality with 
sufficient plausibility to withstand a 12(b)(6) motion." 
Question Presented: (1) Whether, in a misrepresentation case under Securities and Exchange 
Commission Rule 10b-5, the district court must require proof of materiality before celiifying a 
plaintiff class based on the fraud-on-the-market theory; and (2) whether, in such a case, the 
district court must allow the defendant to present evidence rebutting the applicability of the 
fraud-on-the-market theory before certifying a plaintiff class based on that theory. (Breyer, 1., 
recused) 
CONNECTICUT RETIREMENT PLANS AND TRUST FUNDS, Plaintiff-Appellee, 
v. 
AMGEN INC.; Kevin W. Sharer; Richard D. Nanula; Roger M. Perlmutter; George W. 
Morrow, Defendants-Appellants. 
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
Decided November 8, 2011 
[Excerpt; some footnotes and citations omitted.] 
SILVERMAN, Circuit Judge 
To obtain class certification III a 10b-5 
securities fraud case, the plaintiff, as 
required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
23(b )(3), must convince the district court 
that the element of reliance is common to 
the class. The Supreme COUli has held that 
this can be done in an appropriate case by 
invoking the "fraud-on-the-market" 
presumption-the principle that the market 
price of a security traded in an efficient 
market reflects all public information and 
therefore that a buyer of the security is 
presumed to have relied on the truthfulness 
of that information in purchasing the 
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security. Were it not for the fraud-on-the-
market presumption, a plaintiff seeking class 
certification would be required to show the 
impossible-reliance by each individual 
prospective class member who bought the 
stock. 
What must a plaintiff do to invoke the fraud-
on-the-market presumption in aid of class 
certification? Today we join the Third and 
Seventh Circuits in holding that the plaintiff 
must (l) show that the security in question 
was traded in an efficient market (a fact 
conceded here), and (2) show that the 
alleged misrepresentations were public (a 
fact not contested here). As for the element 
of materiality, the plaintiff must plausibly 
allege-but need not prove at this 
juncture-that the claimed 
misrepresentations were material. Proof of 
materiality, like all other elements of a lOb-
s claim, is a merits issue that abides the trial 
or motion for summary judgment. Likewise, 
rebuttal of the fraud-on-the-market 
presumption, at least by showing that the 
alleged misrepresentations were not 
material, is a matter for trial or summary 
judgment, not a matter to be taken up in a 
class certification motion. 
In this case, the plaintiff plausibly alleged 
that several of the defendants' public 
statements about Amgen's pharmaceutical 
products were false and material. Coupled 
with the concession that Amgen's stock 
traded in an efficient market, this was 
sufficient to invoke the fraud-on-the-market 
presumption of reliance. The district court 
did not abuse its discretion in certifying the 
class. 
I. Background 
Connecticut Retirement Plans and Trust 
Funds brought this securities fraud action 
against biotechnology company Amgen Inc. 
and several of its officers, alleging that, by 
misstating and failing to disclose safety 
information about two Amgen products used 
to treat anemia (a red blood cell deficiency), 
they violated Sections 1 O(b) and 20( a) of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, IS U.S.C. 
§§ 78j(b), 78t(a), and Rule 10b-S, 17 C.F.R. 
§ 240.1 Ob-S. 
The complaint alleges four actionable 
misstatements. First, Amgen supposedly 
downplayed the FDA's safety concerns 
about its products in advance of an FDA 
meeting with a group of oncologists. 
Second, Amgen allegedly concealed details 
about a clinical trial that was canceled over 
concerns that Amgen's product exacerbated 
tumor growth in a small number of patients. 
Third, Amgen purportedly exaggerated the 
onlabel (that is, for FDA-approved uses) 
safety of its products. And fOUl1h, Amgen 
allegedly misrepresented its marketing 
practices, claiming that it promoted its 
products solely for onlabel uses when it in 
fact promoted significant off-label usage, in 
violation of federal drug branding statutes. 
Those alleged misstatements and omissions, 
according to the complaint, inflated the price 
of Amgen's stock when Connecticut 
Retirement purchased it. Later, corrective 
disclosures allegedly caused Amgen's stock 
prIce to fall, InjUrIng Connecticut 
Retirement. 
II. The District Court's Class 
Certification Order 
Connecticut Retirement moved In the 
district court to certify the action as a class 
action under Federal Rule ofCivii Procedure 
23(b )(3) on behalf of all purchasers of 
Amgen stock between the date of the alleged 
misstatements and omissions and the date of 
the corrective disclosures. Rule 23(b )(3) 
permits a party to maintain a class action if 
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the Rule 23(a) prerequisites are satisfied and 
"the court finds that the questions of law or 
fact common to class members predominate 
over any questions affecting only individual 
members, and that a class action is superior 
to other available methods for fairly and 
efficiently adjudicating the controversy." 
Fed.R.Civ.P.23(b)(3). 
The district cOUli found that the Rule 23(a) 
prerequisites were satisfied and that 
common questions predominated. Of the 
elements of a claim under Section 1 O(b) and 
Rule 10b-5, the district cOUli found that the 
following questions were common to the 
class: whether Amgen made false 
statements, whether those statements were 
material, whether those statements were 
connected with the sale of securities, 
whether those statements were intentionally 
false, and whether those statements caused 
the class members' losses. The district court 
fmiher found that although the class 
members' losses differed depending on 
when and how much they bought, the losses 
would be simple to calculate. 
The district comi also ruled that the 
remaining element-reliance-was common 
to the class because the class could avail 
itself of the fraud-on-the-market 
presumption of reliance. That doctrine, first 
approved by the Supreme Court in Basic 
Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988), rests 
on the efficient capital market hypothesis: 
The price of a stock traded in an efficient 
market fully reflects all publicly available 
information about the company and its 
business. See 485 U.S. at 241-42, 244-45, 
246-47. If the stock price did not reflect a 
piece of publicly available information, the 
logic goes, then investors would have a 
strong incentive to buy the stock (if the 
information were positive) or sell it (if 
negative); in an efficient market, that 
activity would drive the stock price up or 
down until it fully reflected the information. 
Anyone who buys stock at the prevailing 
market price is presumed to have relied on 
that price-and, by extension, each piece of 
publicly available information it reflects-as 
a measure of the stock's value, even if the 
investor never saw that information. See id. 
at 247. Thus, the fraud-on-the-market 
presumption is a way to prove reliance-a 
causal link from the defendant's 
misrepresentation, reflected in the prevailing 
market price, to each class member's 
decision to buy the stock. The presumption, 
however, is rebuttable-for example, by 
showing that the market was already aware 
of the truth behind the defendant's supposed 
falsehoods and thus that those falsehoods 
did not affect the market price (the so-called 
"truth-on-the-market" defense), or by 
showing that a particular plaintiff would 
have bought the stock without relying on the 
integrity of the market price. See Basic, 485 
U.S. at 248-49. 
The district cOUli ruled that Connecticut 
Retirement successfully invoked the fraud-
on-the-market presumption by showing that 
Amgen's stock traded in an efficient market 
(which Amgen conceded) and that the 
alleged misstatements were public (which 
Amgen did not contest). The district court 
fUliher held that at the class certification 
stage, Connecticut Retirement did not need 
to prove-but rather could merely allege-
that Amgen's supposed falsehoods were 
material to invoke the fraud-on-the-market 
presumption. Materiality would, of course, 
have to be proven at trial. 
Moreover, the district cOUli declined to 
afford Amgen an opportunity to rebut the 
presumption of reliance at the class 
certification stage, holding again that 
rebuttal of the presumption was a trial issue. 
Amgen's proposed rebuttal consisted of 
evidence purportedly showing that the truth 
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behind each of the supposed misstatements 
had already entered the market by the time 
the misstatements were made. Amgen 
argued that the misstatements therefore 
could not have affected Amgen's stock 
price, or, by extension, anyone relying on 
the integrity of that stock price. 
Having found that the Rule 23(a) 
prerequisites were satisfied and that 
common questions predominated, the 
district court certified the action as a class 
action under Rule 23(b )(3). 
III. Amgen's Interlocutory Appeal 
We granted Amgen's Rule 23(f) request for 
permission to appeal the district comi's class 
certification order. See Chamberlan v. Ford 
Motor Co., 402 F.3d 952, 959 (9th Cir. 
2005). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1292(e). 
IV. Analysis 
A. Connecticut Retirement's Motion to 
Vacate Grant of Permission to Appeal 
At the outset, Connecticut Retirement moves 
to vacate our grant of permission to appeal 
the certification order, arguing that the 
central issue in this appeal has been settled 
by three cases decided since the district 
comi certified the class: United Steel, Paper 
& Forestry, R1Ibber, Man1lfact1lring Energy, 
Allied Ind1lstrial & Service Workers 
International Union v. ConocoPhillips Co., 
593 F.3d 802 (9th Cir. 2010), D1Ikes v. Wal-
Mart Stores, Inc., 603 F.3d 571 (9th Cir. 
2010) (en banc), rev'd, _ U.S. _, 131 
S.Ct. 2541, 180 L.Ed.2d 374 (2011), and 
Miller v. Thane International, Inc., 615 F.3d 
1095 (9th Cir. 2010). But neither United 
Steel Workers nor D1Ikes was a securities 
fraud case, and thus neither had occasion to 
decide whether a securities fraud plaintiff 
must prove materiality to avail herself of the 
fraud-on-the-market presumption of 
reliance. See United Steel, 593 F.3d at 804 
(state law wage and hour claim); D1Ikes, 131 
S.Ct. at 2547 (sex discrimination claim). 
And Miller had no occasion to decide the 
question either, because that case was 
brought under a securities fraud statute 
that-unlike Section 1 O(b) here-does not 
require the plaintiff to show reliance. See 
Miller, 615 F.3d at 1102 n. 2. Accordingly, 
because the question remains unsettled, we 
deny Connecticut Retirement's motion. 
B. Elements That Must Be Proved at the 
Class Certification Stage to Invoke the 
Fraud-on-the-Market Presumption of 
Reliance 
We review a district court's class 
celiification order for abuse of discretion, 
and any error of law on which a celiification 
order rests is deemed a per se abuse of 
discretion. See United Steel, 593 F.3d at 
807; Yokoyama v. Midland Nat'! Life his. 
Co., 594 F.3d 1087, 1090-91 (9th Cir. 
2010). 
As the party seeking class certification, 
Connecticut Retirement "bears the burden of 
demonstrating that the requirements of 
Rules 23(a) and (b) are met." See United 
Steel, 593 F.3d at 807. And the district court 
facing a class certification motion is 
required to conduct "a rigorous analysis" to 
ensure that the Rule 23 requirements are 
satisfied. Gen. Tel. Co. of Sw. v. Falcon, 457 
U.S. 147, 161 (1982). 
Amgen argues that Connecticut Retirement 
failed to carry that burden because it did rot 
prove that Amgen's supposedly false 
statements were material. If those 
misrepresentations were immaterial, Amgen 
contends, they by definition would not affect 
Amgen's stock price in an efficient market, 
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and thus no buyer could claim to have been 
misled by an artificially inflated stock price. 
Thus, Amgen concludes, each individual 
plaintiff would be left to prove reliance at 
trial individually-making a class 
proceeding unwieldy. 
The problem with that argument is that, 
because materiality is an element of the 
merits of their securities fraud claim, the 
plaintiffs cannot both fail to prove 
materiality yet still have a viable claim for 
which they would need to prove reliance 
individually. See Dura Pharm., Inc. v. 
Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 341 (2005). If the 
misrepresentations turn out to be material, 
then the fraud-on-the-market presumption 
makes the reliance issue common to the 
class, and class treatment is appropriate. But 
if the misrepresentations turn out to be 
immaterial, then every plaintiffs claim fails 
on the merits (materiality being a standalone 
merits element), and there would be no need 
for a trial on each plaintiffs individual 
reliance. Either way, the plaintiffs' claims 
stand or fall together - the critical question 
in the Rule 23 inquiry. As the Supreme 
Court said in Dukes, 
"[ w ]hat matters to class certification 
. . . is not the raising of common 
'questions'-even in droves - but, 
rather the capacity of a classwide 
proceeding to generate common 
answers apt to drive the resolution of 
the litigation. Dissimilarities within 
the proposed class are what have the 
potential to impede the generation of 
common answers." 
131 S. Ct. at 25 51 (quoting Richard A. 
Nagareda, Class Certification in the Age of 
Aggregate Proof, 84 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 97, 132 
(2009)). 
By contrast, the elements of the fraud- on 
the-market presumption-whether the 
securities market was efficient and whether 
the defendant's purpolied falsehoods were 
public-are not elements of the merits of a 
securities fraud claim. See D1Ira Pharm., 
544 U.S. at 341-42. Thus, if the plaintiffs 
failed to prove those elements, they could 
not use the fraud-on-the-market 
presumption, but their claims would not be 
dead on arrival; they could seek to prove 
reliance individually. That scenario, 
however, would be inappropriate for a class 
proceeding. Accordingly, the district court 
was correct to require Connecticut 
Retirement to prove at the class certification 
stage that the market for Amgen's stock was 
efficient and that Amgen's supposed 
misstatements were public. (Because those 
elements were uncontested, we need not 
decide the applicable standard of proof for 
proving those elements at the class 
certification stage.) 
The Seventh Circuit, recently faced with this 
same issue, held that proving materiality is 
not a precondition to invoking the fraud-on-
the-market presumption at the class 
certification stage: 
Defendants say that, before 
certifying a class, a cOUli must 
determine whether false statements 
materially affected the price. But 
whether statements were false, or 
whether the effects were large 
enough to be called material, are 
questions on the merits. Although we 
concluded in [a prior case] that a 
comi may take a peek at the merits 
before celiifying a class, [we] 
insisted that this peek be limited to 
those aspects of the merits that affect 
the decisions essential under Rule 
23. If something about "the merits" 
also shows that individual questions 
predominate over common ones, 
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then certification may be 
inappropriate. Falsehood and 
materiality affect investors alike, 
however. It is possible to celiify a 
class under Rule 23(b )(3) even 
though all statements turn out to 
have only trivial effects on stock 
prices. CeIiification is appropriate, 
but the class wi11lose on the merits. 
Schleicher v. Wendt, 618 F.3d 679, 685 (7th 
Cir. 2010). The Third Circuit agrees. See In 
re DVI, Inc. Sec. Litig., 639 F.3d 623, 631 
(3d Cir. 2011) ("To invoke the fraud-on-the-
market presumption of reliance, plaintiffs 
must show they traded shares in an efficient 
market, and the misrepresentation at Issue 
became public") (citations omitted). 
The three circuits that require a plaintiff to 
prove materiality at the class certification 
stage do so on the apparent rationale that a 
footnote in Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 
224 (1988), compels it. See id. at 248 n. 27, 
108 S.Ct. 978 ("The COUli of Appeals held 
that in order to invoke the presumption, a 
plaintiff must allege and prove ... that the 
misrepresentations were material. ... "); see 
also In re Salomon Analyst Metromedia 
Litig., 544 F.3d 474, 481 (2d Cir. 2008) 
("The Basic Court thereby set f01ih a test of 
general applicability that where a defendant 
has (1) publicly made (2) a material 
misrepresentation (3) about stock traded on 
an impersonal, well-developed (i.e., 
efficient) market, investors' reliance on 
those misrepresentations may be 
presumed.") (citing Basic, 485 u.s. at 248 n. 
27); Oscar Private Eq1lity Invs. v. Allegiance 
Telecom, Inc., 487 F.3d 261, 264 (5th Cir. 
2007) ("The Supreme Court in Basic 
adopted this presumption of reliance. . . . 
Reliance is presumed if the plaintiffs can 
show that '(1) the defendant made public 
material misrepresentations. . . . "') (citation 
omitted), abrogated on other gro1lnds by 
Erica P. John Fund, 131 S.Ct. at 2183, 
2186; In re PolyMedica Corp. Sec. Litig., 
432 F.3d 1, 8 n. 11 (1 st Cir. 2005) (noting in 
a dictum that to invoke fraud-on-the-market 
presumption at class certification stage, 
plaintiff must prove materiality) (quoting 
Basic, 485 U.S. at 248 n. 27,108 S.Ct. 978). 
But as the Seventh Circuit pointed out, those 
circuits misread the Basic footnote: "All 
note 27 [in Basic] does ... is state that the 
cOUli of appeals deemed materiality 
essential; the Justices did not adopt it as a 
precondition to class certification." See 
Schleicher, 618 F.3d at 687; see also Basic, 
485 U.S. at 248 n. 27. That reading of Basic 
also enjoys support from the Supreme 
Court's more recent formulations of the 
presumption in Erica P. John F1lnd and 
Dukes, which require the plaintiff to show 
that the stock was traded in an efficient 
market but do not mention materiality as a 
requirement. See Erica P. John Fund v. 
Halliburton, 131 S.Ct. 2179, 2185 (2011); 
Dukes, 131 S.Ct. at 2552 n. 6. 
Moreover, two Ninth Circuit cases have 
mentioned materiality as an element of the 
presumption, but neither squarely held that a 
plaintiff must prove materiality at the class 
ceIiification stage. See Binder v. Gillespie, 
184 F .3d 1059, 1064 (9th Cir. 1999) (noting 
that "the presumption of reliance is available 
only when a plaintiff alleges that a 
defendant made material misrepresentations 
or omissions concerning a security that is 
actively traded in an 'efficient market,'" but 
holding that presumption did not apply 
because market was not efficient); Blackie v. 
Barrack, 524 F .2d 891, 900-01 & n. 17, 
905-08 (9th Cir. 1975) (holding, in pre-
Basic case, that complaint's allegation of 
materiality sufficed to trigger presumption). 
In sum, because proof of materiality is not 
necessary to ensure that the question of 
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reliance is common among all prospective 
class members' securities fraud claims, we 
hold that plaintiffs need not prove 
materiality to avail themselves of the fraud-
on-the-market presumption of reliance at the 
class certification stage. They need only 
allege materiality with sufficient plausibility 
to withstand a 12(b)(6) motion. See Ashcroft 
v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). 
C. Opportunity to Rebut the Presumption 
at the Class Certification Stage 
Amgen also argues that the district court 
erred by not affording it an opportunity to 
rebut the fraud-on-the-market presumption 
at the class certification stage. Specifically, 
Amgen sought to introduce evidence that 
FDA announcements and analyst reports 
about Amgen's business publicized the truth 
about the safety issues looming over 
Amgen's drugs, and thus that Amgen's 
alleged misrepresentations could not have 
affected the stock price-the so-called 
"truth-on-the-market" defense. See, e.g., 
Basic, 485 U.S. at 248-49 ("[I]f, despite 
[defendants'] allegedly fraudulent attempt to 
manipulate market price, [the truth] credibly 
entered the market and dissipated the effects 
of the misstatements, those who traded . . . 
after the corrective statements would have 
no direct or indirect connection with the 
fraud."). 
But as the Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit 
have explained, the truth-on-the-market 
defense is a method of refuting an alleged 
misrepresentation's materiality. See, e.g., 
Va. Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 501 U.S. 
1083, 1097-98 (1991); Provenz v. Miller, 
102 F.3d 1478, 1492 (9th Cir. 1996). As 
explained above, a plaintiff need not prove 
materiality at the class certification stage to 
invoke the presumption; materiality is a 
merits issue to be reached at trial or by 
summary judgment motion if the facts are 
uncontested. The only elements a plaintiff 
must prove at the class certification stage are 
whether the market for the stock was 
efficient and whether the alleged 
misrepresentations were public-issues that 
Amgen does not contest here. 
Thus, the district court correctly refused to 
consider Amgen's truth-on-the-market 
defense at the class certification stage. 
AFFIRMED. 
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"High Court to Hear Amgen Challenge" 
The Wall Street Journal 
June 11,2012 
Brett Kendall 
The U.S. Supreme COUli said Monday it will 
consider Amgen lnc.'s challenge to a 
securities lawsuit alleging the biotech 
company played down safety concerns about 
two drugs used to treat anemia. 
The suit, brought by Connecticut pension 
funds on behalf of purchasers of Amgen 
stock, alleged the Thousand Oaks, Calif., 
company repeatedly reassured investors 
about the safety of anti-anemia drugs 
Aranesp and Epogen even as clinical trial 
data raised concerns that the drugs could 
harm cancer patients who were taking them. 
Amgen's statements led to inflated share 
prices, the suit alleged. 
The lawsuit alleged the misrepresentations 
took place from April 2004 through May 10, 
2007, a day when Amgen's shares dropped 
more than 9% after a Food and Drug 
Administration panel expressed concerns 
about the drugs and recommended new 
limits on patient use. 
Amgen is seeking to oveliurn a lower-court 
ruling that certified the lawsuit to proceed as 
a class action. The company said the 
plaintiffs couldn't show that the alleged 
misrepresentations had a material effect on 
the price of Amgen shares. The market had 
readily available access to the safety 
information that Amgen allegedly played 
down, the company said. 
At issue before the Supreme Court is 
whether securities plaintiffs, before being 
allowed to proceed with a class-action 
lawsuit, have to demonstrate that a 
company's alleged misrepresentations 
materially affected share prices. 
Amgen argued that companies need to be 
able to defeat weak lawsuits at early stages 
of the proceedings. Otherwise, companies 
will feel financial pressures to settle cases 
even when they think they have a strong 
defense, Amgen said. 
The case is Amgen v. Connecticut 
Retirement Plans and Trust Funds, 11-
1085. The Supreme Court is expected to 
hear oral arguments in the fall. 
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"Amgen May Face Trial for Allegedly Fudging Info" 
Courthouse NeHls Service 
November 8, 2011 
Tim Hull 
Stockholders can move ahead with a class 
action alleging that the biotechnology 
company Amgen inflated its stock price by 
misstating and withholding safety 
information about its anemia drugs, the 9th 
Circuit ruled Tuesday. 
While Amgen promoted its products, the 
U.S. Food and Drug Administration had 
concerns, according to the consolidated 
securities-fraud action filed by Connecticut 
Retirement Plans and Trust Funds and other 
investors. Amgen allegedly hid the true 
nature of these concerns and "concealed 
details about a clinical trial that was 
canceled over concerns that Amgen's 
product exacerbated tumor growth in a small 
number of patients," according to the court's 
description of the case. 
Investors also claim that Amgen 
misrepresented the on-label safety of the 
drugs and "promoted significant off-label 
usage, in violation of federal drug branding 
statutes. " 
The investors moved for federal class status 
in Los Angeles, arguing that Amgen's 
alleged misstatements and omissions had 
inflated the company's stock price and cost 
them money. 
U.S. District Judge Philip Gutierrez found 
the allegations sufficient, and the plaintiffs 
sufficiently linked, to certify the class. 
Specifically, he found that the plaintiffs had 
reliance in common based on the "fraud-on-
the-market" presumption: "the principle that 
the market price of a security traded in an 
efficient market reflects all public 
information and therefore that a buyer of the 
security is presumed to have relied on the 
truthfulness of that information In 
purchasing the security," according to the 
ruling. 
The 9th Circuit agreed in an interlocutory 
appeal, affirming the lower comi and 
rejecting Amgen's call for proof of 
materiality rather than mere plausible 
allegations among the class. 
"Plaintiffs need not prove materiality to 
avail themselves of the fraud-on-the-market 
presumption of reliance at the class 
certification stage," Judge Barry Silverman 
wrote for the unanimous, three-judge panel 
in Pasadena. "They need only allege 
materiality with sufficient plausibility." 
Silverman added that the proposed class had 
"plausibly alleged that several of the 
defendants' public statements about 
Amgen's pharmaceutical products were 
false and material." 
"Coupled with the concession that Amgen's 
stock traded in an efficient market," he 
wrote, "this was sufficient to invoke the 
fraud-on-the-market presumption of 
reliance. " 
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"Amgen Gets Supreme Court Review 
of Stock Fraud Lawsuit" 
Bloomberg 
June 11,2012 
Bob Drummond 
The U.S. Supreme COUli will decide 
whether investors must prove that 
misinformation from Amgen (AMGN) Inc. 
propped up its stock price before they can 
pursue a class-action stock-fraud suit against 
the world's largest biotechnology company. 
The justices today agreed to review an 
appeal by Amgen in a case alleging the 
company and its executives misled investors 
for more than three years about safety 
questions involving its Aranesp and Epogen 
anemia drugs. 
Amgen says a federal appeals court ruling 
makes it too easy to mount class-action 
lawsuits representing thousands of people, 
pressuring companies to pay settlements for 
even frivolous allegations rather than risk 
huge damages in a trial. Amgen's appeal is 
backed by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce 
and the pharmaceutical industry's trade 
group. 
"Securities class actions are almost always 
settled once a class is certified, because the 
risks to a defendant of going to trial are so 
substantial," a group of law professors and 
former Securities and Exchange 
Commission members said III a brief 
suppOliing Amgen's bid for a Supreme 
COUli hearing. 
All sides agree that the investors alleging 
securities fraud must, at some point, show 
that misrepresentations by Amgen had an 
effect on its share price. 
The company says judges should resolve 
disputes about the relevance of misleading 
information before letting multiple investors 
band together in a class-action suit. The San 
Francisco-based 9th U.S. Circuit Court of 
Appeals disagreed, saying that, if a case 
meets other requirements for class-action 
status, evidence about the effect on share 
price must wait for the trial itself. 
'Enormous Sums' 
Because the potential cost of class-action 
lawsuits is so large, Amgen said companies 
will "frequently be forced, by practical 
realities, to settle cases for enormous sums" 
before trial. They may never get a chance to 
prove that allegedly misleading statements 
were irrelevant, the Thousand Oaks, 
California-based company said. 
The 9th Circuit's ruling acknowledged that 
other federal appeals courts have conflicting 
VieWS. 
A New York-based federal cOUli has said 
investors must show that misleading 
information affected stock prices before a 
judge can allow a class-action suit. An 
appeals cOUli in Philadelphia doesn't require 
investors to show the effect on share price at 
that point, although it has said a company 
can defeat a request for class-action status 
by proving that alleged wrongdoing had no 
impact on trading. 
Class-Action Rules 
In a case last year about the standards for 
granting class- action status, the Supreme 
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Court sided with investors, lUling 
unanimously that they could sue Halliburton 
Co. (HAL) as a group without first showing 
that they lost money because of alleged 
fraud. 
Investors, led by Connecticut's public 
employee pension plans, allege that Amgen 
executives withheld or played down safety 
concerns, including questions about whether 
its anemia drugs contributed to growth of 
cancerous tumors. Amgen says it didn't 
mislead investors, and that information 
about drug-safety questions was widely 
known and was reflected in Amgen's share 
pnce. 
The justices will hear arguments in the case 
during the term that begins in October. 
The case is Amgen v. Connecticut 
Retirement Plans and Trust Funds, 11-
1085. 
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"Solving a Circuit Splitter: Amgen 
in the High Court" 
The National Law Review 
July 3, 2012 
Robert A. Horowitz 
Must a plaintiff in a securities fraud class 
action prove that the alleged 
misrepresentations or omissions are material 
in order to obtain class celiification? That is 
the issue the US. Supreme Court agreed to 
consider when it granted certiorari in 
Connecticut Retirement Plans and Trust 
Funds v. Amgen, 660 F.3d 1170 (9th Cir. 
2011), celio granted, _ US. _, (June 11, 
2012). 
In Amgen, the Ninth Circuit held that 
materiality is not an issue at the class 
certification stage-a plaintiff can rely on 
the fraud-on-the-market presumption to 
demonstrate that reliance is a common issue 
simply by proving that there is an efficient 
market for the security at issue and the 
misrepresentation was pUblic. The court 
observed that materiality is a merits issue to 
be addressed in a motion for summary 
judgment or at trial, not at the class 
certification stage. Amgen, 660 F.3d at 1177. 
In light of this holding, the cOUli also 
rejected Amgen's argument that it should be 
permitted an opportunity to rebut the fraud-
on-the-market presumption to defeat class 
certification by pointing to evidence that the 
tmth already was published to the market so 
the alleged misrepresentations could not 
have affected the stock price because this so 
called "tmth-on-the-market" defense is a 
method of refuting an alleged 
misrepresentation's materiality. Id. 
With this holding, the Ninth Circuit joined 
the Seventh Circuit (Schleicher V. Wendt, 
618 F.3d 679, 685 (7th Cir. 2010)) and the 
Third Circuit (In re DVI, Inc. Sec. Lit., 639 
F.3d 623,631 (3d Cir. 2011)). Three circuits 
disagree: the Second Circuit (1n re 
SalomonAnalyst Metromedia Litig., 544 
F.3d 474, 481 (2d Cir. 2008)), the Fifth 
Circuit (OscarPrivate Equity Invs. V. 
Allegiance Telecom Inc., 487 F.3d 261, 264 
(5th Cir. 2007)), and the First Circuit (1n re 
PolyMedica Corp. Sec. Litig., 432 F.3d 1, 8 
n. 11 (1 st Cir. 2005). 
The Ninth Circuit noted that its conclusion 
(and that of the Seventh Circuit) "enjoys 
suppOli from the Supreme Court's more 
recent formulations of the presumption in 
Erica P. John Fund and Dukes, which 
require the plaintiff to show that the stock 
was traded in an efficient market but do not 
mention materiality as a requirement." 
Amgen at 1176. 
However, Erica P. John Fund Inc. V. 
Halliburton, 563 U.S. _, 131 S. Ct. 1179 
(2011), does not support the Ninth Circuit's 
conclusion and, in fact, suggests a contrary 
conclusion. In Halliburton, the Supreme 
Court held that a plaintiff need not prove 
loss causation to obtain class certification in 
a securities fraud class action. It noted that 
reliance is a common element if the plaintiff 
can rely on the fraud-on-the-market 
presumption and the presumption does not 
require a showing of loss causation. "Loss 
causation addresses a matter different from 
whether an investor relied on a 
misrepresentation presumptively or 
otherwise, when buying or selling a stock." 
Id. at2186. 
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However, the court reiterated that the fraud-
on-the-market theory applies only with 
regard to "material misrepresentations." 
Quoting from its opinion in Basic v. 
Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, the Supreme COUli 
stated in Hal1iburton: "According to [the 
fraud-on-the-market theory], 'the market 
price of shares reflects all publicly available 
information, and, hence, any material 
misrepresentations." Id. at 2185. 
The court described as "Basic's fundamental 
premise" "that an investor presumptively 
relies on a misrepresentation so long as it 
was reflected in the market price at the time 
of his transaction." Id. at 2186. As Basic 
made clear, the market price reflects all 
material representations. Thus, for the fraud-
on-the-market presumption to apply, a 
plaintiff should be required to prove that the 
alleged misrepresentation is material. 
In Halliburton, the defendant argued that 
while the Fifth Circuit in Amgen held that 
plaintiff was required to prove loss causation 
to obtain class celiification, what the Fifth 
Circuit really meant was that plaintiff was 
required to prove that the alleged 
misrepresentation affected the market price, 
i.e., that the misrepresentation was material. 
The Supreme Court elected not to address 
the issue: "While the opinion below may 
include some language consistent with a 
'price impact' approach ... , we simply 
cannot ignore the COUli of Appeals' 
repeated and explicit references to 'loss 
causation,' [citations omitted]. Whatever 
Halliburton thinks the Court of Appeals 
meant to say, what it said was loss 
causation .... We take the Court of Appeals 
at its word. Based on those words, the 
decision cannot stand." Id. at 2187. 
Thus, while the Supreme Court ill 
Halliburton agreed with the Second Circuit's 
holding in Salomon Analyst Metromedia 
that the plaintiff is not required to prove loss 
causation at the class certification stage, it 
did not address the Second Circuit's holding 
that the plaintiff has the burden to establish 
that the alleged misrepresentations were 
material in order to invoke the fraud-on-the-
market presumption. 
In Salomon Analyst Metromedia, the Second 
Circuit held that the plaintiff seeking class 
certification could satisfy its burden to prove 
materiality without showing a market price 
reaction by demonstrating under the test first 
enunciated in TSC Ind1ls. Inc. v. Northway 
Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976), "a 
substantial likelihood that the alleged 
misrepresentations and omissions would 
have been viewed by a reasonable investor 
as having significantly altered the 'total mix' 
of information available." 
The Second Circuit held this was sufficient 
to make a threshold showing that the 
misrepresentations were material, but that 
defendants would have to be afforded an 
opportunity before class certification to 
demonstrate that the misrepresentations 
were not material, which the defendants 
could do by showing that "the allegedly 
false or misleading material statements did 
not measurably impact the market price of 
the security." Id. at 486 n.9. 
In Oscar v. Allegiance, 487 F.3d 262, 264 
(5th Cir. 2007), the Fifth Circuit went 
fUliher, holding that plaintiff has the burden 
to prove that the alleged misrepresentation 
"actually moved the market." However, the 
Oscar cOUli's holding was based on its 
requirement that the plaintiff must prove 
loss causation to invoke the fraud-on-the-
market presumption. Id. at 265. As 
discussed above, that rationale was 
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undermined by the Supreme Court's 
rejection of the loss causation requirement in 
Halliburton. 
Conclusion 
The fraud-on-the-market presumption 
applies where the defendant publicly makes 
a material misrepresentation about a stock 
traded in an efficient market. Therefore, to 
take advantage of the fraud-on-the-market 
presumption to obtain class certification, a 
plaintiff should be required to prove that the 
alleged misrepresentation is material. 
Moreover, although not required to prove 
loss causation, a plaintiff should be required 
to show that the alleged misrepresentation 
actually impacted the stock price. Requiring 
a plaintiff to demonstrate an impact on the 
stock price would provide a much needed 
bright line test as to whether the alleged 
misrepresentation is in fact material, and 
therefore whether the case should proceed as 
a class action. 
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Nike, Inc. v. Already, LLC 
11-982 
Ruling Below: Nike, Inc. v. Already, LLC, 663 F.3d 89 (2d Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 2012 WL 
425184 (U.S. 2012). 
In July 2009, Nike, the producer of Air Force 1 sneakers, sued Already, the producer of YUMS 
shoes, alleging trademark infringement, false designation of origin, unfair competition, and 
trademark dilution. Already denied infringement and filed a counterclaim challenging validity of 
Nike's mark registration. In March 2010, Nike delivered a "Covenant Not to Sue" (the 
"Covenant") to Already and moved to dismiss its complaint with prejudice and then dismiss 
Already's counterclaim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The U.S. District Court for the 
Southern District of New York proceeded to dismiss Nike's claim with prejudice and dismiss 
Already's counterclaims without prejudice, finding that the court no longer had jurisdiction over 
the counterclaim. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's order, 
finding that after Nike's Covenant Not to Sue, there was no longer a live controversy upon which 
the court could find jurisdiction. 
Question Presented: Whether a federal district court is divested of Article III jurisdiction over 
a party's challenge to the validity of a federally registered trademark if the registrant promises 
not to assert its mark against the party's then-existing commercial activities. 
NIKE, INC., Plaintiff-Counter-Defendant-Appellee, 
v. 
ALREADY, LLC d/b/a Yums, Defendant-Counter-Claimant-Appellant. 
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
Decided December 10,2011 
[Excerpt; some footnotes and citations omitted.] 
LOHIER, Circuit Judge 
This appeal requires us to decide whether a 
trademark registrant's delivery of a covenant 
not to sue, and voluntmy dismissal of its 
trademark claims, divests a federal court of 
subject matter jurisdiction over a 
defendant's counterclaims for a declaratory 
judgment and cancellation of the 
trademark's registration. After considering 
the breadth of the plaintiffs covenant not to 
sue and the improbability of future 
infringement, the United States District 
Court for the Southern District of New York 
(Richard J. Sullivan, 1.) dismissed the 
defendant's counterclaims because no case 
or controversy existed under Article III of 
the United States Constitution. We affirm. 
BACKGROUND 
1. The Complaint and Counterclaims 
In July 2009, plaintiff Nike, Inc. filed a 
300 
complaint against defendant Already, LLC 
d/b/a Yums ("Yums"), alleging trademark 
infringement, false designation of origin, 
unfair competition, and trademark dilution 
in violation of 15 U.S.C. §§ 
1114(1), 1125( a), and 1125( c), and related 
claims under New York common law and 
New Yode General Business Law § 360. 
According to the complaint, in 1982, Nike 
designed a shoe called the Air Force 1, 
which it has since produced in more than 
1,700 color combinations, selling millions of 
pairs each year. The complaint alleged that 
the Air Force 1 shoe has a distinctive 
appearance for which Nike owns several 
federal trademark registrations, including 
U.S. Trademark Registration Number 
3,451,905, registered with the United States 
Patent and Trademark Office on June 24, 
2008 (hereinafter the "'905 Registration"), 
for "the design of the stitching on the 
exterior of the shoe, the design of the 
material panels that form the exterior body 
of the shoe, the design of the wavy panel on 
the top of the shoe that encompasses the 
eyelets for the shoe laces, the design of the 
vertical ridge pattern on the sides of the sole 
of the shoe, and the relative position of these 
elements to each other." Compl. ~ 11 
(quoting the '905 Registration). It further 
alleged that Yums was selling "footwear 
bearing a confusingly similar imitation" of 
the Air Force 1 shoe, including shoes known 
as Sugar and Soulja Boy.ld. at ~~ 14-15. 
In November 2009, Yums filed counter-
claims for a declaratory judgment that the 
'905 Registration was not in fact a 
"trademark" under 15 U.S.C. § 1127 or New 
York law, and for cancellation of the '905 
Registration pursuant to the cancellation 
provisions of the Lanham Act,15 U.S.C. § 
1119. Yums also alleged that an "actual 
controversy" existed regarding whether 
Yums had infringed any rights Nike had in 
the purported trademark. 
2. The Covenant Not To Sue 
In March 2010, Nike delivered a "Covenant 
Not to Sue" (the "Covenant") to Yums. The 
Covenant's preamble stated as follows: 
NIKE has recently learned that 
[Yums]'s actions complained of in 
the Complaint no longer infringe or 
dilute the NIKE Mark at a level 
sufficient to warrant the substantial 
time and expense of continued 
litigation and NIKE wishes to 
conserve resources relating to its 
enforcement of the NIKE Mark. 
The Covenant obligated Nike as follows: 
to refrain from making any claim(s) 
or demand(s), or from commencing, 
causing, or permitting to be 
prosecuted any action in law or 
equity, against [Yums] or any of its 
[successors or related entities and 
their customers], on account of any 
possible cause of action based on or 
involving trademark infringement, 
unfair competition, or dilution, under 
state or federal law in the United 
Sates [sic] relating to the NIKE Mark 
based on the appearance of any of 
[Yums]'s current and/or previous 
footwear product designs, and any 
colorable imitations thereof, 
regardless of whether that foot-wear 
is produced, distributed, offered for 
sale, adveliised, sold, or otherwise 
used in commerce before or after the 
Effective Date of this Covenant. 
3. The District Court Proceedings and 
Decision 
In April 2010, a month after Nike delivered 
the Covenant, the District COUli held a 
hearing to determine whether the Covenant 
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divested it of subject matter jurisdiction over 
Yums's counterclaims. Although Nike 
conceded during the hearing that it would be 
bound by the Covenant even if Yums 
became a competitive threat, Yums argued 
that a case or controversy persisted because 
Nike's litigation-and the '905 Registration 
itself-constituted a "continuing libel" 
against Yums by making it appear that 
Yums had infringed and continued to 
infringe Nike's trademark. In the course of 
its argument, Yums acknowledged that it 
had not previously sought to cancel the '905 
Registration, which had been filed nearly 
two years earlier. 
After the hearing, Nike moved pursuant to 
Rule 12(b)(l) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure to dismiss Yums's counter-claims 
without prejudice on the ground that the 
District Court lacked subject matter 
jurisdiction. Nike also moved to dismiss its 
own claims voluntarily and with prejudice, 
pursuant to Rule 41(a)(2). 
In response, Yums argued that Nike's claims 
should be dismissed with prejudice by 
summary judgment under Rule 56(b) rather 
than Rule 41 (a)(2) to allow the action, 
insofar as it included Yums's counter-
claims, to proceed. Yums argued that its 
counterclaims were not subject to dismissal 
along with Nike's claims because, under the 
Declaratory Judgment Act, they created an 
independent controversy over whether Nike 
had violated Yums's rights by improperly 
obtaining a trademark registration. 
To demonstrate the existence of an actual 
controversy notwithstanding the Covenant's 
broad language, Yums filed affidavits from 
prospective investors who suggested that 
Nike's lawsuit had deterred them from 
investing in Yums or had prompted them to 
withdraw prior investments. A former 
investor in Yums, for example, stated that he 
resold his stock to Yums at a loss after 
learning of Nike's lawsuit, which he feared 
would tarnish Yums's reputation and deter 
other investors from investing in the 
company. The investor explained that the 
Covenant provided inadequate assurance 
that Nike could not "assert its trademarks 
against" Yums in the future over the sales of 
shoes similar to Air Force 1. 
On January 20, 2011, the District Court 
dismissed Nike's claims with prejudice and 
Yums's counterclaims without prejudice. 
See Nike, Inc. v. Already, LLC, d/b/a Yums, 
No.09 Civ. 6366(RJS), 2011 WL 310321, at 
*1, *8 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 20, 2011). In 
dismissing Nike's claims "on consent," the 
District Court explained that Yums had 
"consent[ ed] to" dismissal of these claims 
but did not specify which rule, if any, it was 
invoking.Id. at *2. 
Turning to Yums's counterclaims and 
relying on Medlmmllne, Inc. v. Genentech, 
Inc., 549 U.S. 118 (2007), the District Court 
first concluded that Yums's declaratory 
judgment action failed to create a justiciable 
"case or controversy," since a declaratory 
judgment claimant "must, 'under all the 
circumstances,' demonstrate 'a substantial 
controversy, between parties having adverse 
legal interests, of sufficient immediacy and 
reality to warrant the issuance of a 
declaratory judgment.'" Nike, Inc., 2011 WL 
310321, at *4 (quoting Medlmmllne, 549 
U.S. at 127). The District Court held that 
Yums's counterclaims did not meet this 
standard in light of the Covenant. In 
reaching this conclusion, the District Court 
considered the Covenant's language and 
broad scope, id., Yums's failure to show that 
it had taken meaningful steps to create new 
shoes not covered by the Covenant, id. 
(quoting Diamonds.net LLC v. IdexOnline, 
Ltd., 590 F.Supp.2d 593, 600 (S.D.N.Y. 
2008)), and the absence of prior litigation 
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between Nike and Yums. Id. at *5 (citing 
ICaS Vision Sys. CO/p., N. V v. Scanner 
Techs. CO/p., 699 F.Supp.2d 664, 670-71 
(S.D.N.Y. 2010) (Chin, J.)). The District 
Court then ruled that Yums's counterclaim 
for cancellation of the '905 Registration 
under 15 U.S.c. § 1119 failed to confer 
subject matter jurisdiction because such a 
claim can arise only as part of a separate, 
independently supportable action. Id. at *6-
7. Lastly, without holding an evidentiary 
hearing, the District Court rejected Yums's 
application for attorneys' fees under the 
Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a), because 
the case was not "exceptional" as required 
by the Act.Id. at *8. 
Yums timely appealed, challenging both the 
District Court's dismissal of its claims and 
the court's denial of Yums's motion for 
attorneys' fees without an evidentiary 
hearing. 
DISCUSSION 
We determine the existence of subject 
matter jurisdiction before addressing other 
threshold issues. Where a district court 
dismisses an action "for lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction, we review factual 
findings for clear error and legal conclusions 
de novo. " Maloney v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 517 
F.3d 70, 74 (2d Cir. 2008). A "case is 
properly dismissed for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)( 1) when the 
district court lacks the statutory or 
constitutional power to adjudicate it." 
Makarova v. United States, 201 F.3d 110, 
113 (2d Cir. 2000). 
1. Rule 41(a)(2) 
Because the District Court's conclusion that 
it lacked jurisdiction followed its dismissal 
ofNike's claims under Rule 41 (a)(2), Yums 
urges us to review in the first instance 
whether the District Court complied with 
that rule, which provides, in relevant part: 
Except as provided in Rule 41(a)(l), 
an action may be dismissed at the 
plaintiffs request only by court order, 
on terms that the court considers 
proper. If a defendant has pleaded a 
counterclaim before being served 
with the plaintiffs motion to dismiss, 
the action may be dismissed over the 
defendant's objection only if the 
counterclaim can remain pending for 
independent adjudication. 
Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(a)(2). Yums claims that it 
did not consent to dismissal of its counter-
claims, and that the District Court's 
dismissal of the entire action in fact 
occurred "over the defendant's objection" in 
violation of the second sentence of the rule. 
When a plaintiff seeks to withdraw its 
claims pursuant to Rule 41 (a)(2), but 
another event independently deprives the 
district court of an Article III case or 
controversy involving the defendant's 
counterclaims, Rule 41 (a)(2) is irrelevant. 
See Super Sack Mfg. Corp. v. Chase 
Packaging Corp., 57 F.3d 1054, 1057 n. 2 
(Fed. Cir. 1995) (finding it unnecessary to 
consider whether dismissal pursuant to Rule 
41 (a)(2) was proper where dismissal was 
clearly proper because of the absence of an 
Article III case or controversy), abrogated 
on other grounds by Medlmmune, 549 U.S. 
118; see also Intellectual Prop. Dev., Inc. v. 
TCI Cablevision of Cal., Inc., 248 F.3d 
1333, 1340 & n. 6 (Fed. Cir. 2001) 
(affirming a dismissal of a counterclaim 
based on a lack of Article III case or 
controversy even though the district court 
had not indicated any reliance on Rule 
41(a)(2) or a statement of non-liability, and 
the record failed to show whether the 
defendant consented to Rule 41 (a)(2) relief). 
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Accordingly, we need not further address 
Rule 41 (a)(2) because we conclude, as a 
matter of law, that Nike's delivery of the 
Covenant to Yums divested the District 
Court of subject matter jurisdiction, and we 
affirm on that basis. 
2. The Covenant Not To Sue 
In order to qualify as a justiciable "case or 
controversy" under Article III, "[t]he 
controversy must be definite and concrete, 
touching the legal relations of parties having 
adverse legal interests." Aetna Life Ins. Co. 
v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 240-41 (1937). 
The "case or controversy" requirement is not 
satisfied by a "difference or dispute of a 
hypothetical or abstract character." Id. at 
240. In trade-mark cases seeking relief 
under either the Declaratory Judgment Act, 
28 U.S.C. § 2201(a), or Section 37 of the 
Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1119, a valid 
covenant not to sue may strip district courts 
of jurisdiction. We review the jurisdictional 
effect of such a covenant under both Acts in 
turn. 
a. Declaratory Judgment Act 
We turn first to the effect of such a covenant 
in trademark cases involving the Declaratory 
Judgment Act, which provides in relevant 
part: 
In a case of actual controversy within 
its jurisdiction . . . any court of the 
United States, upon the filing of an 
appropriate pleading, may declare 
the rights and other legal relations of 
any interested party seeking such 
declaration, whether or not fuliher 
relief is or could be sought. 
28 U.S.c. § 2201(a). The Declaratory 
Judgment Act does not expand the subject 
matter jurisdiction of the federal courts. See 
PDK Labs, Inc. v. Friedlander, 103 F.3d 
1105, 1110 (2d Cir. 1997). In Aetna, the 
Supreme Court "explained that the phrase 
'case of actual controversy' in the Act refers 
to the type of 'Cases' and 'Controversies' 
that are justiciable under Article III." 
Medlmmllne, 549 U.S. at 127 (citing Aetna, 
300 U.S. at 240). Its pronouncement in 
Aetna was refined four years later in 
Maryland Casualty Co. v. Pacific Coal& Gil 
Co., 312 U.S. 270,273 (1941), in which the 
Supreme Court endorsed a totality of the 
circumstances test for determining whether a 
party seeking relief under the Act has 
demonstrated that a justiciable 
"controversy" exists. The Court in Maryland 
Casualty explained that "[b ]asically, the 
question in each case is whether the facts 
alleged, under all the circumstances, show 
that there is a substantial controversy, 
between pmiies having adverse legal 
interests, of sufficient immediacy and reality 
to warrant the issuance of a declaratory 
judgment." Id. In adopting this test, the 
Supreme Court recognized that "[t]he 
difference between an abstract question and 
a 'controversy' contemplated by the 
Declaratory Judgment Act is necessarily one 
of degree, and it would be difficult, if it 
would be possible, to fashion a precise test 
for determining in every case whether there 
is such a controversy." Id. 
We did not apply the Maryland Casualty 
test in a trademark case until Starter Corp. v. 
Converse, Inc., 84 F.3d 592, 595 (2d Cir. 
1996) (per curiam). In that case, we 
employed a two-pronged test for 
determining whether subject matter 
jurisdiction exists: 
[i]n a declaratory judgment action 
involving trademarks, the test for an 
"actual case or controversy" has two 
prongs, both of which must be 
satisfied 111 order to establish 
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declaratory judgment jurisdiction: 
(1) has the defendant's conduct 
created a real and reasonable 
apprehension of liability on the part 
of the plaintiff, and (2) has the 
plaintiff engaged in a course of 
conduct which has brought it into 
adversarial conflict with the 
defendant. 
ld. at 595. 
After our decision in Starter, the Supreme 
Court decided Medlmmllne, which 
confirmed that Malyland Casllalty 's totality 
of the circumstances test for declaratory 
judgment actions applied in intellectual 
property cases, see 549 U.S. at 126-27, but 
which rejected Starter's reasonable 
apprehension requirement, id. at 122, 132 
(quoting Gen-Probe Inc. v. Vysis, Inc., 359 
F.3d 1376, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2004)). 
Medlmmllne requires that we consider only 
whether the adversity of legal interests that 
exists between the parties is '''real and 
substantial'" and "'admi[ts] of specific relief 
through a decree of a conclusive character, 
as distinguished from an opinion advising 
what the law would be upon a hypothetical 
state of facts.'" ld. at 127 (quoting Aetna 
Lifelns., Co., 300 U.S. at 241). The Court 
also suggested that the threat of future 
litigation remains relevant in determining 
whether an actual controversy exists. As in 
Medlmmllne, for example, simply holding 
litigation in abeyance, where a party could 
forestall litigation indefinitely by paying 
licensing fees, does not eliminate the case or 
controversy. ld. at 128 ("[The declaratory 
judgment plaintiffJ's own acts ... eliminate 
the imminent threat of harm [and][t]he 
question before us is whether this causes the 
dispute no longer to be a case or controversy 
within the meaning of Article III."). 
Until now, we have not applied Medlmmllne 
in an intellectual property case. However, a 
few of our sister circuits have done so in the 
context of declaratory judgment actions 
involving patents, which we have described 
as sufficiently "analogous" to those 
involving trademarks that "principles 
applicable to declaratory judgment actions 
involving patents are generally applicable 
with respect to trademarks." Starter Corp., 
84 F.3d at 596; see also Revollltion 
Eyewear, Inc. v. Aspex Eyewear, Inc., 556 
F.3d 1294, 1298-99 (Fed. Cir. 2009) 
(applying Medlmmllne to declaratory 
judgment action involving patents). 
In determining whether a covenant not to 
sue eliminates a justiciable case or 
controversy in a declaratory judgment action 
involving a trademark, district courts 
applying the Medlmmllne totality of the 
circumstances test should especially 
consider, in addition to other factors: (1) the 
language of the covenant, (2) whether the 
covenant covers future, as well as past, 
activity and products, and (3) evidence of 
intention or lack of intention, on the part of 
the party asserting jurisdiction, to engage in 
new activity or to develop new potentially 
infringing products that arguably are not 
covered by the covenant. 
Applying these factors here, we agree with 
the District Comi that it had no actual case 
or controversy before it. The language of the 
Covenant is broad, covering both present 
and future products: Nike "unconditionally" 
and permanently renounced its right to 
claim, demand or "commenc[e], caus[e] or 
permit[] to be prosecuted any action in law 
or in equity" with respect to any shoe 
currently made by Yums, including the 
Sugar and Soulja Boy shoes, and all 
colorable imitations thereof. Nike, Inc., 2011 
WL 310321, at * 1-2. The breadth of the 
Covenant renders the threat of litigation 
remote or non-existent even if Yums 
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continues to market and sell these shoes or 
significantly increases their production. 
Given the similarity of Yums's designs to 
the '905 mark and the breadth of the 
Covenant, it is hard to imagine a scenario 
that would potentially infringe the '905 
mark and yet not fall under the Covenant. 
Yums has not asserted any intention to 
market any such shoe. Nike, Inc., 2011 WL 
310321, at *4. 
In Revolution Eyewear, 556 F.3d at 1296, 
the Federal Circuit concluded that a 
controversy persisted when the plaintiff 
delivered a covenant that promised not to 
sue only as to prior sales of the allegedly 
infringing product. The crucial difference 
between Revolution Eyel,,/ear and this case is 
the scope of the two covenants. In 
Revolution Eyewear, it was undisputed that 
the covenant did not protect the defendant 
from suit for any future marketing. Id. Here, 
the Covenant is far broader. It covers both 
past sales and future sales of both existing 
products and colorable imitations. Given the 
breadth of the Covenant, no controversy 
exists. 
Yums nevertheless urges that a justiciable 
controversy persists because Nike's 
litigation continues to have an injurious 
effect. Pointing to the affidavits of various 
investors, Yums alleges harm from the 
potential loss of investments by investors 
who fear infringement lawsuits in the future 
and for that reason have refrained from 
further investing or have withdrawn their 
investments. In this case, potential investor 
concerns about infringement law-suits 
against the company, despite Nike's broad 
Covenant, fail to establish the sort of 
genuinely adverse legal interests between 
Nike and Yums that Medlmmune requires. 
In addition, Yums contends that the 
Covenant is a "continuing libel" against it 
because the Covenant asserts Yums' s 
ongoing de minimis infringement of Nike's 
trademark. Yums did not file a counterclaim 
alleging libel, however, and in any event we 
reject the contention that the mere existence 
of a document asserting infringement-
where the registrant cannot assert a claim 
relating to that infringement-creates a case 
or controversy. 
Relying on Cardinal Chemical Co. v. 
Morton International, Inc., 508 U.S. 83, 96, 
99-103 (1993), Yums also argues that a 
finding of non-infringement does not 
deprive a court of jurisdiction to rule on the 
validity of a trademark or patent. Cardinal 
Chemical is inapposite, however, as it 
"concern[s] the jurisdiction of an 
intermediate appellate court, not a trial 
court." Giese v. Pierce Chern. Co., 43 
F.Supp.2d 98, 112 n. 14 (D.Mass. 1999); see 
also Lamb-Weston, Inc. v. McCain Foods, 
Ltd., 78 F.3d 540, 546 (Fed. Cir. 1996) 
("The Supreme Court's decision in Cardinal 
Chemical is limited to the specific facts of 
that case[;] [s ]pecifically, [that] an 
affirmance by th[ e] court [of appeals] of a 
finding of noninfringement is not, by itself, 
enough to vacate a declaratory judgment 
holding the patent invalid."). Moreover, 
unlike the trial court in Cardinal Chemical, 
the District Court here made no "finding[ s]" 
on the merits of Yums's declaratory 
judgment action. See Cardinal Chemical, 
508 U.S. at 86, 95 (emphasizing that the 
only issue before the Court was the circuit 
court's jurisdiction, and that "[i]n the trial 
court, of course, a party seeking a 
declaratory judgment has the burden of 
establishing the existence of an actual case 
or controversy"). 
Yums also makes much of the District 
Court's exercise of subject matter 
jurisdiction over Nike's claims, which Yums 
contends was inconsistent with the District 
Court's determination that a case or 
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controversy no longer existed. We have 
already acknowledged that the District Court 
could have dismissed Nike's claims either 
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction or "on 
consent." See supra at 92-94. But Yums has 
not appealed the District COUlt's exercise of 
jurisdiction over Nike's claims, which 
resulted in a lUling favorable to Yums, and 
in the part of the District COUlt order that is 
before us there is no error. 
b. The Lanham Act 
We turn next to the Lanham Act, IS U.S.c. 
§ 1119, which Yums contends provides an 
independent basis of federal subject matter 
jurisdiction, notwithstanding the dismissal 
of the underlying trademark claim. Under 
the Lanham Act, district courts are 
authorized to cancel registrations, but only 
"[i]n any action involving a registered 
mark." 15 U.S.c. § 1119. The limiting 
phrase "[i]n any action involving a 
registered mark" plainly narrows the 
circumstances in which cancellation may be 
sought-namely, in connection with "a 
properly instituted and otherwise 
jurisdictionally supportable action involving 
a registered mark." Universal Sewing Mach. 
Co. v. Standard Sewing Equip. Corp., 185 
F.Supp. 257,260 (S.D.N.V. 1960). 
Section 1119 therefore creates a remedy for 
trademark infringement rather than an 
independent basis for federal jurisdiction. 
Both the Third Circuit and the Federal 
Circuit have held that, by its plain terms, this 
provision requires that "a controversy as to 
the validity of or interference with a 
registered mark . . . exist before a district 
COUlt has jurisdiction to grant the 
cancellation remedy." Ditri v. Coldwell 
Banker Residential Affiliates, Inc., 954 F.2d 
869, 873 (3d Cir. 1992); see id. (noting that 
a petition to the Patent and Trademark 
Office is the "primary means of securing a 
cancellation," and that § 1119 provides no 
independent basis for jurisdiction) (citing 
Universal Sewing Mack Co., 185 F.Supp. at 
260); Windsurfing Int'! Inc. v. AMF Inc., 
828 F.2d 755, 758-59 (Fed. Cir. 1987); see 
also McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair 
Competition § 30: 11 0 (4th ed. 2010) 
("[Section 1119] alone does not create 
grounds for federal jurisdiction."). We agree 
with their analysis, and hold that a claim for 
trademark cancellation under § 1119 is 
insufficient to support federal jurisdiction 
where a covenant not to sue has resolved the 
underlying infringement action. 
Yums cites only one case, Bancroft & 
Masters, Inc. v. Aug1lsta National Inc., 223 
F .3d 1082 (9th Cir. 2000), in support of its 
argument that a COUlt may retain jurisdiction 
over a § 1119 claim notwithstanding the end 
of a case or controversy with respect to the 
rest of the action. The Ninth Circuit in 
Bancroft & Masters, however, concluded 
that the promise not to sue in that case failed 
to end the case or controversy. ld. at 1085. 
Its pronouncement that even an unqualified 
promise "would not have mooted [the] 
separate request for [§ 1119] cancellation of 
[the] trademarks" is therefore dictum. Id. Tn 
addition, the Ninth Circuit in Bancroft failed 
to consider the language in § 1119 that 
renders that section remedial, not 
jurisdictional. Accordingly, we find its 
opmlOn unpersuasive. 
Yums next characterizes Nike's original 
lawsuit as a "properly instituted and 
otherwise jurisdictionally supportable 
action" and contends that this fact alone 
provided a basis for the District Court to 
retain jurisdiction over Yums's § 1119 
cancellation counterclaim notwithstanding 
the Covenant. Yums's argument ignores the 
settled lUle that the "case-or-controversy 
requirement . . . subsists through all stages 
of federal judicial proceedings." White River 
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Am1lsement P1Ib, Inc. v. Town of Hartford, 
481 F.3d 163, 167 (2d Cir. 2007) (internal 
quotation marks omitted) (citing Spencer v. 
Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7 (1998)). Although 
Nike's action was "properly instituted," it 
was no longer 'jurisdictionally supportable" 
after the Covenant was delivered. 
3. Attorneys' Fees 
We review an order denying attorneys' fees 
under the Lanham Act for abuse of 
discretion. See Gordon & Breach Science 
P1Iblishers S.A. v. Am. Inst, of Physics, 166 
F.3d 438, 439 (2d Cir. 1999) (per curiam). 
Such fees are available only in "exceptional 
cases," which generally means that fees will 
be awarded to the defendant only if the 
plaintiff filed the action in bad faith. See 
Banff, Ltd. v. Colberts, Inc., 996 F.2d 33, 36 
(2d Cir. 1993). Here, Nike filed its action 
pursuant to its own registered trademark and 
withdrew the action quickly. On the record 
before us, we cannot say that the District 
Court abused its discretion when it found 
that Nike had not acted in bad faith, and 
Yums fails to identify what additional 
information the District Comt needed to 
make an informed decision about attorneys' 
fees. Accordingly, we find no abuse of 
discretion in its decision to deny fees 
without a hearing. 
CONCLUSION 
We affirm the judgment of the District 
Court. 
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"Supreme Court Forces Nike to Defend its Right 
Not to Defend its Trademarks" 
Re1lters 
June 27, 2012 
Alison Frankel 
Is a trademark owner's promise not to sue 
for infringement a good enough reason for a 
challenger to the mark to be forced to walk 
away from litigation? On Monday the U.S. 
Supreme Court gave intellectual property 
practitioners a good reason to look forward 
to next term, granting celiiorari to a shoe 
company called Already in a trademark 
dispute with Nike. The case has a through-
the-looking-glass quality because the issue 
is whether Already can proceed with 
counterclaims against Nike even though 
Nike dropped its infringement case against 
Already. 
Here's the backstory. In 2009 Nike sued 
Already, which is the producer of YUMS 
shoes, in federal court in Manhattan, 
claiming that one of Already's designs 
infringed a Nike trademark. Already denied 
the infringement but also filed a 
counterclaim challenging the validity of 
Nike's mark. According to Already's 
petition for writ of certiorari-filed by 
James Dabney of Fried, Frank, Harris, 
Shriver & Jacobson-Nike "abruptly" 
changed course in March 2010 and delivered 
a "Covenant Not to Sue" to Already, 
promising not to sue over any of the 
company's current or previous shoe designs. 
Nike moved to dismiss its own complaint 
with prejudice and asked U.S. District Judge 
Richard Sullivan to dismiss Already's 
counterclaim for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction. 
Already certainly had no problem with Nike 
dropping the infringement suit but urged the 
court to keep its invalidity counterclaim 
alive. In January 2011 Sullivan sided with 
Nike, finding that Already was no longer 
exposed to potential litigation based on the 
trademark, so the court did not have 
jurisdiction over the counterclaim. In 
November 2011 a three-judge panel of the 
2nd Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed 
Sullivan's order, saying the "breadth of 
(Nike's) covenant not to sue and the 
improbability of future infringement" meant 
that there was no live controversy that 
would give the district court jurisdiction. 
(The opinion was written by Circuit Judge 
Raymond Lohier for a panel that also 
included judges Debra Ann Livingston and 
Pierre Leva!.) 
Already's cert petition argued that the 2nd 
Circuit's decision created a circuit split with 
a 2000 ruling by the 9th Circuit. That ruling, 
in a case called Bancroft & Masters v. 
A1Igllsta National, held that a promise not to 
assert a registered trademark did not divest 
the lower cOUli of jurisdiction to hear 
challenges to the mark at issue. 
Should the Supreme Court side with 
Already, the balance of power during 
litigation and settlement negotiations would 
shift noticeably from the mark holder to the 
accused infringer, said Jason Rantanen, an 
associate professor of law at the University 
of Iowa who blogs at PatentlyO. As things 
stand, when rights holders sue to protect 
their marks, they risk invalidity challenges. 
If the 2nd Circuit ruling for Nike stands, 
Rantanen said, a trademark or patent holder 
who's worried about such a challenge could 
just pull the relevant mark from the 
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litigation and promise not to enforce it 
against the alleged infringer. A finding for 
Already, on the other hand, would likely 
force patent and trademark owners to think a 
little more carefully about which marks they 
want to risk enforcing. "Once you place 
your irons in the fire, it (would be) much 
harder to pull them out," Rantanen said. 
Wilmer Cutler Hale Pickering and Dorr IP 
Chair Donald Steinberg, who is not involved 
in the case, said that the issue is the breadth 
of protection a mark holder should receive 
from a promise not to sue. Because that is a 
fact-specific question (i.e., what does the no-
suit covenant say?), Steinberg said, it's 
possible the court will focus more on 
general guidance than a strict rule. 
Specific facts aside, the reach of intellectual 
property has been of interest to the high 
court lately. In recent decisions, including 
March's Mayo Collaborative Sen1ices v. 
Promethells Laboratories, which invalidated 
a process patent for correlations between 
blood test results and patient health, the 
Supreme COUli has taken an interest in the 
broader policy question of how far rights 
holders' powers should extend, Steinberg 
said. 
Thomas Goldstein of Goldstein & Russell 
and attorneys from Banner & Witcoff 
handled Nike's brief opposing cert. 
Attorneys from Dickstein Shapiro also 
represented Nike at the 2nd Circuit. 
Goldstein's office directed me to a Nike 
spokesperson, who declined to comment. 
(Reporting by Erin Geiger Smith) 
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"Supreme Court Looks to Take Trademark Standing Case 
Following Covenant-not-to-Sue" 
Patently-O 
April 16,2012 
Dennis Crouch 
Nike sued YUMS back in 2009 alleging 
trademark infringement, unfair competition, 
and dilution under both federal and NY state 
law. The complaint included the image 
below comparing YUMS brand shoes with 
Nike's federal trademark registration 
number 3,451,905. The design is related to 
N ike's Air Force 1 shoe that was first 
released in 1982. The Yums intentionally 
retro look is apparently fashionable for 
skaters and freestyle BMX riders. (The 
image does not show the shoes' creative 
soles.) 
After being sued, YUMS counterclaimed-
seeking to cancel the registration. However, 
before the court could reach a decision on 
the merits, Nike's attorneys at Banner & 
Witcoff provided YUMS with a covenant-
not-to-sue on the AF1 design rights. In the 
document, Nike wrote that YUMS brand 
"no longer infringe or dilute the Nike Mark 
at a level sufficient to warrant the substantial 
time and expense of continued litigation." 
The covenant was limited to YUMS current 
shoes as well as 'colorable imitations' of 
current lines. In particular, Nike promised 
to: 
refrain from making any claim(s) or 
demand(s), or from commencing, 
causing, or permitting to be 
prosecuted any action in law or 
equity, against [Yums] or any of its 
[successors or customers], on 
account of any possible cause of 
action based on or involving 
trademark infringement, unfair 
competition, or dilution, under state 
or federal law in the United States 
relating to the [Nike eAir Force 1 
Mark] based on the appearance of 
any of [Yums]'s current and/or 
previous footwear product designs, 
and any colorable imitations thereof, 
regardless of whether that footwear 
is produced, distributed, offered for 
sale, adveliised, sold, or otherwise 
used in commerce before or after the 
Effective Date of this Covenant. 
YUMS was apparently happy with the 
document, but not fully satiated. Rather, 
YUMS maintained its declaratory judgment 
lawsuit-arguing that the Nike Mark 
continued to improperly chill its innovative 
marketing efforts. However, the district 
court dismissed the case-finding that it 
lacked subject matter jurisdiction because 
there was no ongoing case or controversy. 
ImpOliant for its ruling, YUMS had not 
taken any "meaningful steps" toward 
developing a new potentially infringing 
product not covered by the covenant-not-to-
sue. 
On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed, 
holding specifically that the cancelation 
power under 15 U.S.C. § 1119 does not 
provide federal courts with an independent 
basis for jurisdiction absent an actual case-
or-controversy between the parties. 
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Supreme Court: Now, YUMS has appealed 
to the US Supreme Court-relying upon the 
expertise of Jim Dabney and Prof John 
Duffy (of KSR fame) to bring their case. 
They raise the simple question: "Whether a 
federal district court is divested of Aliicle III 
jurisdiction over a party's challenge to the 
validity of a federally registered trademark if 
the registrant promises not to asseli its mark 
against the party's then-existing commercial 
activities." The complaint raises a circuit 
split between the Second Circuit here and 
the Ninth Circuit, which is much more 
friendly to OJ trademark actions in this type 
of situation. In addition, the petition 
highlights Supreme COUli precedent that 
suggest broad jurisdiction should be 
available to challenge the validity of suspect 
intellectual property rights. See Lear, Inc. v. 
Adkins, 395 U.S. 653 (1969), Medlmm1lne, 
Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118 (2007), 
Cardinal Chem. Co. v. Morton Int'l, Inc., 
508 U.S. 83 (1993), and Scott Paper Co. v. 
Marca/lls Mfg. Co., 326 U.S. 249 (1945). 
The Supreme Court has now asked Nike to 
respond to the petition-due May 4. This 
move greatly increases the odds that the 
petition will eventually be granted. 
Of interest, a key element of the Myriad 
gene patent case is whether the ACLU and 
AMP have standing to sue. This case may 
shed further light on that outcome. 
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"Supreme Court to Decide Whether Patent 
Bullies Can Hit and Run" 
The HlIffington Post 
June 29, 2012 
Daniel B. Ravicher 
I've written before on the sad state of patent 
quality in our country. Today I'm writing 
about a beacon of hope. Earlier this week, 
the Supreme Court agreed to hear a case that 
could greatly expand the right of the public 
to defend itself from bogus patents. 
Remember, the granting of a patent is an 
intrusive act of government telling you, me 
and every other American we cannot do 
something. Jefferson called them 
"embarrasments," and he was right, they are, 
especially when they are completely 
undeserved, as a great many of the 4,500 
patents issued every week are. 
Unfortunately, as unbelievable as it may 
sound, there is absolutely nothing you, me 
or any other American can do to stop the 
government from taking our freedom away 
willy nilly by granting meritless patents in 
the first place. In fact, the government 
makes a lot of money doing so (it makes ten 
times as much money when it grants a patent 
as when it denies one; which would you 
prefer if you were a fat cat bureaucrat?). 
This is why it is so important to have ways 
to take our freedom back after the 
government has stolen it from us. As of 
now, that's very hard to do, because the 
government knows it has to make it as hard 
as possible for us Americans to take back 
our freedom in order to "protect the value of 
IP" (that's how the Director of the Patent 
Office spins the situation), else the Patent 
Office won't make as much money giving 
our freedom away. 
In the Supreme Court case accepted this 
week, Nike (yes, that Nike, the famous 
sportswear company) sued a much smaller 
shoe company called Already, which does 
business under the name YUMS, for 
allegedly infringing one of its trademarks 
relating to the design of a shoe. Already 
looked at the trademark and quite quickly 
realized that it was completely invalid. (If 
you want to know how it's possible for our 
government to give out invalid trademarks 
and patents, see my talk on the Patent 
Pollution Problem. The same government 
agency, the United States Patent and 
Trademark Office, grants both.) 
Knowing it was going to lose, Nike decided 
to quit and walk off the field before time 
expired. In legal terms, what that means is 
Nike promised never to sue Already again 
for infringing that trademark "for similar 
shoes." After making the "promise" and 
giving up on its dead loser of a case, Nike 
asked the court to dismiss Already's request 
that the trademark be declared invalid. In 
other words, Nike picked a fight with a 
much smaller competitor, realized it was 
going to get its butt kicked once the little 
guy decided to defend itself, became a total 
chicken, and tried to run the other way, all 
the while retaining its trademark to assert 
against the same little guy again in the future 
(because surely Nike will argue new shoes 
by Already are not "similar" and therefore 
fall outside the "promise" they made). 
Nike is not alone in using this hit-and-run 
tactic. There are numerous examples of 
overly aggressive patent owners doing 
exactly the same thing, threatening innocent 
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people with completely false claims of 
infringement, suing them in court hoping the 
burden of defense alone will make them 
crumble, but then seeking to drop the entire 
case by making a meaningless promise not 
to sue once they realize the jig is up because 
their patent is completely bogus and the 
defendant is seeking to have it invalidated 
by the comi. These patent bullies want to 
concede the case in order to avoid 
permanently losing the right to threaten and 
sue again in the future for infringing the 
same worthless patent. It's absolutely 
disgusting and the people who do this 
should be ashamed of themselves. If you 
want to start a fight, that's your prerogative, 
but you better be ready for the other guy to 
finish it. You can't just call time out when 
you're on the brink oflosing so you can stmi 
over later on when you've got your chutzpah 
back. No sir, that's not how we roll here in 
America. 
Not surprisingly, innocently accused parties 
are as outraged as I am at this ploy. They 
don't want to get sued at all, much less for 
infringing invalid trademarks and patents 
that would get shredded if they ever truly 
had their day in court. Already fought Nike 
in both the district court and the court of 
appeals for its right to have Nike's 
trademark declared invalid, but both courts 
let Nike off the hook. So, Already appealed 
to the Supreme Court, which, as I say above, 
on Monday decided to hear the case. Thank 
heavens. At least someone in our judicial 
system has some sense and backbone. 
There are at least two huge reasons to 
celebrate the fact that the Supreme Court 
may direct lower courts to permit challenges 
to trademarks and patents being used to hit-
and-run the American people. 
First, as previously mentioned, American 
patent quality is poor, so poor, the Patent 
Office should be even more "embarrassed" 
than Jefferson was back when he was in 
charge of deciding what applications should 
be granted or denied. The American people 
desperately need ways to challenge and 
eliminate worthless patents that take away 
their freedom. Allowing accused infringers 
to maintain challenges against patent holders 
who sue for infringement will not only help 
fix the patent pollution problem, it will also 
make patent holders think twice about the 
true strength of their patents before even 
asserting them against others. It will thus 
greatly reduce anti-competitive over-
litigious and just plain cowardly behavior. 
Second, allowing validity challenges is 
consistent with general American principles 
relating to protecting freedom from 
improper government restraint. Like 
criminal statutes, patents are government-
issued ways of taking away rights of the 
American people to do something, and the 
Supreme Court has repeatedly allowed 
parties to challenge criminal statutes even 
when there was no threat of those statutes 
ever being enforced, much less when they 
had been used to hit-and-run. And in the last 
Supreme Comi case on the right of parties to 
challenge patents, the Supreme Court relied 
on those other cases challenging criminal 
statutes to find that the patent challenge 
could proceed even though the potential 
infringers were not even likely to be sued by 
the patent holder. It's only logical that a 
pmiy that has been previously accused of 
infringing a patent should be able to 
challenge it. Further still, the right to bring a 
challenge should stem from the fact that the 
existence of the bogus patent is a threat to 
freedom in and of itself, especially when the 
patent holder has been brandishing it in an 
aggressive and threatening way. 
We'll now have to wait several months 
before we get a decision from the Supreme 
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Court in the case, but it would be strange 
indeed for them to have taken it merely to 
uphold the lower courts' decisions to 
dismiss the challenges. Hopefully, the 
Already v Nike case will open up new doors 
for the American people to take back their 
freedom by challenging invalid patents. I'm 
going to go buy some YUMS products right 
now to show my support. One of my 
favorite little cousins is heading to college 
this fall and could use some new kicks. 
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Ruling Below: John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Kirtsaeng, 654 F.3d 210 (2d Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 
2012 WL 1252751 (U.S. 2012). 
As an international student, Supap Kirtsaeng came from Thailand for his undergraduate and 
doctoral education. Kirtsaeng had family in Thailand purchase textbooks and ship them to him. 
After using them, Kilisaeng sold these textbooks on eBay to repay the original purchasers, and 
kept the remaining profit to himself. Eight of the textbooks he sold were printed by John Wiley 
& Sons in Asia. John Wiley & Sons brought suit under the Copyright Act § 602(a)(1), under 
which it is impermissible to import a work without the copyright owner's consent. In defense, 
Kirtsaeng cited § 109(a) which allows the owner of a lawfully made copy to sell without the 
copyright owner's permission. The district court found for John Wiley & Sons, holding that the 
first sale doctrine does not extend to goods manufactured abroad and imported into the United 
States. On appeal to the COUli of Appeals for the Second Circuit in 2011, the majority upheld the 
district court's decision for the plaintiff. Kirtsaeng's request for a rehearing was denied. 
Question Presented: How do Section 602(a)(1) of the Copyright Act, which prohibits the 
importation of a work without the authority of the copyright's owner, and Section 109(a) of the 
Copyright Act, which allows the owner of a copy "lawfully made under this title" to sell or 
otherwise dispose of the copy without the copyright owner's permission, apply to a copy that 
was made and legally acquired abroad and then imported into the United States? 
JOHN WILEY & SONS, INC., Plaintiff-Appellee, 
v. 
Supap KIRTSAENG, doing business as Bluechristine99, Defendant-Appellant. 
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
Decided August 15, 2011 
[Excerpt; some footnotes and citations omitted.] 
CABRANES, Circuit Judge 
The "first sale doctrine" in copyright law 
permits the owner of a lawfully purchased 
copy of a copyrighted work to resell it 
without limitations imposed by the 
copyright holder. The existence of the 
doctrine dates to 1908, when the Supreme 
Court held that the owner of a copyright 
could not impose price controls on sales of 
copies of a copyrighted work beyond the 
initial sale. Congress codified the doctrine in 
successive Copyright Acts, beginning with 
the Copyright Act of 1909. 
The principal question presented in this 
appeal is whether the first sale doctrine, 17 
U.S.c. § 109(a), applies to copies of copy-
righted works produced outside of the 
United States but imported and resold in the 
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United States. Under another basic copyright 
statute, it is ordinarily the case that 
"[i]mportation into the United States, 
without the authority of the owner of copy-
right under [the Copyright Act], of copies .. 
. of a work that have been acquired outside 
the United States is an infringement of the 
[owner's] exclusive right to distribute 
copies .... " 
Defendant contends, however, that 
individuals may import and resell books 
manufactured abroad pursuant to 17 U.S.C. 
§ I09(a), which provides that "the owner of 
a particular copy . . . lawfully made under 
[the Copyright Act], or any person 
authorized by such owner, is entitled, 
without the authority of the copyright 
owner, to sell or otherwise dispose of the 
possession of that copy." 
Defendant's claim is an Issue of first 
impression in our Court. 
BACKGROUND 
A. The Parties 
Plaintiff-appellee John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 
("plaintiff or "Wiley") is the publisher of 
academic, scientific, and educational 
journals and books, including textbooks, for 
sale in domestic and international markets. 
Wiley relies upon a wholly-owned 
subsidiary, John Wiley & Sons (Asia) Pte 
Ltd. ("Wiley Asia"), to manufacture books 
for sale in foreign countries. While the 
written content of books for the domestic 
and international markets is often similar or 
identical, books intended for international 
markets can differ from the domestic version 
in design, supplemental content (such as 
accompanying CD-ROMS), and the type 
and quality of materials used for printing, 
including "thinner paper and different 
bindings, different cover and jacket designs, 
fewer internal ink colors, if any, [and] lower 
quality photographs and graphics." Joint 
App'x at 18. The foreign editions, moreover, 
are marked with a legend to designate that 
they are to be sold only in a particular 
country or geographic region. One example 
of such a designation reads as follows: 
Authorized for sale in Europe, 
Asia, Africa and the Middle East 
Only. 
This book is authorized for sale in 
Europe, Asia, Africa and the Middle 
East only [and] may not be exported. 
ExpOliation from or importation of 
this book to another region without 
the Publisher's authorization is 
illegal and is a violation of the 
Publisher's rights. The Publisher 
may take legal action to enforce its 
rights. The Publisher may recover 
damages and costs, including but not 
limited to lost profits and attorney's 
fees, in the event legal action is 
required. 
Defendant Supap Kirtsaeng ("defendant" or 
"Kirtsaeng") moved to the United States 
from Thailand in 1997 to pursue an 
undergraduate degree in mathematics at 
Cornell University. According to Kirtsaeng, 
he later moved to California to pursue a 
doctoral degree. 
B. The Instant Action 
To help subsidize the cost of his education, 
Kirtsaeng allegedly participated in the 
following scheme: Between 2007 and 
September 8, 2008, Kirtsaeng's friends and 
family shipped him foreign edition 
textbooks printed abroad by Wiley Asia. In 
turn, Kirtsaeng sold these textbooks on 
commercial websites such as Bay.com. 
Using the revenues generated from the sales, 
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Kirtsaeng would reimburse his family and 
friends for the costs that they incurred 
during the process of acquiring and shipping 
the books and then keep any remaining 
profits for himself. Kirtsaeng claims that, 
before selling the textbooks, he sought 
advice from friends in Thailand and 
consulted "Google Answers," a website 
which allows web users to seek research 
help from other web users, to ensure that he 
could legally resell the foreign editions III 
the United States. 
On September 8, 2008, Wiley filed this 
action against Kirtsaeng in the United States 
District COUli for the Southern District of 
New York (Donald C. Pogue, Judge of the 
United States COUli of International Trade, 
sitting by designation), claiming, among 
other things, copyright infringement under 
17 U.S.C. § 501, trademark infringement 
under 15 U.S.C. § 1114(a), and unfair 
competition under New York state law. 
Wiley sought a preliminary and permanent 
injunction under 17 U.S.C. § 502(a), and 
statutory damages under 17 U.S.C. § 504(c). 
C. Relevant Pre-Trial Proceedings 
In anticipation of trial, Kirtsaeng submitted 
proposed jury instmctions charging that the 
first sale doctrine was a defense to copyright 
infringement. By Order dated October 9, 
2009, the District Court prohibited Kirtsaeng 
from raising this defense and rejected the 
applicability of the first sale doctrine to 
foreign editions of text-books, holding that 
"[t]here is no indication that the imported 
books at issue here were manufactured 
pursuant to the U.S. Copyright Act ... 
[and,] [t]o the contrary, the textbooks 
introduced as evidence purport, on their 
face, to have been published outside of the 
United States." 
On October 23, 2009 and November 3, 
2009, Kirtsaeng filed motions in limine to 
preclude the introduction at trial of (1) his 
online "PayPal" sales records, and 
specifically, evidence of his gross revenues 
from the sales of the foreign editions of 
Wiley's books, and (2) the profits he earned 
on unrelated sales activities. From the bench 
during a pre-trial conference on November 
3, 2009, the District Court granted the 
motions in part and denied them in patio The 
Court explained that Wiley could not 
introduce evidence of profits earned by 
Kirtsaeng from the sales of textbooks 
produced by other publishers, but "in ... 
anticipation that the net worth testimony 
[would indicate] that [Kirtsaeng did not 
have] significant net worth ... [Wiley's 
counsel had the] right to inquire about 
additional revenue s and the profits there 
from and where they went in order to make 
sure that we had an accurate record about 
[Kirtsaeng's] net worth." The Court further 
stated that Wiley's counsel "must be careful 
not to refer to these [unrelated] sales in any 
way as infringing sales, because that would 
be entirely improper." 
D. Events at Trial 
At trial, during direct examination, Wiley's 
counsel asked Kirtsaeng, "Now sir, if we 
were to go back and look at January 1 st of 
2008, what were your financial assets at that 
point in time?" 
The District Court sustained an objection by 
Kitisaeng's counsel and a sidebar discussion 
followed. 
After the sidebar conference and a recess, 
the first question by Wiley's counsel to 
Kirtsaeng was: "Mr. Kirtsaeng, before the 
break we were talking about your net worth 
during the period of 1999, correct? Excuse 
me. 200.9." Kilisaeng answered "yes." 
Wiley's counsel proceeded to ask Kirtsaeng 
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a series of questions about his "net worth" in 
an attempt to impeach his previous 
statements. Specifically, he attempted to 
enter into evidence a record of Kirtsaeng's 
PayPal revenues, showing $1.2 million in 
revenues, in contrast to Kilisaeng's previous 
testimony that he had earned only $900,000 
In revenues. 
At a second sidebar conference, during 
which the jury was excused from the 
courtroom, the District COUli excluded the 
record of the PayPal evidence as "confusing 
and unfairly prejudicial." 
When the jury reentered the courtroom, 
Wiley's counsel continued to ask Kirtsaeng 
about his revenues from eBay sales. 
Although Kirtsaeng's counsel immediately 
objected to the line of questioning on the 
basis that it had already been "asked and 
answered"-an objection the District Court 
initially sustained-the Court subsequently 
allowed the questioning, explaining that it 
was unceliain whether the same questions 
had in fact been asked of the witness earlier 
in the examination. 
At the end of the trial, the District Comi 
charged the jury to determine whether 
Kirtsaeng had infringed the copy-rights of 
each of eight works and whether any such 
infringements had been willful. The District 
Court explained that, under the statutory 
damages scheme found at 17 U.S.C. § 
504(c), if the jury found that Kirtsaeng had 
infringed Wiley's copyright, it could award 
no less than $750 and no more than $30,000 
in damages for each infringed work. 
The District Court identified two exceptions 
to this rule. First, the District Court 
instructed the jury that, if it found that Wiley 
had proved by a preponderance of the 
evidence that the infringement was willful, 
under the statutory scheme the jury had the 
option of awarding up to $150,000 in 
damages per infringed work. Second, if the 
jury found that Kirtsaeng had proved by a 
preponderance of the evidence "that he was 
not aware and had no reason to believe that 
his acts constituted an infringement of 
copyright," the jury could choose to impose 
an award of statutory damages as low as 
$200 per infringed work. The jury ultimately 
found Kirtsaeng liable for willful copyright 
infringement of all eight works and imposed 
damages of $75,000 for each of the eight 
works. 
Kirtsaeng filed a timely notice of appeal. He 
claims that (1) the District Court erred in 
holding that the first sale doctrine was not an 
available defense in the circumstances 
presented; (2) the District Court should have 
advised the jury of the first sale doctrine as a 
defense to the claim of willful infringement; 
and (3) with respect to the jury's assessment 
of statutory damages, the admission into 
evidence of testimony regarding the amount 
of Kirtsaeng's gross receipts was unduly 
prej udicial. 
DISCUSSION 
A. The first sale doctrine does not apply 
to goods produced outside of the United 
States. 
1. Standard of review 
The threshold question is whether, pursuant 
to § 1 09( a) of the Copyright Act, see note 1, 
ante, the District Court correctly determined 
that the phrase "lawfully made under this 
title" does not include copyrighted goods 
manufactured abroad. 
Where the decision of a district court 
"presents only a legal issue of statutory 
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interpretation . . . [w]e reVIew de novo 
whether the district court correctly 
interpreted the statute." 
2. Interpreting the First-Sale Doctrine 
In the Copyright Act of 1976, Congress 
enacted what is now 17 U.S.c. § 602(a)(1). 
That section provides: 
Importation into the United States, 
without the authority of the owner of 
copyright under this title, of copies 
or phonorecords of a work that have 
been acquired outside the United 
States is an infringement of the 
exclusive right to distribute copies or 
phonorecords under section 106, 
actionable under section 501. 
Even if the conduct at issue in this case is 
otherwise covered by this statutory 
language, Kirtsaeng contends that he is 
shielded from any liability under the 
Copyright Act by § 1 09( a), see note 1, ante. 
Again, in relevant part, that section 
provides: "Notwithstanding the provisions 
of section 106(3) [of the Copyright Act], the 
owner of a particular copy . . . lawfully 
made under this title, or any person 
authorized by such owner, is entitled, 
without the authority of the copyright 
owner, to sell or otherwise dispose of the 
possession of that copy." Section 109( a) is a 
codification of the longstanding "first sale 
doctrine." 
There is at least some tension between § 
602(a)(l), which seemingly seeks to give 
copyright holders broad control over the 
circumstances in which their copyrighted 
material may be imported (directly or 
indirectly) into the United States, and § 
109(a), which limits the extent to which the 
copyright holder may limit distribution 
following an initial sale. The Supreme Court 
first had occasion to address the interplay 
between § 602(a)(l) and § 109(a) in Quality 
King Distributors, Inc. v. L 'anza Research 
International, Inc. 
Qllality King involved the sales practices of 
L'anza Research International, a California 
corporation engaged in the business of 
manufacturing and selling shampoos, 
conditioners, and other hair care products. 
L'anza sold its products domestically and 
internationally, but its prices to foreign 
distributors were 35% to 40% lower than the 
prices charged to its domestic distributors. 
Lanza brought suit against Quality King 
Distributors, Inc., which had purchased 
shipments of L'anza's products from one of 
L'anza's foreign distributors and then 
reimported the products into the United 
States for resale. L'anza alleged that Quality 
King's actions violated its "exclusive rights 
under 17 U.S.C. §§ 106, 501 and 602 to 
reproduce and distribute the copyrighted 
material in the United States." The Supreme 
Court heard the case in order to decide the 
question of "whether the 'first sale' doctrine 
endorsed in § 109(a) is applicable to 
imported copies." 
In a unanimous opinion, the Supreme Court 
held that § 109(a), operating in combination 
with § 106(3), does in fact limit the scope of 
§ 602(a). However, there was a key factual 
difference at work in Q1Iality King that is of 
critical importance to our disposition of the 
instant appeal. In Q1Iality King, the 
copyrighted items in question had all been 
manufactured in the United States. Indeed, 
this important fact provided the basis for 
Justice Ginsburg's brief concurring opinion, 
in which she explained: "This case involves 
a 'round trip' journey, travel of the copies in 
question from the United States to places 
abroad, then back again. I join the Comt's 
OpInIOn recognizing that we do not today 
resolve cases in which the allegedly 
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infringing impOlts were manufactured 
abroad." 
Although the maJonty opmlOn did not 
directly address the question of whether § 
I09(a) can apply to items manufactured 
abroad, the opinion contains instructive 
dicta that guides our disposition of the issue. 
In particular, the Court took pains to explain 
ways in which § 109(a) and § 602(a) do, and 
do not, overlap. As the Court stated: 
"[ A ]lthough both the first sale doctrine 
embodied in § 109(a) and the exceptions in 
§ 602(a) may be applicable in some 
situations, the former does not subsume the 
latter; those provisions retain significant 
independent meaning." For instance, § 
602(a) "encompasses copies that are not 
subject to the first sale doctrine-e.g., 
copies that are lawfully made under the law 
of another country[.]" The COUlt even 
pondered the following hypothetical: 
If the author of [a] work gave the 
exclusive United States distribution 
rights-enforceable under the Act-
to the publisher of the United States 
edition and the exclusive British 
distribution rights to the publisher of 
the British edition, . . . presumably 
only those made by the publisher of 
the U.S. edition would be 'lawfully 
made under this title' within the 
meaning of § I09(a). The first sale 
doctrine would not provide the 
publisher of the British edition who 
decided to sell in the American 
market with a defense to an action 
under § 602( a) (or, for that matter, to 
an action under § 106(3), ifthere was 
a distribution of the copies). 
In these passages, the Court suggests that 
copyrighted material manufactured abroad 
cannot be subject to the first sale doctrine 
contained in § I09(a). 
The Supreme COUlt recently seemed poised 
to transform this dicta into holding when it 
granted a writ of certiorari to review the 
Ninth Circuit's decision in Omega S.A. v. 
Costco Wholesale Corp. That case involved 
the importation into the United States of 
Omega-brand watches by unidentified third 
parties without the permission of Omega; 
the watches were ultimately purchased and 
resold by Costco Wholesale Corporation. 
The Ninth Circuit maintained its well-settled 
position that § 109(a) does not apply to 
items manufactured outside of the United 
States unless they were previously impOlted 
and sold in the United States with the 
copyright holder's permission. After hearing 
oral argument, an equally divided Supreme 
Court (with Justice Kagan recused) was 
obliged to affirm the judgment rendered by 
the Ninth Circuit. 
Without fmther guidance from the Supreme 
COUlt, we now consider the extent to which 
the protections set forth in § 109(a) may 
apply to items manufactured abroad. In 
doing so, we rely on the text of § I09(a), the 
structure of the Copyright Act, and the 
Supreme Court's opinion in Quality King. 
3. Textual Analysis 
We start, of course, by turning to the 
statutory language enacted by Congress. 
"Statutory interpretation always begins with 
the plain language of the statute, assuming 
the statute is unambiguous." In the instant 
case, we are principally called upon to give 
meaning to the phrase "lawfully made under 
this title" contained in § 109(a). 
In arnvmg at a satisfactory textual 
interpretation of the statutory language at 
issue, we focus primarily on the words 
"made" and "under," but this task is 
complicated by twa factors: (1) the word 
"made" is not a term of art in the Copyright 
321 
Act, and (2) "[t]he word 'under' is [a] 
chameleon" and courts "must draw its 
meaning from its context." Wiley contends 
that we must interpret "lawfully made under 
this title" to mean "lawfully made in the 
United States." This view of the law-which 
was also adopted by the United States in its 
amicus brief before the Supreme Court in 
Costco-is certainly consistent with the text 
of § 109(a). It is also the logical 
consequence, Wiley submits, of the general 
presumption against the extraterritorial 
application of statutes, a presumption which 
we have specifically applied to the copyright 
laws. Wiley argues that Title 17 only applies 
in the United States, and thus, copyrighted 
items can only be "made" under that title if 
they were physically made in this country. 
But the extraterritorial application of Title 
17 is more complicated than Wiley allows, 
since certain provisions in Title 17 explicitly 
take account of activity occurring abroad. 
Most notably, § 1 04(b )(2) provides that 
"[t]he works specified by sections 1 02 and 
1 03, when published, are subject to 
protection under this title if the work is first 
published in the United States or in a 
foreign nation that, on the date of first 
publication, is a treaty party[.]"lndeed, 
because § 1 04(b )(2) provides that copyright 
protection can apply to works published in 
foreign nations, it is possible to interpret § 
109(a)'s "lawfully made under this title" 
language to mean, in effect, "any work that 
is subject to protection under this title." 
There are other reasons why a textual 
analysis alone is not sufficient to support 
Wiley's preferred reading of § 109(a). Most 
obviously, if Congress had intended the first 
sale doctrine-at least as codified by § 
109(a)-to apply only to copies of works 
made in the United States, it could have 
easily written the statute to say precisely 
that. Moreover, "lawfully made under this 
title" appears in other provisions of Title 17 
where it is at least arguable that Congress 
intended this language to apply to copies of 
works manufactured outside of the United 
States. For instance, § 1 006( a)(1) of the 
Audio Home Recording Act provides for 
applicable royalty payments to be made to 
"any interested copyright party whose 
musical work or sound recording has been 
embodied in a digital musical recording or 
an analog musical recording lawfully made 
under this title that has been distributed .... " 
It is the view of the U.S. Copyright Office 
that distribution of royalty payments under 
this Act is not limited to those recordings 
manufactured in the United States. 
But while a textual reading of § 109(a) does 
not compel the result favored by Wiley, it 
does not foreclose it either. The relevant text 
is simply unclear. "[L]awfully made under 
this title" could plausibly be interpreted to 
mean any number of things, including: (1) 
"manufactured in the United States," (2) 
"any work made that is subject to protection 
under this title," or (3) "lawfully made under 
this title had this title been applicable." 
4. Section 602(a)(1) and Quality King 
Confronted with an utterly ambiguous text, 
we think it best to adopt an interpretation of 
§ 109(a) that best comports with both § 
602(a)(1) and the Supreme Court's opinion 
in Quality King. 
Section 602(a)(1) prohibits the impOliation 
into the United States of copies of 
copyrighted works acquired abroad without 
the authorization of the copyright holder. 
This provision is obviously intended to 
allow copyright holders some flexibility to 
divide or treat differently the international 
and domestic markets for the particular 
copyrighted work. If the first sale doctrine 
codified in § 109(a) only applies to 
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copyrighted copies manufactured 
domestically, copyright holders would stilI 
have a free hand-subject, of course, to 
other relevant exceptions enumerated in 
Title 17, such as those in §§ 107, 108, and 
602(a)(3)-to control the circumstances in 
which copies manufactured abroad could be 
legally imported into the United States. On 
the other hand, the mandate of § 602(a)(1)-
that "[i]mportation into the United States, 
without the authority of the owner of 
copyright under [the Copyright Act], of 
copies ... of a work that have been acquired 
outside the United States is an infringement 
of the [owner's] exclusive right to distribute 
copies"-would have no force in the vast 
majority of cases if the first sale doctrine 
was interpreted to apply to every copy 
manufactured abroad that was either made 
"subject to protection under Title 17," or 
"consistent with the requirements of Title 17 
had Title 17 been applicable." This reading 
of the Copy-right Act militates in favor of 
finding that § 109(a) only applies to 
domestically manufactured works. While the 
Ninth Circuit in Omega held that § 109(a) 
also applies to foreign-produced copies of 
works sold in the United States with the 
permission of the copyright holder, that 
holding relied on Ninth Circuit precedents 
not adopted by other courts of appeals. 
Accordingly, while perhaps a close call, we 
think that, in light of its necessary interplay 
with § 602( a)(1), § 1 09( a) is best interpreted 
as applying only to copies manufactured 
domesticall y. 
In adopting this view, we are comfOlied by 
the fact that our interpretation of § 1 09( a) is 
one that the Justices appear to have had in 
mind when deciding Q1Iality King. There, 
the COUli reasoned, admittedly in dicta, that 
§ 602(a)(1) had a broader scope than § 
1 09( a) because, at least in part, § 602( a)( 1) 
"applies to a category of copies that are 
neither piratical nor 'lawfully made under 
this title.' That category encompasses copies 
that were 'lawfully made' not under the 
United States Copyright Act, but instead, 
under the law of some other country." This 
last sentence indicates that, in the Court's 
view, copies "lawfully made" under the laws 
of a foreign country-though perhaps not 
produced in violation of any United States 
laws-are not necessarily "lawfully made" 
insofar as that phrase is used in § 109(a) of 
our Copyright Act. 
Applying these principles to the facts of this 
case, we conclude that the District COUli 
correctly decided that Kilisaeng could not 
avail himself of the first sale doctrine 
codified by § 1 09( a) since all the books in 
question were manufactured outside of the 
United States. In sum, we hold that the 
phrase "lawfully made under this Title" in § 
109(a) refers specifically and exclusively to 
copies that are made in territories in which 
the Copyright Act is law, and not to foreign-
manufactured works. 
We freely acknowledge that this is a 
patiicularly difficult question of statutory 
construction in light of the ambiguous 
language of § 109(a), but our holding is 
supported by the structure of Title 17 as well 
as the Supreme Court's opinion in Q1Iality 
King. If we have misunderstood 
Congressional purpose in enacting the first 
sale doctrine, or if our decision leads to 
policy consequences that were not foreseen 
by Congress or which Congress now finds 
unpalatable, Congress is of course able to 
correct our judgment. 
B. The District Court did not err in its 
instructions to the jury. 
"We review jury instructions de novo, and 
reverse only when the charge, viewed as a 
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whole, constitutes prejudicial error." 
Kirtsaeng claims that the District Court 
erred by rejecting proposed jury instructions 
that acknowledged that the applicability of 
the first sale doctrine to foreign-produced 
goods was an unresolved question in the 
federal courts. Specifically, Kirtsaeng argues 
that he was prejudiced by the Court's failure 
to charge that the first sale doctrine was an 
unsettled area of law because the charge was 
essential to his argument that he had 
performed presak internet research regarding 
the legality of his sales and therefore had not 
"willfully" infringed the copyrights. 
It is undisputed that Kirtsaeng's counsel did 
not object to the final jury instructions 
during trial. "[F]ailure to object to a jury 
instruction . . . prior to the jury retiring 
results in a waiver of that objection." 
Nonetheless, under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 51 (d)(2), we "may consider a 
plain error in the instruction that has not 
been preserved as required [under Rule 51] 
if the error affects substantial rights." 
"To constitute plain error, a court's action 
must contravene an established rule of law." 
Kirtsaeng does not meet his burden under 
this stringent standard. Although the District 
Court was free to permit the jury to consider 
the unsettled state of the law in determining 
whether Kirtsaeng's conduct was willful, we 
can find no binding authority for the 
proposition that it was required to do so. 
Furthermore, Kilisaeng was provided ample 
opportunity to introduce evidence at trial 
and to argue to the jury that his internet 
research had led him to believe that his 
conduct was not unlawful. Accordingly, we 
cannot conclude that the District Court 
plainly erred in declining to give Kilisaeng's 
proposed instruction. 
C. The District Court did not err in 
allowing into evidence the amount of 
defendant's gross revenues. 
Kilisaeng argues that admission of evidence 
regarding his gross revenues prejudiced him 
by confusing the jury as to the amount of 
damages that should have been awarded to 
Wiley. He suggests that the majority of his 
revenues came from the sale of other 
publishers' used volumes, many of which 
were produced in the United States, and 
claims that because of the evidence of 
revenues that the judge permitted to be 
presented to the jury, he was inappropriately 
forced to pay high statutory damages. 
To determine whether evidence of the 
amount of defendant's gross revenues was 
properly admitted, ordinarily we first 
determine the appropriate standard of 
review. As stated above, where a party does 
not contemporaneously object to an 
evidentiary ruling, that party must 
demonstrate that the District Court 
committed "plain error." However, even if a 
proper objection was asselied in a timely 
fashion, we accord "considerable deference 
to a district court's decision to admit ... 
evidence" pursuant to Federal Rule of 
Evidence 403(b) and will reverse a district 
court's evidentiary ruling only if it 
constitutes an abuse of discretion. When we 
review a district court's "judgment 
regarding the admissibility of a particular 
piece of evidence under [Federal Rule of 
Evidence] 403, we generally maximize its 
probative value and minimize its prejudicial 
effect." Here, however, we need not reach 
the question of whether Kirtsaeng's counsel 
properly objected to the admission of 
evidence regarding his gross revenues 
because we hold that admission of the 
324 
evidence by the District COUli was not error 
or an abuse of discretion, and certainly not 
plain error. 
At trial, the jury awarded $75,000 in 
statutory damages per copyrighted work for 
Kirtsaeng's willful infringement of eight 
works. Under the relevant statutory 
provision, 17 U.S.C. § 504(c), see note 10, 
ante, the jury could have awarded damages 
of up to $150,000 per copyrighted work. 
Because abundant evidence was available to 
support the jury's finding of willfulness, the 
admission of information about Kirtsaeng's 
revenues was not prejudicial-that is, the 
jury could have imposed the same amount of 
damages without knowledge of Kirtsaeng's 
revenues. For example, the books m 
question clearly stated the following: 
This book is authorized for sale [in a 
foreign region] only and may not be 
exported out of this region. 
Exportation from or impOliation of 
this book to another region without 
the Publisher's authorization, is 
illegal and is a violation of the 
Publisher's rights. The Publisher 
may take legal action to enforce its 
rights. The Publisher may recover 
damages and costs, including but not 
limited to lost profits and attorney's 
fees, in the event legal action is 
required. 
In these circumstances, it does not seem 
anomalous or extraordinary that the jury 
made the findings it did, and we see no 
reason to conclude that the District Court's 
decision was improper under Rule 403(b). 
CONCLUSION 
To summarize, we hold that (l) the first sale 
doctrine does not apply to copies 
manufactured outside of the United States; 
(2) the District Court did not err in declining 
to instruct the jury regarding the unsettled 
state of the first sale doctrine; and (3) the 
District Court did not err in admitting 
evidence of Kitisaeng's gross revenues. 
Accordingly, the judgment of the District 
COUli is AFFIRMED. 
J. GARV AN MURTHA, District Judge, 
dissenting: 
As noted by the majority, the application of 
the first sale doctrine when a copy is 
manufactured outside the United States is an 
issue of first impression in this Circuit. The 
Supreme Court has recently considered the 
issue but unfortunately provided no specific 
guidance. Unlike the majority, I conclude 
the first sale defense should apply to a copy 
of a work that enjoys United States 
copyright protection wherever 
manufactured. Accordingly, I respectfully 
dissent. 
The Copyright Act sections that are 
pertinent to this appeal-17 U.S.c. §§ 
106(3), 109(a), and 602(a)(1)-are set out in 
the opinion of the majority. The distribution 
right of § l06(3) primarily protects a 
copyright owner's ability to control the 
terms on which her work enters the market. 
The first sale doctrine of § 109(a) limits the 
scope of this distribution right. Finally, § 
602(a)(I) addresses the extent to which the 
distribution right allows a copyright owner 
to also control importation of copies of her 
work. 
The Supreme Court has held a copyright 
owner's § 602 (a) right to control the 
impOliation of copies of her work is 
derivative of § 106(3)'s distribution right, 
which is subject to the first sale doctrine. 
Q1Iality King Distrib. v. L 'anza Research 
1nt'1 Inc., 523 U.S. 135. The Court noted 
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"the text of § 602(a) itself unambiguously 
states that the prohibited importation is an 
infringement of the exclusive distribution 
right 'under section 106, actionable under 
section 501.'" Because the rights granted in 
§ 106(3) are "subject to sections 107 
through 122," the copyright owner's power 
to limit importation is qualified by the first 
sale doctrine of § 109(a). 
The issue is whether this holding can be 
extended to copies manufactured outside the 
United States. The Q1lality King Court held 
the first sale doctrine applies to imported 
copies that were made in the United States. 
Here, the district court held-and the 
majority affirms-the doctrine does not 
apply to imported copies that were made 
abroad because § 109(a) applies only to 
copies that are "lawfully made under this 
title," and that means physically 
manufactured in the United States. The 
court's decision is based on the following 
dicta in Q1lality King: 
Even in the absence of a market 
allocation agreement between, for 
example, a publisher of the United 
States edition and a publisher of the 
British edition of the same work, 
each such publisher could make 
lawful copies. If the author of the 
work gave the exclusive United 
States distribution rights-enforceable 
under the Act-to the publisher of the 
United States edition and the 
exclusive British distribution rights 
to the publisher of the British 
edition, however, presumably only 
those made by the publisher of the 
United States edition would be 
'lawfully made under this title' 
within the meaning of § 109(a). The 
first sale doctrine would not provide 
the publisher of the British edition 
who decided to sell in the American 
market with a defense to an action 
under § 602(a) .... 
I respectfully disagree with the court's 
analysis. To apply, § 109(a) requires (1) the 
person claiming protection be the owner of 
the copy, and (2) the copy was "lawfully 
made under this title." 17 U.S.C. § 109(a). 
Courts have split over the meaning of 
"lawfully made under this title," with some 
holding it means "legally manufactured ... 
within the United States," and others 
"confess[ing] some uneasiness with this 
construction" and suggesting "lawfully 
made under this title" refers not to the place 
a copy is manufactured but to the lawfulness 
of its manufacture as a function of U.S. 
copyright law. 
The statutory text does not refer to a place of 
manufacture: It focuses on whether a 
particular copy was manufactured lawfully 
under title 17 of the United States Code. 17 
U.S.C. § 109(a). The United States law of 
copyrights is contained in title 17. 
Accordingly, the lawfulness of the 
manufacture of a particular copy should be 
judged by U.S. copyright law. A U.S. 
copyright owner may make her own copies 
or authorize another to do so. 17 U.S.C. § 
106(1). Thus, regardless of place of 
manufacture, a copy authorized by the U.S. 
rightsholder is lawful under U.S. copyright 
law. Here, Wiley, the U.S. copyright holder, 
authorized its subsidiary to manufacture the 
copies abroad, which were purchased and 
then imported into the United States. 
This interpretation of "lawfully made" is 
supp011ed by the language of the Copyright 
Act as a whole. For example, Congress used 
the phrase "under this title" in multiple 
sections of the Act to describe the scope of 
rights created by the Act. However, "[ w ]hen 
Congress considered the place of 
manufacture to be imp011ant . . . the 
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statutory language clearly expresses that 
concern." Sebastian, 847 F.2d at 1098 n. 1. 
F or example, § 601 ( a), the "manufacturing 
requirement," provides: 
Prior to July 1, 1986, and except as 
provided by subsection (b), the 
importation into or public 
distribution in the United States of 
copies of a work consisting 
preponderantly of nondramatic 
literary material that is in the English 
language and is protected 1lnder this 
title is prohibited unless the portions 
consisting of such material have 
been man1lfact1lred in the United 
States or Canada. 
17 U.S.C. § 601(a)(1) (emphasis added). 
Also, as the majority points out, § 1 04(b )(2) 
provides "[t]he works specified by sections 
102 and 103, when published, are subject to 
protection under this title if the work is first 
published in the United States or in a 
foreign nation .... " 17 U.S.C. § 104(b)(2) 
(emphasis added). If Congress intended § 
109(a) to apply only to copies manufactured 
in the United States, it could have stated 
"lawfully manufactured in the United States 
under this title." As Congress did not 
include "manufactured in the United States" 
in § 109(a), though it was clearly capable of 
doing so as demonstrated by § 601(a), the 
omission suppOlis the conclusion that 
Congress did not intend the language 
"lawfully manufactured under this title" to 
limit application of § 109(a) to only copies 
manufactured in the United States. 
As noted in the majority opinion, supra note 
14, the first sale doctrine originated in 
Babbs-Merrill Co. v. Stra1ls. There the 
Supreme COUli held defendant retailer's 
sales of a copyrighted book for less than the 
price noted on the copyright page was not a 
copyright violation. "The purchaser of a 
book, once sold by authority of the owner of 
the copyright, may sell it again, although he 
could not publish a new edition of it." Once 
the copyright holder has controlled the terms 
on which the work enters the market, i.e., 
the purpose of the distribution right, "the 
policy favoring a copyright monopoly for 
authors gives way to the policy opposing 
restraints of trade and restraints on 
alienation." Accordingly, the Babbs-Merrill 
Court held the copyright owner did not have 
the right to control the terms of subsequent 
sales. 
The common law policy against restraints on 
trade and alienation is not limited by the 
place of manufacture. Under the 1909 
(codifying the Babbs-Merrill holding) and 
1947 Copyright Acts, the first sale doctrine 
applied to "any copy of a copyrighted work 
the possession of which has been lawfidly 
obtained" The Supreme Court noted 
"[t]here is no reason to assume Congress 
intended either § 109(a) or the earlier 
codifications of the doctrine to limit its 
broad scope." The changed wording in the 
current version of § 109(a)-"lawfully made 
under this title"-from the prior versions-
"possession of which has been lawfully 
obtained"-should likewise not be presumed 
to do so. 
Economic justifications also support 
applicability of the first sale doctrine to 
foreign made copies. Granting a copyright 
holder unlimited power to control all 
commercial activities involving copies of 
her work would create high transaction costs 
and lead to uncertainty in the secondary 
market. An owner first would have to 
determine the origin of the copy-either 
domestic or foreign-before she could sell 
it. If it were foreign made and the first sale 
doctrine does not apply to such copies, she 
would need to receive permission from the 
copyright holder. Such a result would 
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provide greater copyright protection to 
copies manufactured abroad than those 
manufactured domestically: Once a 
domestic copy has been sold, no matter 
where the sale occurred, the copyright 
holder's right to control its distribution is 
exhausted. I do not believe Congress 
intended to provide an incentive for u.s. 
copyright holders to manufacture copies of 
their work abroad. 
The Ninth Circuit has attempted to 
circumvent this perpetual right when a copy 
is made abroad by holding the first sale 
doctrine can apply to copies made outside 
the United States but only after there has 
been one authorized sale here. This 
precedent carried over into the reasoning in 
Omega S.A. The Supreme Court, however, 
provided no guidance as to its views on the 
Ninth Circuit's imperfect solution, which is 
judicially created. This interpretation finds 
no support in the statutory text and is in 
direct conflict with the pOliion of the 
Supreme Court's Quality King decision 
which noted that where a sale occurs IS 
irrelevant for first sale purposes. 
Supporters of limiting the application of the 
first sale doctrine to domestically 
manufactured copies rely on the argument 
that applying the doctrine to foreign made 
copies would render § 602(a) "virtually 
meaningless." (Appellee's Br. at 15-17.) 
However, § 602(a) will always apply to 
copies of a work that have not been sold or 
are piratical copies. It also applies to copies 
of a work not lawfully manufactured under 
title 17 but lawfully manufactured under 
some other source of law, as in the Quality 
King dicta, and to copies not in the 
possession of the "owner," e.g., a bailee, 
licensee, consignee or one whose possession 
of the copy was unlawful. Further, § 602(a) 
itself states unauthorized importation is an 
infringement of the exclusive distribution 
right of § 106, which as noted above is 
subject to the first sale doctrine of § 109(a). 
Nothing in § 109(a) or the history, purposes, 
and policies of the first sale doctrine limits it 
to copies of a work manufactured in the 
United States. That leaves the question 
whether the Quality King dicta "sp[ eaks] 
directly to whether the first sale doctrine 
applies to copies manufactured abroad." 
That dicta, however, makes no reference to 
the place of manufacture, Quality King, and 
therefore does not speak directly to the issue 
of applicability of the doctrine to foreign 
made copies. Further, the dicta states the 
first sale doctrine would not provide a 
defense to the publisher who sold copies in 
the American market. Of course, because in 
that situation there has been no first sale 
unlike here, where the issue is whether the 
first sale doctrine is available as a defense to 
the subsequent purchaser. 
In Quality King, Justice Ginsburg, in a 
concurrence joined by no other justice, 
noted: "I Jom the Court's opmlon 
recognizing that we do not today resolve 
cases in which the allegedly infringing 
imports were manufactured abroad." That 
issue, however, was squarely before the 
Supreme Court in Omega and four justices 
presumably did not agree the Quality King 
dicta directly addresses it or constitutes the 
Court's current view. In light of the above 
analysis, I agree with the majority that it is a 
"close call," supra p. 221, and I would 
conclude the first sale doctrine applies to 
foreign manufactured copies. 
For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully 
dissent. 
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"Thai Student's Money-Making Effort at Center of 
Supreme Court Copyright Case" 
The Washington Post 
April 16,2012 
Mark Sherman 
The Supreme COUli agreed Monday to 
decide a copyright case with important 
implications for the large and growing 
markets in discount and Internet sales. 
The justices said they will hear an appeal 
from a Thai student doing graduate work in 
the United States who tried to make ends 
meet by re-selling textbooks that family and 
friends first purchased abroad. A jury 
awarded textbook publisher John Wiley & 
Sons $600,000 after deciding that math 
graduate student Supap Kirtsaeng infringed 
on the company's copyrights. 
The issue at the Supreme Court is whether 
U.S. copyright protection applies to items 
that are made abroad, purchased abroad and 
then resold in the U.S. without the 
permission of the manufacturer. The high 
court split 4-4 when it tried to answer that 
question in a case in 2010 involving Costco 
and Swiss watch maker Omega. 
Justice Elena Kagan sat out the Costco case, 
but will join the other justices in hearing the 
new dispute. 
Discount sellers like Costco and Target and 
Internet giants eBay and Amazon help form 
an estimated $63 billion annual market for 
goods that are purchased abroad, then 
impolied and resold without the permission 
of the manufacturer. The U.S.-based sellers, 
and consumers, benefit from the common 
practice of manufacturers to price items 
more cheaply abroad than in the United 
States. This phenomenon is sometimes 
called a parallel market or gray market. 
The high court already has ruled that 
copyright protections do not apply when the 
goods are made in the U.S., sold abroad and 
reimported. This case concerns only foreign-
made items. 
Federal judges have come to different 
conclusions about whether copyright law 
applies in Kirtsaeng's and other cases. 
Kilisaeng returned to Thailand in 2010 after 
doing graduate work at the University of 
Southern California, said his lawyer, Joshua 
Rosenkranz. Earlier, he received his 
undergraduate degree from Cornell 
University in Ithaca, N.Y. 
While at USC, Kirtsaeng arranged for 
family and friends living abroad to purchase 
textbooks and ship them to him. He resold 
the copies on eBay. Eight textbooks sold by 
Kilisaeng were published by Wiley's Asian 
subsidiary. The company sued the student in 
federal court in New York. 
eBay was among the outside parties urging 
the court to hear the case and decide it in 
Kirtsaeng's favor. 
The case will be argued in the fall. 
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"The Wait for Kirtsaeng Is Over" 
IP In Brief 
August 15, 2011 
Andrew Berger 
The cloud lingering over the gray market 
industry since the Supreme Court split 4-4 in 
Castea just got a lot darker. Gray market 
goods are those made by the copyright 
holder abroad and then imported into this 
country without the permission of the 
copyright holder. Just last week it seemed 
the 2d Circuit would never decide John 
Wiley v. Kirtsaeng argued in May of 2010. 
Today in 2-1 decision the 2d Circuit (2-1) 
affirmed the result below. 
The 2d Circuit held that § 602 (a)(1) of the 
Copyright Act trumps the first sale doctrine 
in § 109(a) of that Act with respect to goods 
made abroad and then imported into this 
country. But the tension between § 602 
(a)(1) and § 109(a) is far from over. 
Kirtsaeng admitted the case raised "a 
particularly difficult question of statutory 
construction" and the result was therefore a 
"close call" And Judge Murtha's well-
reasoned dissent in Kirtsaeng adds to the 
uncertainty. 
Sections 109 and 602 are in tension because 
they lead to opposing results. Section 109, 
the first sale doctrine, provides that a 
copyright holder loses control over the 
distribution of goods once the holder has 
made a first sale. But Section 602(a)(1) 
provides that a copyright holder may retain 
control over the distribution of copyrighted 
goods made abroad if they were then 
imported into the US without the permission 
of the copyright holder. Control is 
maintained because §602( a)(1) states that 
unauthorized importation of goods into the 
U.S. infringes copyright holder's "exclusive 
right to distribute ... under section 106." 
This tension between these sections was at 
play in Kirtsaeng. Mr. Kirtsaeng was 
engaged in what some refer to as textbook 
arbitrage. He bought text books Wiley made 
aboard and intended for distribution abroad 
and without Wiley's consent imported and 
sold them in this country at prices below 
what Wiley charged for the same texts it 
manufactured here. 
Kirtsaeng sought refuge under the first sale 
doctrine. He argued that, once Wiley had 
sold these texts abroad, Wiley had exhausted 
its first sale rights and therefore he was free 
to resell them in the U.S. Kitisaeng relied on 
the "subject to" language of section 106 (3). 
That language gives the copyright holder the 
exclusive right to distribute "subject to" a 
number of sections of the Copyright Act, 
including section 109. Thus, Kirtsaeng 
asserted that, once Wiley exercised its first 
sale rights abroad, Wiley lost its exclusive 
right to control distribution of the goods 
under §§602(a)(I) and 106(3). In other 
words, Kirtsaeng stated that Wiley should 
not complain that he, as lawful owner of the 
goods, resold them here because Wiley had 
already received a fair return for those goods 
abroad. 
The problem for Mr. Kirtsaeng was some 
vague and ill-chosen language in the first 
sale doctrine. It only applies to copyrighted 
goods "lawfully made under this title." But 
no one really knows what "lawfully made 
under this title" means. As the 2d Circuit 
aptly noted in Kirtsaeng, "made is not a 
term of ali in the Copyright Act," and the 
word "under" is a "chameleon and courts 
must draw its meaning from its context." 
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Kirtsaeng offered three interpretations of 
"lawfully made under this title." This phrase 
may refer to (1) goods manufactured in this 
country; (2) goods made anywhere that are 
"subject to protection under this title [17];" 
or (3) goods "lawfully made under this title 
had this title been applicable." 
The majority in Kirtsaeng opted for the first 
interpretation with considerable skepticism, 
recognizing that "lawfully made under this 
title" "is simply unclear." The lack of clarity 
hobbles the opinion. 
Kirtsaeng stated that restricting the first sale 
doctrine to domestically made goods might 
be the "logical consequence" of the 
presumption against extraterritorial 
application of the Copyright Act. Id. at 14. 
But the court also acknowledged that 
"certain provisions of Title 17 take account 
of activity occurring abroad." For instance, 
the court stated that "§ 1 04(b )(2) provides 
that copyright protection can apply to works 
published in foreign nations." 
Moreover, Kirtsaeng indicated that 
'''lawfully made under this title' appears in 
other provisions of Title 17 where it is at 
least arguable that Congress intended this 
language to apply to works manufactured 
outside of the United States." The court 
pointed to § 106(a)(1) of the Audio Home 
Recording Act, which provides for royalties 
to the copyright owner whose work is 
embodied in a digital recording. The court 
noted the Copyright Office's view that 
royalties under this section are "not limited 
to those recordings manufactured in the 
United States." 
So, in view of this "patiicularly difficult 
question" of first impression, what prompted 
the Second Circuit to restrict the first sale 
doctrine to only those goods made in the 
U.S.? 
The Second Circuit stated that this result 
"best comports" with § 602 (a)(1) and the 
Supreme Comi's opinion in Quality King. 
The court reasoned that, applying the first 
sale doctrine to works made abroad, would 
give "no force" to § 602 "in the vast 
majority of cases." But, as the dissent 
pointed out, § 602 will still apply: "to copies 
of a work that have not been sold [abroad] 
or are piratical copies;" "to copies of a work 
not lawfully manufactured under title 17 but 
lawfully manufactured under some other 
source of law," and "to copies not in the 
possession of the 'owner,' e.g., a bailee, 
licensee, consignee or one whose possession 
of the copy was unlawful." 
The court also indicated that dicta in the 
Supreme Court's earlier opinion in Quality 
King v. L 'Anza seemed to suggest that § 602 
"had a broader scope than § 109(a)" because 
§ 602 applied to goods made "under the 
laws of some other country." But the 
concepts of being lawfully made under the 
laws of another country and lawfully made 
under this title are not mutually exclusive. If 
a U.S. copyright holder makes goods in 
Brazil, then the copies are made in 
accordance with the Copyright Act (which 
gives the holder the right to make copies) 
and therefore those goods are lawfully made 
under this title as well as presumably under 
Brazilian law. 
The defendant had appropriately warned that 
a finding for Wiley may induce 
manufacturers to shift operations overseas to 
take advantage of the expanded protections 
of § 602. Although the majority touched on 
this concern, the comi passed the ball to 
Congress, inviting it to "correct our 
judgment" "if our decision leads to policy 
consequences that were not foreseen by 
Congress." 
Kirtsaeng raises some troubling questions 
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that are the subject of Mr. Kirtsaeng's 
petition for en bane review. If the first sale 
doctrine no longer applies to any goods 
made abroad (as others have warned) even 
though imported with the permission of the 
copyright holder, has the Second Circuit 
given foreign manufacturers the right to 
destroy longstanding and enormously 
important secondary and rental markets in 
this country? In other words, does a 
Japanese car manufacturer who impOlis and 
sells a car in this country now have the 
section 106(3) right to direct the buyer not to 
resell it? 
Further, the Second Circuit has yet to decide 
Pearson v. Arora, argued on January 19, 
2011 and Pearson v. K1Imar, argued March 
21,2011 both of which raise identical issues. 
But Kirtsaeng is now binding Second 
Circuit precedent that Arora and Kumar 
must follow. Only an intervening change in 
the law or en bane review will allow the 
Second Circuit to deviate from its holding in 
Kirtsaeng. Nevertheless, with the 4-4 split in 
Costeo and Judge MUliha's dissent III 
Kirtsaeng, there may be more to come. 
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"Made in the USA: Does the 'First Sale' 
Doctrine Require It?" 
Forbes 
May 2,2012 
Richard Busch 
Are used books and CDs legal? The answer 
may depend on where the book or CD was 
manufactured. People who trade in used 
books and CDs should closely watch a case 
pending before the Supreme Court that will 
determine if the Copyright Act's "first sale" 
doctrine applies to "gray market" 
copyrighted goods, i.e. those manufactured 
abroad but imported to the United States for 
resale. 
The first sale doctrine provides that after a 
copyrighted good, like a CD or a book, has 
been sold once, that copy of the work can be 
resold without the authorization of the 
copyright owner. That means you can 
legally buy and sell books and CDs. This 
keeps local Nashville favorites like 
Grimey's New & Pre loved Music and 
McKay Books open for business. It is also a 
huge source of revenue for behemoths like 
Amazon.com. According to the language of 
the Copyright Act, the first sale doctrine 
applies as long as the copyrighted good was 
"lawfully made under [the Copyright Act]." 
The question that follows is what does 
"lawfully made under [the Copyright Act]" 
mean? This is an easy question if you buy a 
book at an authorized retailer like 
Nashville's Parnassus Books and resell it a 
few miles away at McKay Books. That 
locally purchased new book was almost 
certainly made under the Copyright Act. It's 
a more difficult question if you buy a book 
in Thailand and resell it in California. 
The United States Supreme COUl1 just 
recently agreed to consider what "lawfully 
made under [the Copyright Act]" really 
means. Does it refer to any work that is 
protected under the Copyright Act, 
regardless of where it was manufactured? Or 
does it mean "manufactured in the United 
States," so that only copyrighted goods 
manufactured in the United States are 
subject to the first sale doctrine? The 
Supreme Court first planned to address this 
issue a couple of years ago in the case 
Omega S.A. v. Cos teo Wholesale 
Corporation, but Justice Kagan had to 
recuse herself from participating, and the 
remaining justices split 4-4 over the issue. 
As a result, the Supreme COUl1 did not 
deliver a written opinion or set any 
precedent. 
The case now before the Supreme Court, 
John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Kirtsaeng, 
involves the resale of textbooks 
manufactured in both the United States and 
in Thailand. The publisher, John Wiley & 
Sons, Inc., sells its textbooks in both 
domestic and international markets, 
including Thailand. The domestic and 
international versions have mostly the same 
content, but the textbooks manufactured in 
Thailand differ in design and are made from 
lower quality materials. Accordingly, the 
textbooks manufactured in Thailand sell at a 
much lower price than the United States 
verSIOns. 
The defendant in the case, Supap Kil1saeng, 
a native of Thailand, moved to the United 
States to pursue his education. While a 
doctoral candidate at the University of 
Southern California, Kirtsaeng helped 
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subsidize the cost of his education by having 
friends and family purchase Wiley textbooks 
manufactured in Thailand and ship them to 
him for resale on websites like eBay.com. 
Wiley learned about Kirtsaeng's business 
and sued him for copyright infringement in 
the United States District Court for the 
Southern District of New York. 
The trial court refused to allow Kirtsaeng to 
assert a first sale defense and the jury found 
him liable for copyright infringement, 
awarding Wiley $600,000 in damages. On 
appeal, the Second Circuit agreed that the 
first sale doctrine does not apply to 
copyrighted goods manufactured outside of 
the United States. 
Based on the 4-4 split in the Costco case, it's 
not clear what the Supreme Court will think 
about the Second Circuit's interpretation of 
"lawfully made under [the Copyright Act]." 
It is clear, however, that Justice Kagan's 
view on the matter likely will be the 
deciding factor. 
The Court's decision could have a big 
impact on the gray market for copyrighted 
goods, including CDs and possibly even 
mp3s (the Southern District of New York 
ruled earlier this year that it may be possible 
to resell an mp3). This might not affect your 
local used book store, but it would likely 
have a big impact on sites like Amazon.com 
and eBay.com. It also might be good for 
content producers like publishers and record 
labels. As I discussed in a previous post on 
how eliminating CDs and lowering the price 
of mp3 albums could encourage more new 
sales, websites like Amazon.com often sell 
used CDs for less than their mp3 
counterparts, with no additional royalties to 
the record label, artist, and songwriter 
because of the first sale doctrine. 
If the Supreme Court agrees with the Second 
Circuit and decides that the first sale 
doctrine does not apply to albums 
manufactured abroad, this will prohibit 
people from purchasing foreign gray market 
albums and reselling them on Amazon.com 
and other similar sites. The result could 
mean less used CDs available for sale, an 
increase in sales of new CDs or mp3 
albums, and more control for content owners 
over the distribution of their copyrighted 
works. 
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"Supreme Court Takes Another Look 
at Gray Market Resales" 
Reuters 
April 17,2012 
Erin Geiger Smith 
The Supreme Court has decided to take a 
second crack at reconciling two apparently 
contradictory provisions in the Copyright 
Act: one that permits buyers to resell goods 
without worrying about permission from 
U.S. copyright holders, and another that 
controls the importation of copyrighted 
material into the United States. 
It may sound arcane, but this is a hugely-
consequential issue. The case in which the 
Supreme Court granted certiorari or judicial 
review involves a Thai graduate student 
reselling used foreign-manufactured books 
on eBay, but the court's ultimate ruling will 
profoundly affect the approximately $63 
billion "gray market" business. 
On Monday, the Supreme Court agreed to 
hear Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, which 
stems from one man's enterprise to help pay 
his tuition fees. Supap Kirtsaeng, a 
University of Southern California graduate 
student from Thailand, had family and 
friends buy textbooks manufactured 
internationally and ship them to him in 
California. He then resold the books on 
eBay and pocketed the proceeds. 
(Kirtsaeng's attorney for the earlier portions 
of this case, solo practitioner Sam Israel, 
was joined in Supreme Court briefing by 
counsel from Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe. 
Orrick patiner E. Joshua Rosenkranz said 
the firm had been watching the case and 
approached Israel about teaming up.) 
According to his petition for certiorari 
Kirstaeng was a notably well-informed eBay 
dealer. He researched the first-sale doctrine 
of U.S. copyright law, which entitles the 
owner of lawfully-produced work to resell 
the work without the authority of the 
copyright owner. John Wiley & Sons, whose 
Asian subsidiary produced some of the 
books Kilisaeng resold, disagreed with the 
graduate student's interpretation of the law. 
The publisher filed an infringement suit in 
Manhattan federal district court in 2008. A 
jury eventually found Kirtsaeng liable for 
infringing eight works and imposed 
statutory damages of $600,000. 
But Kirtsaeng is just a small player in the 
vast gray market, which includes not only 
individuals re-selling items, but also huge 
discount businesses like Costco selling 
foreign-made goods. By the time his case 
reached the 2nd Circuit COUli of Appeals the 
Supreme Court had already taken its first 
crack at regulating the market. In December 
2010, in a 4-to-4 split ruling in which Justice 
Elena Kagan did not take part, the high court 
affirmed, without written opinion, a ruling 
by the 9th Circuit COUli of Appeals, holding 
in Costeo Wholesale Corp. v. Omega that 
the first-sale doctrine applies only to U.S.-
made works. 
The 2nd Circuit applied the Costco case 
when it decided Kirstaeng's case in August 
2011, but acknowledged tension in the 
copyright law. In a 2-to-1 decision, Judges 
Jose Cabranes and Robert Katzmann (with a 
dissent from U.S. District COUli Judge 1. 
Gat'Van MUliha of Vermont, sitting by 
designation) upheld the verdict against the 
graduate student, ruling that the first-sale 
doctrine applies only to goods made in the 
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United States. But the appeals court also 
noted a "paIiicularly difficult question of 
statutory construction," because another 
section of the Copyright Act holds that 
importation of copyrighted goods without 
the authority of the copyright owner 
infringes the holder's right to distribute 
copies. 
The decision has had the strange impact of 
giving foreign manufactures the right "to 
control how goods are resold in the 
American marketplace," said Andrew 
Berger of Tannenbaum Helpern Syracuse & 
Hirschtritt, who authors the blog IP In Brief. 
He explained the implications via an 
extreme hypothetical: He might right afoul 
of the 2nd Circuit's Kirstaeng opinion if he 
tried to resell his foreign-made Nissan 
Altima despite any Nissan claims that 
dashboard elements are copyrighted. (That 
hypothetical might not even be so crazy-
the issue in the Costco case was a watch 
whose copyrighted component was a logo 
on the back.) "The Second Circuit seemed to 
say that this that is the kind of control 
Congress intended," Berger said. 
It'll now be up to the Supreme Court to 
decide Congress's intent and reconcile the 
gap in rights between U.S. and foreign 
manufacturers when it comes to resale. 
(Kagan, who will participate this time 
around, would seem to be the key vote, 
given the high comi's previous 4-to-4 split 
in Costco.) Orrick's Rosenkranz, who will 
likely argue on behalf of Kirtsaeng, said that 
the 100-year-old first-sale doctrine should 
also apply to foreign-made goods. "This 
notion that we would give foreign made 
goods greater protection than local goods 
makes no sense at all to me," he said. 
Theodore Olson of Gibson, Dunn & 
Crutcher, who represents John Wiley, did 
not return a call for comment. A Wiley 
spokesperson sent this statement: "The 2nd 
Circuit correctly concluded that those 
seeking to profit from the creative works of 
others cannot evade our intellectual property 
laws by impOliing copies from overseas. We 
look forward to defending that decision in 
the Supreme Comi." 
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Symczyk v. Genesis HealthCare Corp. 
10-3178 
Ruling Below: Symczyk v. Genesis HealthCare Corp., 656 F. 3d 189 (3rd Cir. 2011), cert. 
granted, 2012 WL 609478 (U.S. 2012). 
From April 2007 through December 2007, Symczyk was employed by defendants as a 
Registered Nurse at Pennypack Center in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. On December 4, 2009, 
Symczyk initiated a collective action under 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) on behalf of herself and all 
similarly situated individuals, alleging defendants violated the FLSA when they implemented a 
policy subjecting the pay of certain employees to an automatic meal break deduction whether or 
not they performed compensable work during their breaks. On February 18, 2010, defendants 
filed an answer to Symczyk's complaint and served her with an offer of judgment under 
Fed.R.Civ.P. 68 in the amount of "$7,500.00 in alleged unpaid wages, plus attorneys' fees, costs 
and expenses as determined by the Court." Symczyk did not dispute the adequacy of defendants' 
offer but nevertheless declined to respond. U.S. District Judge Michael M. Baylson ordered that 
the plaintiff would have 90 days to conduct initial discovery before filing her motion to have the 
case certified as a collective action. On March 23, 2010, defendants filed a motion to dismiss for 
lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(l), contending that, because 
Symczyk had effectively rejected their Rule 68 offer of judgment. On May 19,2010, the District 
Court "tentatively concluded" that defendants' Rule 68 offer mooted the collective action and 
that the action should be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Symczyk appealed. 
Question Presented: Whether a case becomes moot, and thus beyond the judicial power of 
Article III, when the lone plaintiff receives an offer from the defendants to satisfy all of the 
plaintiffs claims. 
Laura SYMCZYK, an individual, on behalf of herself and others similarly situated, 
Appellant 
v. 
GENESIS HEALTHCARE CORPORATION; ElderCare Resources Corporation d/b/a 
Genesis ElderCare. 
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 
Filed August 31, 2011 
[Excerpt: Some footnote and citations omitted.] 
SCIRICA, Circuit Judge 
Laura Symczyk sought relief under the Fair 
Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29U.S.C. §§ 
207 and 216(b), on behalf of herself and all 
others similarly situated. The District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
dismissed Symczyk's complaint for lack of 
subject matter jurisdiction after defendants 
Genesis HealthCare Corporation and 
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ElderCare Resources Corporation extended 
an offer of judgment under Fed.R.Civ.P. 68 
in full satisfaction of her alleged damages, 
fees, and costs. At issue in this case is 
whether a collective action brought under § 
216(b) of the FLSA becomes moot when, 
prior to moving for "conditional 
certification" and prior to any other plaintiff 
opting in to the suit, the putative 
representative receives a Rule 68 offer. We 
will reverse and remand. 
I. 
From April 2007 through December 2007, 
Symczyk was employed by defendants as a 
Registered Nurse at Pennypack Center in 
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. On December 4, 
2009, Symczyk initiated a collective action 
under 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) on behalf of 
herself and all similarly situated individuals, 
alleging defendants violated the FLSA when 
they implemented a policy subjecting the 
pay of certain employees to an automatic 
meal break deduction whether or not they 
performed compensable work during their 
breaks. On February 18, 2010, defendants 
filed an answer to Symczyk's complaint and 
served her with an offer of judgment under 
Fed.R.Civ.P. 68 in the amount of"$7,500.00 
in alleged unpaid wages, plus attorneys' 
fees, costs and expenses as determined by 
the COUli." Symczyk did not dispute the 
adequacy of defendants' offer but 
nevertheless declined to respond. 
The District Court-unaware of the offer of 
judgment-held a Fed.R.Civ.P. 16 
scheduling conference on March 8, 2010. 
Two days later, the court entered a 
scheduling order providing for "an initial 
ninety (90) day discovery period, at the 
close of which [Symczyk] will move for 
conditional certification under § 216(b) of 
the FLSA." Following the court's ruling on 
certification, the parties were to have "an 
additional six (6) month discovery period, to 
commence at the close of any Court-ordered 
opt-in window." 
On March 23, 2010, defendants filed a 
motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1), 
contending that, because Symczyk had 
effectively rejected their Rule 68 offer of 
judgment, see Fed.R.Civ.P. 68(a) (providing 
a plaintiff with 14 days to accept an offer), 
she "no longer ha[ d] a personal stake or 
legally cognizable interest in the outcome of 
this action, a prerequisite to this Court's 
subject matter jurisdiction under Atiicle III 
of the United States Constitution." Symczyk 
objected, citing defendants' strategic attempt 
to "pick off' the named plaintiff before the 
court could consider her "certification" 
motion. 
On May 19, 2010, the District Court 
"tentatively concluded" that defendants' 
Rule 68 offer mooted the collective action 
and that the action should be dismissed for 
lack of subject matter jurisdiction. In its 
memorandum, the court explained: 
Symczyk does not contend that other 
individuals have joined her collective 
action. Thus, this case, like each of 
the district court cases cited by 
Defendants, which concluded that a 
Rule 68 offer of judgment mooted 
the underlying FLSA collective 
action, involves a single named 
plaintiff. In addition, Symczyk does 
not contest Defendants' assertion 
that the 68 offer of judgment fully 
satisfied her claims .... 
The cOUli instructed Symczyk to file a brief 
in support of continued federal jurisdiction 
on her state-law claims and her motion for 
class certification under Fed.R.Civ.P. 23 by 
June 10, 20 I O. Symczyk did so but 
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conceded she did not believe the court 
possessed an independent basis for 
jurisdiction over her state-law claims in the 
event her FLSA claim was dismissed. The 
District Court declined to exercise 
supplemental jurisdiction over Symczyk's 
state-law claims in accordance with 28 
U.S.C. § 1367(c) and dismissed those claims 
without prejudice. The cOUli also dismissed 
Symczyk's FLSA claim with prejudice in 
accordance with its earlier memorandum. 
Symczyk timely appealed. 
II. 
A. 
Enacted in 1938, the FLSA, 29 U.S.c. § 201 
et seq., was designed "to aid the 
unprotected, unorganized and lowest paid of 
the nation's working population; that is, 
those employees who lacked sufficient 
bargaining power to secure for themselves a 
minimum subsistence wage." Brooklyn Sav. 
Bank v. O'Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 707 n. 18 
(1945). Under the "collective action" 
mechanism set forth in 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), 
an employee alleging an FLSA violation 
may bring an action on "behalf of himself .. 
. and other employees similarly situated," 
subject to the requirement that "[n]o 
employee shall be a party plaintiff to any 
such action unless he gives his consent in 
writing to become such a party and such 
consent is filed in the court in which such 
action is brought." 
Prior to 1947, the FLSA permitted an 
aggrieved employee to "designate an agent 
or representative to maintain such action for 
and in behalf of all employees similarly 
situated." Martino v. Mich. Window 
Cleaning Co., 327 U.S. 173, 175 n. 1 
(1946). But in response to "excessive 
litigation spawned by plaintiffs lacking a 
personal interest in the outcome," Congress 
amended the Act to eliminate 
"representative action by plaintiffs not 
themselves possessing claims." Hoffmann-
La Roche, Inc. v. Sperling, 493 U.S. 165, 
173 (1989). Further altering the collective 
action procedure in § 216(b), Congress 
inserted a requirement that similarly situated 
employees must affirmatively "opt in" to an 
ongoing FLSA suit by filing express, written 
consents in order to become party plaintiffs. 
In deciding whether a suit brought under § 
216(b) may move forward as a collective 
action, courts typically employ a two-tiered 
analysis. During the initial phase, the court 
makes a preliminary determination whether 
the employees enumerated in the complaint 
can be provisionally categorized as similarly 
situated to the named plaintiff. If the 
plaintiff carries her burden at this threshold 
stage, the cOUli will "conditionally certify" 
the collective action for the purposes of 
notice and pretrial discovery. In the absence 
of statutory guidance or appellate precedent 
on the proper definition of "similarly 
situated," a divergence of authority has 
emerged on the level of proof required at 
this stage. Some trial courts within our 
circuit have allowed a plaintiff to satisfy her 
burden simply by making a "substantial 
allegation" in her pleadings that she and the 
prospective party plaintiffs suffered from a 
single decision, plan or policy, but the 
majority of our circuit's trial cOUlis have 
required the plaintiff to make a "modest 
factual showing" that the proposed 
recipients of opt-in notices are similarly 
situated. 
Under the "modest factual showing" 
standard, a plaintiff must produce some 
evidence, "beyond pure speculation," of a 
factual nexus between the manner in which 
the employer's alleged policy affected her 
and the manner in which it affected other 
employees. We believe the "modest factual 
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showing" standard-which works III 
harmony with the opt-in requirement to 
cabin the potentially massive size of 
collective actions-best comports with 
congressional intent and with the Supreme 
Court's directive that a court "ascertain[ ] 
the contours of [a collective] action at the 
outset." 
After discovery, and with the benefit of "a 
much thicker record than it had at the notice 
stage," a court following this approach then 
makes a conclusive determination as to 
whether each plaintiff who has opted in to 
the collective action is in fact similarly 
situated to the named plaintiff. Morgan v. 
Family Dollar Stores, Inc., 551 F.3d 1233, 
1261 (11 th Cir.2008). "This second stage is 
less lenient, and the plaintiff bears a heavier 
burden." Should the plaintiff satisfy her 
burden at this stage, the case may proceed to 
trial as a collective action. 
Absent from the text of the FLSA is the 
concept of "class celiification." As the 
Eighth Circuit has noted, however, "[m]any 
courts and commentators ... have used the 
vernacular of the Rule 23 class action for 
simplification and ease of understanding 
when discussing representative cases 
brought pursuant to § 16(b) of the FLSA." 
Kelley v. Alamo, 964 F.2d 747, 748 n. 1 (8th 
Cir.1992). As a result, comis commonly 
refer to a plaintiff's satisfaction of her 
burden at the notice stage as resulting in 
"conditional celiification," see, e.g., R1Iehl v. 
Viacom, Inc., 500 F.3d 375, 389 n. 17 (3d 
Cir.2007), or "provisional certification," see, 
e.g., Nash v. CVS Caremark Corp., 683 
F.Supp.2d 195, 199 (D.R.I.201O). Similarly, 
the court's second-step analysis is 
traditionally triggered by a defendant's 
motion to "decertify the class" on the 
ground that its proposed members are not 
similarly situated. And, in the same fashion, 
a named plaintiff becomes a "class 
representative," see, e.g., id. at 966, his 
attorney becomes "class counsel," see, e.g., 
Harkins v. Riverboat Servs., Inc., 385 F.3d 
1099, 11 01 (7th Cir.2004), and similarly 
situated employees become "potential class 
members," see, e.g., In re Family Dollar 
FLSA Litig., 637 F.3d 508, 518 (4th 
Cir.2011). 
Despite this judicial gloss on § 216(b), "the 
'certification' we refer to here is only the 
district court's exercise of [its] discretionary 
power, upheld in Hoffmann-La Roche, to 
facilitate the sending of notice to potential 
class members," and "is neither necessary 
nor sufficient for the existence of a 
representative action under FLSA." Myers v. 
Hertz Corp., 624 F.3d 537, 555 n. 10 (2d 
Cir.2010); see also Morgan, 551 F.3d at 
1261 n. 40. Defendants here rely heavily on 
the superficiality of the similarities between 
the "certification" processes inherent in Rule 
23 class actions and § 216(b) collective 
actions in arguing Symczyk could not 
purport to "represent" the interests of 
similarly situated employees before anyone 
had opted in to the action. And, as noted, 
expedient adoption of Rule 23 terminology 
with no mooring in the statutory text of § 
216(b) may have injected a measure of 
confusion into the wider body of FLSA 
jurisprudence. Although "conditional 
certification" may not vest a § 216(b) 
"class" with the independent legal status that 
certification provides a Rule 23 class, see 
Trotter v. Klincar, 748 F .2d 1177, 1183 (7th 
Cir.1984), this realization does not control 
our mootness analysis in the manner 
suggested by defendants. Provision of notice 
does not transform an FLSA suit into a 
"representative action," but, as we will 
explain, its central place within the litigation 
scheme approved of by the Supreme Court 
in Hoffinann-La Roche necessarily shapes 
our approach to squaring Rule 68 and § 
216(b). 
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B. 
Article III of the United States Constitution 
limits the jurisdiction of the federal courts to 
"actual 'Cases' and 'Controversies.' " Sprint 
Commc 'ns Co. v. APCC Servs., Inc., 554 
U.S. 269, 298 (2008) (Roberts, C.J., 
dissenting). "When the issues presented in a 
case are no longer 'live' or the patties lack a 
legally cognizable interest in the outcome, 
the case becomes moot and the court no 
longer has subject matter jurisdiction." 
Weiss v. Regal Collections, 385 F.3d 337, 
340 (3d Cir.2004). "An offer of complete 
relief will generally moot the plaintiff's 
claim, as at that point the plaintiff retains no 
personal interest in the outcome of the 
litigation." Thus, whether or not the plaintiff 
accepts the offer, no justiciable controversy 
remains when a defendant tenders an offer 
of judgment under Rule 68 encompassing all 
the relief a plaintiff could potentially recover 
at trial. We have recognized, however, that 
conventional mootness principles do not fit 
neatly within the representative action 
paradigm. 
Rule 68 was designed "to encourage 
settlement and avoid litigation." Marek v. 
Chesny, 473 U.S. 1, 5, 105 S.Ct. 3012, 87 
L.Ed.2d 1 (1985). In the representative 
action arena, however, Rule 68 can be 
manipulated to frustrate rather than to serve 
these salutary ends. Exploring this deviation 
from Rule 68's purposes, the Supreme Court 
has noted: 
Requiring multiple plaintiffs to bring 
separate actions, which effectively 
could be 'picked off' by a 
defendant's tender of judgment 
before an affirmative ruling on class 
certification could be obtained, 
obviously would frustrate the 
objectives of class actions; moreover 
it would invite waste of judicial 
resources by stimulating successive 
suits brought by others claiming 
aggrievement. 
Deposit G1Iar. Nat'! Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 
326, 339 (1980). 
We addressed the tension between Rules 23 
and 68 in Weiss. There, the named plaintiff 
filed a federal class action complaint 
alleging violations of the Fair Debt 
Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692, 
and, prior to moving for class certification, 
received a Rule 68 offer of judgment in full 
satisfaction of the individual relief sought. 
The plaintiff rejected the offer, and the court 
granted the defendants' 12(b)(1) motion to 
dismiss the complaint on mootness grounds. 
On appeal, we explored the applicability of 
the "relation back" doctrine to a scenario in 
which the defendants' "tactic of picking off' 
lead plaintiffs with a Rule 68 offer ... may 
deprive a representative plaintiff the 
opportunity to timely bring a class 
certification motion, and also may deny the 
court a reasonable opportunity to rule on the 
motion." 385 F.3d at 347. Finding 
application of the doctrine necessary to 
vindicate the policy aims inherent in Rule 
23, we held that, "[a]bsent undue delay in 
filing a motion for class certification . . . 
where a defendant makes a Rule 68 offer to 
an individual claim that has the effect of 
mooting possible class relief asserted in the 
complaint, the appropriate course is to relate 
the certification motion back to the filing of 
the class complaint." As there had been no 
undue delay, we reversed and directed the 
district court to allow the plaintiff to file a 
class certification motion that would "relate 
back" to the filing of the complaint. 
In essence, the relation back doctrine allows 
a district COUlt to retain jurisdiction over a 
matter that would appear susceptible to 
dismissal on mootness grounds by viliue of 
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the expiration of a named plaintiff's 
individual claims. In Sosna v. lmva, 419 
U.S. 393, 401 (1975), the Supreme Court 
found federal court jurisdiction to adjudicate 
a live controversy between members of a 
certified Rule 23 class and a named 
defendant was not extinguished by the 
named plaintiff's claim becoming moot 
before the district court reached the merits 
of the case. Addressing the possibility that 
resolution of the controversy as to the 
named plaintiffs may occur "before the 
district comi can reasonably be expected to 
rule on a certification motion," the Court 
explained such certification "can be said to 
'relate back' to the filing of the complaint" 
when the issue might otherwise evade 
review. 
This equitable principle has evolved to 
account for calculated attempts by some 
defendants to short-circuit the class action 
process and to prevent a putative 
representative from reaching the 
certification stage. Certification vests a 
named plaintiff with a procedural right to act 
on behalf of the collective interests of the 
class that exists independent of his 
substantive claims. Although traditional 
mootness rules would ordinarily apply 
absent an affirmative ruling on class 
certification, "in certain circumstances, to 
give effect to the purposes of Rule 23, it is 
necessary to conceive of the named plaintiff 
as a part of an indivisible class and not 
merely a single adverse party even before 
the class certification question has been 
decided." Weiss, 385 F.3d at 347. The 
rationale underpinning the relation back 
doctrine serves to shield from dismissal on 
mootness grounds those claims vulnerable to 
being "picked off' by defendants attempting 
to forestall class formation. As the Seventh 
Circuit has explained: 
Normally, ... a class action must be 
certified as such in order for it to 
escape dismissal once the claims of 
the named plaintiff become moot. 
But the courts have recognized that 
an absolute requirement would 
prevent some otherwise justiciable 
claims from ever being subject to 
judicial review .... [J]ust as necessity 
required the development of the 
relation back doctrine in cases where 
the underlying factual situation 
naturally changes so rapidly that the 
courts cannot keep up, so necessity 
compels a similar result here. If the 
class action device is to work, the 
courts must have a reasonable 
opportunity to consider and decide a 
motion for celiification. If a tender 
made to the individual plaintiff while 
the motion for certification is 
pending could prevent the cOUlis 
from ever reaching the class action 
issues, that oPPOItunity is at the 
mercy of a defendant, even in cases 
where a class action would be most 
clearly appropriate. 
Susman v. Lincoln Am. CO/p., 587 F.2d 866, 
870 (7th Cir.1978). 
When a defendant's Rule 68 offer threatens 
to preempt the certification process, 
reconciling the conflicting imperatives of 
Rules 23 and 68 requires allocating 
sufficient time for the process to "play out." 
Weiss, 385 F.3d at 348. By invoking the 
relation back doctrine, a court preserves its 
authority to rule on a named plaintiff's 
attempt to represent a class by treating a 
Rule 23 motion as though it had been filed 
contemporaneously with the filing of the 
class complaint. Consequently, "the relation 
back' principle ensures that plaintiffs can 
reach the certification stage." Sandoz v. 
Cingular Wireless LLC, 553 F.3d 913, 919 
(5th Cir.2008). 
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III. 
A. 
The issue we must resolve on this appeal, 
then, is whether an FLSA collective action 
becomes moot when (1) the putative 
representative receives a Rule 68 offer in 
full satisfaction of her individual claim prior 
to moving for "conditional certification," 
and (2) no other potential plaintiff has opted 
in to the suit. Animating our decision in 
Weiss was the ability of defendants to use 
Rule 68 "to thwart the putative class action 
before the certification question could be 
decided." 385 F.3d at 349. Symczyk cites 
similar arguments in the § 216(b) context 
and discerns no material distinction between 
the two procedures insofar as this 
consideration is concerned. By contrast, 
defendants contend Weiss does not apply in 
the FLSA context because a putative § 
216(b) named plaintiff allegedly lacks the 
"representative" status that accords a Rule 
23 named plaintiff a personal stake in the 
matter sufficient to confer continued Alticle 
III jurisdiction once his individual claim has 
been mooted. We believe the considerations 
warranting application of the relation back 
doctrine to Rule 23 class actions also apply 
to § 216(b) collective actions. 
In support of their effort to confine Weiss to 
the class action setting, defendants rely 
principally on the dissimilar roles played by 
Rule 23 and § 216(b) named plaintiffs. As 
noted, the statutory form of aggregation 
provided for in the FLSA requires each 
party plaintiff affirmatively to opt in to a 
collective action by filing a consent form "in 
the court in which such action is brought." 
29 U.S.C. § 216(b). Whereas a member ofa 
celtified class in a Rule 23(b )(3) proceeding 
will be bound by judgment unless he has 
intentionally opted out of the suit, resolution 
of a § 216(b) collective action will not bind 
any similarly situated employee absent his 
express, written consent. Defendants argue a 
§ 216(b) named plaintiff whose individual 
claim has been mooted by a Rule 68 offer 
before anyone has opted in to the action 
cannot purport to possess a personal stake in 
representing the interests of others. 
Although defendants' logic has some 
surface appeal, reliance on the watershed 
event of an opt-in to trigger application of 
the special mootness rules that prevail in the 
representative action context incentivizes the 
undesirable strategic use of Rule 68 that 
prompted our holding in Weiss. As the 
Supreme Court explained in Hoffmann-La 
Roche, actualization of § 216(b)' s purposes 
often necessitates a district court's 
engagement at the notice phase of the 
proceeding. 493 U.S. at 170-71, 110 S.Ct. 
482. When a defendant's Rule 68 offer 
arrives before the court has had an 
opportunity to determine whether a named 
plaintiff has satisfied his burden at this 
threshold stage, and the COUlt has therefore 
refrained from overseeing the provision of 
notice to potential patty plaintiffs, it is not 
surprising to find the offer has also preceded 
the arrival of any consent forms from 
prospective opt-ins. If our mootness inquiry 
in the § 216(b) context were predicated 
inflexibly on whether any employee has 
opted in to an action at the moment a named 
plaintiff receives a Rule 68 offer, employers 
would have little difficulty preventing FLSA 
plaintiffs from attaining the "representative" 
status necessary to render an action 
justiciable notwithstanding the mooting of 
their individual claims. 
In Sandoz, the only court of appeals' 
decision to address the applicability of the 
relation back doctrine in the FLSA context, 
the Fifth Circuit concluded Congress did not 
intend, through the enactment of § 216(b), to 
create an "anomaly" by allowing employers 
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"to use Rule 68 as a sword, 'picking off' 
representative plaintiffs and avoiding ever 
having to face a collective action." 553 F.3d 
at 919. The court elaborated: 
[T]he differences between class 
actions and FLSA § 2 I 6(b) 
collective actions do not compel a 
different result regarding whether a 
certification motion can "relate 
back" to the filing of the complaint. 
The status of a case as being an "opt 
in" or "opt out" class action has no 
bearing on whether a defendant can 
unilaterally moot a plaintiff's case 
through a Rule 68 offer of judgment. 
Although the differences between 
Rule 23 class actions and FLSA § 
216(b) collective actions alter the 
conceptual mootness inquiry, each 
type of action would be rendered a 
nullity if defendants could simply 
moot the claims as soon as the 
representative plaintiff files suit. 
Thus, the policies behind applying 
the "relation back" principle for Rule 
23 class actions apply with equal 
force to FLSA § 216(b) collective 
actions. 
There, the defendant tendered its offer of 
judgment approximately one month after 
Sandoz had commenced her FLSA action, 
and Sandoz waited thirteen months after 
filing her complaint to move for 
"conditional certification." Borrowing 
language from Weiss and holding that 
"relation back is warranted only when the 
plaintiff files for certification without undue 
delay,'" the Fifth Circuit remanded for the 
district court to consider whether Sandoz 
had "timely sought certification of her 
collective action." .... 
B. 
Although the opt-in mechanism transforms 
the manner in which a named plaintiff 
acquires a personal stake in representing the 
interests of others, it does not present a 
compelling justification for limiting the 
relation back doctrine to the Rule 23 setting. 
The considerations that caution against 
allowing a defendant's use of Rule 68 to 
impede the advancement of a representative 
action are equally weighty in either context. 
Rule 23 permits plaintiffs "to pool claims 
which would be uneconomical to litigate 
individually." Phillips Petroleum Co. v. 
Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 809, 105 S.Ct. 2965, 
86 L.Ed.2d 628 (1985). Similarly, § 2l6(b) 
affords plaintiffs "the advantage of lower 
individual costs to vindicate rights by the 
pooling of resources." Hoffmann- La Roche, 
493 U.S. at 170. Rule 23 promotes 
"efficiency and economy of litigation." 
Crown, Cork & Seal Co. v. Parker, 462 U.S. 
345, 349 (1983). Similarly, "Congress' 
purpose in authorizing § 216(b) class actions 
was to avoid multiple lawsuits where 
numerous employees have allegedly been 
harmed by a claimed violation or violations 
of the FLSA by a particular employer." 
Prickett v. DeKalb Cnty., 349 F.3d 1294, 
1297 (11th Cir.2003). 
When Rule 68 morphs into a tool for the 
strategic cmiailment of representative 
actions, it facilitates an outcome antithetical 
to the purposes behind § 216(b). Symczyk's 
claim-like that of the plaintiff in Weiss-
was "acutely susceptible to mootness" while 
the action was in its early stages and the 
court had yet to determine whether to 
facilitate notice to prospective plaintiffs. 
When the certification process has yet to 
unfold, application of the relation back 
doctrine prevents defendants from using 
Rule 68 to "undercut the viability" of either' 
type of representative action. 
c. 
Additionally, the relation back doctrine 
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helps safeguard against the erosion of FLSA 
claims by operation of the Act's statute of 
limitations. To qualify for relief under the 
FLSA, a patty plaintiff must "commence" 
his cause of action before the statute of 
limitations applying to his individual claim 
has lapsed. Sperling v. Hoffinann-La Roche, 
Inc., 24 F.3d 463, 469 (3d Cir.1994). For a 
named plaintiff, the action commences on 
the date the complaint is filed. 29 U.S.c. § 
256(a). For an opt-in plaintiff, however, the 
action commences only upon filing of a 
written consent. Id. § 256(b). This represents 
a depatture from Rule 23, in which the filing 
of a complaint tolls the statute of limitations 
"as to all asserted members of the class" 
even if the putative class member is not 
cognizant of the suit's existence. Protracted 
disputes over the propriety of dismissal in 
light of Rule 68 offers may deprive potential 
opt-ins whose claims are in jeopardy of 
expiring of the opportunity to toll the 
limitations period-and preserve their 
entitlements to recovery-by filing consents 
within the prescribed window. 
D. 
In sum, we believe the relation back doctrine 
helps ensure the use of Rule 68 does not 
prevent a collective action fi'om playing out 
according to the directives of § 216(b) and 
the procedures authorized by the Supreme 
Court in Hoffmann-La Roche and further 
refined by courts applying this statute. 
Depriving the parties and the court of a 
reasonable opportunity to deliberate on the 
merits of collective action "conditional 
certification" frustrates the objectives served 
by § 216(b). Absent undue delay, when an 
FLSA plaintiff moves for "certification" of a 
collective action, the appropriate course-
particularly when a defendant makes a Rule 
68 offer to the plaintiff that would have the 
possible effect of mooting the claim for 
collective relief asserted under § 216(b )-is 
for the district court to relate the motion 
back to the filing of the initial complaint. 
Upon remand, should Symczyk move for 
"conditional certification," the court' shall 
consider whether such motion was made 
without undue delay, and, if it so finds, shall 
relate the motion back to December 4, 
2009-the date on which Symczyk filed her 
initial complaint. If (1) Symczyk may yet 
timely seek "conditional certification" of her 
collective action, (2) the COUlt permits the 
case to move forward as a collective action 
(by virtue of Symczyk's satisfaction of the 
"modest factual showing" standard), and (3) 
at least one other similarly situated 
employee opts in, then defendants' Rule 68 
offer of judgment would no longer fully 
satisfy the claims of everyone in the 
collective action, and the proffered rationale 
behind dismissing the complaint on 
jurisdictional grounds would no longer be 
applicable. If, however, the court finds 
Symczyk's motion to certify would be 
untimely, or otherwise denies the motion on 
its merits, then defendants' Rule 68 offer to 
Symczyk-in full satisfaction of her 
individual claim-would moot the action. 
IV. 
For the foregoing reasons, we will reverse 
the judgment of the District Court and 
remand for proceedings consistent with this 
OpInIOn. 
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"Supreme Court to Consider Whether Offer of Judgment to Named Plaintiff 
Moots FLSA Collection Action, Among Other Cases" 
Wolters K11lwer: Law and B1Isiness 
June 25, 2012 
The U.S. Supreme Court will decide 
whether an employer's offer of judgment to 
satisfy all claims of a lone named plaintiff in 
a putative collective action wage suit renders 
the case moot-and thus beyond the power 
of Article III courts. On June 25, the High 
COUli agreed to review Genesis Health Care 
Corp v Symczyk (Docket No 11-1059), a 
Third Circuit decision that revived a putative 
FLSA collective action that was dismissed 
below after the named plaintiff rejected the 
employer's offer of judgment satisfying her 
claim in full. 
In the underlying case, a registered nurse 
filed an FLSA suit claiming the employer 
had an unlawful policy of automatically 
deducting pay for meal breaks without 
regard to whether employees had actually 
taken their breaks. She sought to represent 
similarly situated employees who were also 
subjected to the auto-deduct policy but she 
had not yet moved to conditionally certify a 
class. In response to the complaint, the 
employer made an offer of judgment to 
satisfy the plaintiffs claims in full, as well 
as attorneys' fees and costs, but she rejected 
the settlement. The district court therefore 
dismissed the action as moot. 
Reversing, the Third Circuit ruled that a 
Rule 68 offer of judgment did not prevent an 
FLSA collective action from moving 
forward. The objectives of Sec. 216(b) of 
the Act would be frustrated if the parties and 
the court were deprived of a reasonable 
opportunity to deliberate on the merits of the 
collective action prior to conditional 
certification, the appeals court reasoned. The 
circuit court was concerned that defendants 
could wield Rule 68 as a sword to avoid 
further proceedings in collective actions. 
"When Rule 68 mOl'phs into a tool for the 
strategic cUliailment of representative 
actions, it facilitates an outcome antithetical 
to the purposes behind Sec. 216(b )," 
according to the appeals court. In petitioning 
the Supreme Court, however, the employer 
argued that "the willingness of lower courts 
to elevate ungrounded policy concerns over 
Article III principles warrants this Court's 
immediate attention." ... 
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"Employers Cannot 'Pick Off' Plaintiff 
to End Case Early" 
Pittsburg Post Gazette 
September 2, 2011 
Shannon P. Duffy 
When an employer is hit with a proposed 
collective action under the Fair Labor 
Standards Act, it cannot "pick off' the lead 
plaintiff by making an offer of judgment that 
moots the claim before any other workers 
have the chance to "opt in" to the case, a 
judicial panel has ruled. 
In Symczyk v. Genesis HealthCare Corp., 
three judges from the 3rd U.S. Circuit Court 
of Appeals unanimously held that 
defendants in collective actions cannot 
strategically use an offer of judgment under 
Rule 68 to end such a case at the outset. 
U.S. Circuit Court Judge Anthony 1. Scirica 
found that Rule 68 was designed to 
"encourage settlement and avoid litigation," 
but that "in the representative action arena, 
however, Rule 68 can be manipulated to 
frustrate rather than to serve these salutary 
ends." 
In the suit, lead plaintiff Laura Symczyk, a 
registered nurse in Philadelphia, claimed 
that Genesis HeaIthCare violated the FLSA 
when it implemented a policy that imposed 
an automatic meal break deduction 
regardless of whether workers had 
performed compensable work during their 
breaks. 
U.S. District Judge Michael M. Baylson 
ordered that the plaintiff would have 90 days 
to conduct initial discovery before filing her 
motion to have the case certified as a 
collective action. 
But defense lawyers moved quickly by filing 
an answer to the complaint and serving the 
plaintiff with a Rule 68 offer of judgment 
for $7,500-the full amount of Ms. 
Symczyk's alleged unpaid wages-plus 
attorney fees and costs to be "determined by 
the court." 
Ms. Symczyk objected, claiming the defense 
was making a strategic attempt to "pick off' 
the named plaintiff before the court could 
consider her certification motion. 
But Judge Baylson sided with the defense, 
saying that since no other workers had yet 
opted in, the Rule 68 offer had effectively 
mooted the case. 
Now the 3rd Circuit has ruled that Judge 
Baylson should have employed the "relation 
back" doctrine to allow the plaintiff to file a 
motion for certification of the collective 
action as if it had been filed at the time the 
suit began. 
"When Rule 68 mOl'phs into a tool for the 
strategic curtailment of representative 
actions, it facilitates an outcome antithetical 
to the purposes behind" the FLSA, Judge 
Scirica wrote in an opinion joined by Judges 
Thomas L. Ambro and Thomas I. Vanaskie. 
The relation back doctrine, Judge Scirica 
said, "allows a district comi to retain 
jurisdiction over a matter that would appear 
susceptible to dismissal on mootness 
grounds by viliue of the expiration of a 
named plaintiffs individual claims." 
As an "equitable principle," Scirica said, the 
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doctrine "has evolved to account for 
calculated attempts by some defendants to 
shOli-circuit the class action process and to 
prevent a putative representative from 
reaching the certification stage." 
The 3rd Circuit first applied the relation 
back doctrine in its 2004 decision in Weiss 
v. Regal Collections, holding that a Rule 68 
offer could not be used to end a class action. 
Now the 3rd Circuit has extended the 
holding in Weiss to encompass collective 
actions. 
Genesis HealthCare's lawyer, James N. 
Boudreau of Greenberg Traurig, argued that 
Weiss should be confined to the class action 
setting because there are key differences 
between class actions and collective actions. 
Unlike a member of a class, Mr. Boudreau 
argued, a named plaintiff in a collective 
action whose individual claim has been 
mooted by a Rule 68 offer before anyone 
else has opted in cannot purport to possess a 
personal stake in representing the interests 
of others. 
Judge Scirica disagreed, saying "reliance on 
the watershed event of an opt-in to trigger 
application of the special mootness lUles that 
prevail in the representative action context 
incentivizes the undesirable strategic use of 
Rule 68 that prompted our holding in 
Weiss." 
If courts employed an inflexible approach 
that required others to opt in to avoid the 
mootness that results from a Rule 68 offer, 
Judge Scirica said, "employers would have 
little difficulty preventing FLSA plaintiffs 
from attaining the 'representative' status 
necessary to render an action justiciable 
notwithstanding the mooting of their 
individual claims." 
Mr. Boudreau declined to comment on the 
lUling. 
Plaintiffs attorney Gary F. Lynch of Carlson 
Lynch in New Castle, Pa., could not be 
reached for comment. 
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